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ABSTRACT  
 
Haze pollution in Indonesia is a harmful environmental crisis in the Southeast Asian 
region. The haze pollution source is the fire used by people to clear and convert the land into 
agricultural purposes, mainly for palm oil plantation. The absence of comprehensive and robust 
law enforcement coupled with a failure to find the root problem of policy implementation, the 
social cost resulting from the action of economic agents will exceed the private cost and 
reducing the environmental quality. The current study is expected to contribute to theoretical 
and practical implications in strengthening regulatory enforcement policies.  
Reaching a better understanding of the enforcement of current regulatory approaches 
will provide a baseline for enhancing future policy choices for deterring and controlling the 
devastating effects of haze pollution. Using in-depth interviews with prominent actors who have 
direct and indirect involvement in the law enforcement process (i.e., Investigators, Prosecutors, 
Academic Experts, Witnesses in Court, NGO), Chapter 3 investigates how insufficient power 
and law enforcement capacity could hamper and deter policies for tackling haze pollution. The 
paper shows that a low probability of detection for environmental offenses, especially in South 
Sumatra, causes economic agents to incorrectly receive signals to not engage in unsustainable 
and illegal activities.  
More specifically, the paper finds that the absence of a special arrangement for the 
recovery of environmental costs and direct financial mechanisms for how fines would be 
utilized has been hampering law enforcement. Moreover, a limited budget and coordination, as 
part of the government’s capacity, provide a low probability of inspection and create a relatively 
high benefit for noncompliance, thus inducing the persistence of noncompliance. The 
establishment of a policy regime that is inclusive of fiscal provisions in mixed environmental 
management cannot be overlooked as a reference point for effective future solutions. The 
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potential to use taxes to regulate pollution and generate revenue for the government would 
improve capacity and enhance the enforcement of haze pollution deterrence in Indonesia.  
As mentioned earlier in this paper, enforcement is a method of securing compliance 
with the policy. Enforcement with greater certainty of deterrence, severity, and clarity of 
punishment is more likely to drive people to comply with the law because they fear legal 
sanctions. Chapter 4 will investigate the influence of the gravity of haze pollution as 
environmental harm on judicial sanctioning decisions in the case of land/forest fires. The paper 
adopts a novel approach to analyze judicial sanctioning decisions on criminal offenders based 
on different types of defendant occupations and burning site locations. By using a qualitative 
approach based on content analysis, the paper observes that the actual gravity of environmental 
harm does not consistently affect the pattern of judicial sentencing decisions. More specifically, 
the gravity of the judicial sanction imposed on the plantation company and its director and 
manager is less consistent with internalizing the harm caused by the offense. In contrast, in the 
case of the estate employee, laborer, and farmer/landowner, the judicial sanction is relatively 
consistent with the gravity of the environmental harm. Overall, judicial sanctioning decisions 
that are insensitive to the degree of the environmental harm that should be internalized underlie 
the persistent and devastating haze problem in Indonesia. 
Building the conceptual connection between the current policy implementation and the 
haze pollution, the first and second main chapter qualitatively investigate the deterrent effect of 
enforcement through expected liability and harm. To evaluate the mixed policy impact more 
systematically, Chapter 5 applied empirical estimation using a fixed-effect with including an 
interaction term as one of the independent variables. This chapter investigates the impact of 
fiscal capacity in the context of a mixed instrument on haze pollution. By considering fiscal 
capacity, this paper provides an empirical analysis whereby regulatory tax enforcement may 
coexist and may complement the environmental regulatory action. In the first finding, the paper 
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is observing evidence that an increase of 1 unit in fines as a share of GRDP imposed by the 
court statistically significant decrease in hotspot development. In the main finding, the paper 
also shows an increase of 1-unit Fines as a share of GRDP will reduce the Hotspot development 
as the Tax Enforcement on identified tax evasion as a share of GRDP increases by 1-unit. 
Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that the transition policy to a green tax revenue system is 
useful for addressing haze pollution. 
The research finding shows that prevailing obstacles of current single policy 
implementation, creating the expected liability faced by market-players is relatively low. Thus, 
based on that robust evidence, the optimal level of liability at the level of harm created by 
violations are the Fine reflecting the gravity of harm imposed by the regulator with sufficient 
budget capacity. Moreover, parallel with detection ability that expanded with the tax 
administrator capabilities in capturing the economic actor in the palm oil dan forestry sector.  
In practical implementation, research findings would be contributing to environmental 
management policy in general through strengthening policy implementation based on Law No. 
32/2009 and Law No. 39/2014 and establishing policy regimes that include fiscal instruments 
for environmental management in tackling the haze pollution. Moreover, the policy 
implementation will be strengthened by tax regulatory enforcement through shifting from 
regular taxes to environmental taxes, which more challenging to evade and generate revenue 
for the government in tackling the haze pollution in Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
Land/forest fires in Indonesia that creating dense haze pollution have become a severe 
and prominent problem that represents a regional environmental crisis. The problem’s 
devastating effects include transboundary haze pollution that spreads to the Southeast Asian 
Region: Malaysia, Singapore, the south of Thailand, and the Philippines. The term haze in this 
paper is used following the ASEAN Secretariat1, which defines it as smoke, dust, moisture, and 
vapor suspended in the air that impairs visibility. The World Bank estimates of the haze 
pollution total economic loss episode in 2015 exceed USD 16 billion and equal to about 1.8 
percent of Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product, double than the damage and losses from the 
2004 tsunami (World Bank, 2015). In 2015, the Center for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR) Researcher concluded that Indonesia’s emission from land/forest fire reaches 857.48 
million tons of CO2 (Forest News, 2016), one of conservation scientist calling the 2015 fires 
as the “biggest environmental crime of the twenty-first century.” 
Choking haze pollution also contributes to widespread respiratory infection and 
premature deaths (Hsu et al., 2016). Moreover, the haze in Indonesia had a substantial harmful 
effect on physical functioning for several months among prime-age women and older adults 
(Frankenberg et al., 2005). The health impacts of the haze include eye and skin irritation, 
respiratory morbidity, cardiovascular, burns, psychological effects, heat-induced illness, and 
 
1  ASEAN Secretariat Information on Fire and Haze data page <http://haze.asean.org/about-
us/information-on-fire-and-haze>, 07/08/2017 referred. 
2 
 
even death (Finlay et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015). The previous study using the GEOS-Chem 
Global Chemistry model together with health response function also suggests that the mortality 
in 2015 persistence dense haze event had been increased 2.7 times higher than in 2006 on 
population in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia (Koplitz et al., 2016). Moreover, Johnston et 
al. (2012) were estimating that 110,000 deaths every year in the Southeast Asia region could 
be attributed to haze pollution. 
 The land and forest fire that were creating severe haze pollution also has been 
threatening the biodiverse ecosystem and endangered species in Indonesia. The haze pollution 
from the peat fires was also impacting animals such as the orangutan, which shares 97 percent 
of their DNA with humans, through haze-induced respiratory problems as humans (Drake, 
2015). Moreover, orangutan habitat in the peat-swap forest was also profoundly threatened by 
the fire and palm oil plantation development and continuously adjust their behavior, such as 
through leave areas of active disturbance, return once it stops (Russon et al., 2015; Ancrenaz et 
al., 2010). The remaining habitats of orangutans are the range to 19 percent that overlaps with 
oil palm concessions (Meijaard et al., 2011). 
Previous studies have shown that human-made burning practices coupled with El Nino 
in Indonesia are a driving factor for haze pollution, which releases a significant quantity of 
carbon into the atmosphere (Hayasaka et al., 2014; Wooster et al., 2012). In general, notorious 
haze pollution sources are mainly aggressive human activities (Prasad et al., 2000; Langner et 
al., 2007). Moreover, in the agricultural process, people use burning to clear and convert the 
land for palm oil plantation (Anderson and Bowen, 2000; Heil and Goldammer, 2001; Jones, 
2006; Miettinen and Liew, 2010; Miettinen et al., 2012; Gaveau et al., 2014; Lestari et al., 
2014; Vadrevu et al., 2014). In 2014, Indonesia had the highest gross forest loss in Asia, and it 
has already lost, reaching 11.9 percent of tree loss in the last ten years (Hsu, 2016). Lee et al., 
(2014) also argued that in Sumatra Island, the palm oil development was responsible for 4,744 
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hectares mangrove, 383,528 hectares peat swamp forest, and 289,406 hectares. Thus, the 
clearing is in the peatland area, and the fire spread out of control, creating peatland burning 
(Usup et al., 2004; Heil, 2007; Hu et al., 2018). Indonesia is among the four countries: Rusia, 
Canada, and the United States of America that form 85 percent of the world’s peatland area 
(World Energy Council, 2013). Peat fires are producing a large amount of smoke and 
contributing to a massive fraction of pollutant emissions factors in the atmosphere, in the end, 
causing health problems (Page et al., 2002). Even a low intensity of peatland burning will 
produce significant emissions of pollution (Page et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2015).  
Those conditions coupled with El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) condition in 
1982 - 1983, 1997-1998, 2002, 2006, and 2011 create massive and aggregate severity fires in 
Indonesia (Hayasaka et al., 2014; Field et al., 2009; Langner and Siegert, 2009; Wooster et al., 
2012). The land clearing “fire season” from July to November, more pronounced in Kalimantan, 
were strongly determined by fuel moisture due to connecting the state of abnormality during 
ENSO fuelling ignitability during this period (Heil, 2007).  
ENSO was exhibiting two extremes: El Nino is referring to the period of warming of 
sea-surface across the east-central equatorial Pacific. During this phase, warm surface waters 
are generally concentrated in the western equatorial Pacific Region and shift to eastwards. As 
a result of the shift, Indonesia, as one of the countries in equatorial Pacific regions, experience 
a period of abnormally lowered rainfall. On the contrary, La Nina is referring to the periodical 
cooling of sea-surface across the east-central equatorial Pacific. As a consequence, Indonesia 
will experience a period of abnormally high rainfall due to the rain confined in the extreme 
western part of the equatorial Pacific Basin (Heil, 2007) 
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Figure 1.1 provides the hotspot2 produced in Indonesia based on Moderate Resolution 
Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) data3 from NASA during haze periods and plotting using 
ArcGIS Online maintained by the Environmental Systems Research Institute (Esri). Tabel 1.1 
is also reported a significant haze event in Indonesia.  
 
FIGURE 1.1 Hotspot Area in Indonesia (2001–2016) 
 
Source: FIRMS NASA MODIS Data and Author Calculation using ArcGIS Online by Esri 
 
The Indonesian Government has enacted “command and control” regulation over the 
past several years to address land/forest fires that create severe haze pollution in the region. 
However, the current responses to land/forest fires are not sufficiently comprehensive to 
address the risk of severe haze episodes in the future (Mudiyarso et al., 2004). Moreover, even 
under strict policies, the persistent problem of haze pollution remains due to a lack of 
enforcement with the appropriate regulator to address the problem (Varkkey, 2016).  
 
2 Hotspot is a term used to describe a location that releases high temperatures (radiation) captured by a 
thermal detector from satellites and sent to a receiving station. NASA data page 
<https://earthdata.nasa.gov/faq>, 08/25/2017 referred. 
3 The MODIS instrument is onboard NASA’s Earth Observing System (EOS) Terra (EOS AM) and 
Aqua (EOS PM) satellites. The MODIS instrument acquires data continuously providing global 
coverage every 1-2 days. Earth Data NASA page <https://earthdata.nasa.gov/faq>, 12/01/2017 referred.  
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TABEL 1.1 Major Haze Episodes Corresponding Fire Events 
 
4 PM10 is the fraction of total airborne particles smaller than 10 µm diameter. This fraction can be inhaled 
through the larynx and that can penetrate into the thoracic region. These particles are therefore are also 
termed ‘inhalable’ or ‘throracic’ (Heil, 2007) 
5 Based on Indonesia Metrological Climatological and Geophysical Agency. 
Year 
Burning Area  
(Province)  
Impact 
1980 South Kalimantan  4,850 hectares planted forest area. 
1982 South Sumatra, Riau and 
part of Kalimantan 
Island 
Land/forest fire is creating severe haze 
pollution in the region. Sixty flights were 
canceled in South Sumatra Airport during 5-12 
September 1982. 
1983 East Kalimantan  The burning impact includes forest area, 
reforestation, protected forest, and 2,000 ha 
natural reserves 400 km from Samarinda. 
1987 East Kalimantan Forest area in Soeharto hill. The firefighting 
was using a 48-ton air bombing in 4 sorties. 
1990 Riau 2,500 Ha reforestation area with loss reached 
Rp1,5 billion. 
1993 South Kalimantan  7,000 hectares out of 13,000 hectares of 
reforestation areas were burned. 
1997 East Kalimantan 136,244 hectares land/forest burned area with 
Rp619.7 billion loss from April – December 
1997. The fire is creating transboundary haze 
pollution to Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
1998 Most of Provincial Area 
in Kalimantan Island 
Transboundary haze pollution to Peninsular 
Malaysia. The total burning area is 5.2 million 
ha 
2002 South Kalimantan and 
West Kalimantan 
In Palangkaraya, the PM104 in September and 
October 790 and 630 µg/m3 (above 400 µg/m3 
will be at the dangerous5 level). In Pontianak, 
the PM10 concentration around 300 µg/m3. Total 
burning area 1.2 to 1.5 million hectares.  
2003 Riau  Transboundary haze pollution affected the West 
Coast Peninsula of Malaysia and reached 
Thailand. The fire activity has been burning in 
a total of 0.1 to 0.3 million hectares.  
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Source: World Bank Report; Kompas (30/08/2016); Heil (2007); MoEF databank 
 
Barde and Godard (2012) have been find that the shortcoming of the command and 
control approach to environmental protection due to being costly for the enforcement level 
regulations (not efficient) and lack of incentive to reconcile private interest and collective 
preferences. Other researchers also have been widely criticized the use of command and control 
policy, for example, in the permit and licensing; equalization marginal pollution cost (see for 
instance: Hahn and Hester, 1989; Faure and Ubachs, 2003; Tietenberg, 2000; Faure and 
Weishar, 2012). As a result, in recent years, the versatile and flexible policy (hence often 
referred to as market-based) has been preferable by policy analysts as environmental policy. 
TABEL 1.1 Major Haze Episodes Corresponding Fire Events (continued) 
Year 
Burning Area  
(Province)  
Impact 
2005 Most of Provincial Area 
in Sumatra Island  
Transboundary haze pollution affects Northern 
Peninsula Malaysia, and Singapore also 
reached southern Thailand.  Total burning area 
0.2 to 0.5 million hectares.   
2006 Most of Provincial Area 
in Sumatra Island and 
Kalimantan Island 
In October 2006, haze reached Singapore, 
Brunei, and Malaysia.  A total burning area in 
Sumatra 0.6 to 1.1 million ha and in Kalimantan 
0.8 to 1.6 million hectares. 
2007 Riau, South Sumatra  35 percent of hotspot detected in Riau Province. 
2011-2014 The Primary source of 
Hotspot Riau, South 
Sumatra, West 
Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, East 
Kalimantan 
Total hotspot during 2011-2014 is 114,040, 
with 49,987 hectare burned areas.  
2015 Jambi, South Sumatra, 
Riau, West Kalimantan, 
South Kalimantan, 
Central Kalimantan, and 
East Kalimantan  
Total loss estimation (loss in agriculture, 
environmental until firefighting cost) on the 
burning is USD 16,124 million. The burning 
area reaches 2.6 million hectares.  
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1.2 INDUSTRIAL ARRANGEMENT 
Palm oil is often named as liquid gold and as a way to elevate economic development 
parallel with the issue of transformation of forest assets to agriculture.  However, the unbalance 
development strategy is sacrificing the environment for the sake of economic growth (Koh and 
Wilcove, 2008). Moreover, the root causes of environmental degradation are in development 
villain paradigm (Mittelman, 1998). The industry can also bring a negative impact on 
indigenous people who have traditional culture and livelihoods.  
The palm oil sector in Indonesia, as driven factors of research background, has been a 
significant engine of economic development impact and source income (Feintrenie et al., 2010).  
However, the destruction of the environment, including the conversion and opening of 
forestland, especially for palm oil by the economic actor were parallel in producing 
developmental miracle (Chang and Rajan, 2001; Sumiani et al., 2007). Economic motivation 
became the link between fire and palm oil plantation, creating persistence of the haze pollution 
in Indonesia (Friend of the Earth et al., 2008; Greenpeace, 2016). Please refer to Figure 1.2 and 
Figure 1.3 for detailed development. 
The plantation product is the most significant export product and provides 3.57 percent 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Please refer to Table 1.2. Additionally, the estimated 
contribution of the palm oil sector in tax revenue for the year 2015 is reaching Rp1.21 billion. 
Indonesia has become the largest palm oil producer, accounting for over 50 percent of global 
production by 2012 (Oxfam, 2014). However, the cultivation and production have a severe 
negative impact related to environmental sustainability, primarily due to the forest and 
peatlands clearing (Shiel et al., 2009). Sumatra lost two-thirds of its primary forest cover 
between 1990 – 2010 (Margono et al., 2012), and Kalimantan lost nearly 5 million hectares 
(Abood et al., 2015).  
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FIGURE 1.2 Plantation Area (1979–2016) 
 
Source: Directorate General of Estate Crops  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.3 Fresh Fruit Branches Production (1979–2016) 
 
Source: Directorate General of Estate Crops  
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TABLE 1.2 Contribution of the Plantation Sector to GDP and Total Tax Revenue 
 
Percentage Plantation to  
 GDP Nominal  
Percentage Tax Revenue from Palm 
Oil Plantation to Total Tax 
Revenue 
2006 1.90 N/A 
2007 2.07 0.89 
2008 2.14 N/A 
2009 2.00 1.27 
2010 1.93 1.24 
2011 3.87 1.48 
2012 3.75 1.34 
2013 3.75 1.14 
2014 3.77 1.01 
2015 3.57 1.21 
Source: Statistically Yearbook, BPS; Unpublished Tax Data and Author Calculation  
The private sector has developed several certification initiatives over several years to 
contributing to the sustainable environmental industry. The palm oil industry, e.g., critical 
retailers and end-user of palm oil, also producer, together with nongovernmental organization 
in 2001, establish a private-sector arrangements model, a Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO). The initiative aims to promote the production and use sustainable palm oil for people, 
planet, and prosperity. RSPO is a non-profit industry-led in the palm oil sector with eight 
principles and criteria. Additionally, RSPO is the most prominent private standard-setting body 
in RSPO certified sustainable oil palm products due to incorporate a third-party system 
verification (Brandi et al., 2015). The RSPO certification is an assurance to the customer that 
the palm oil industry production is sustainable.  
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In the RSPO NEXT6 principle and criteria using fire for land clearing in new planting 
or replanting are not permitted, excepts has been approved appropriate authorities (NFR 1.1-
RSPO). Additionally, the PT1.1 RSPO principle forbids the plantation development on peatland 
regardless of depth after 16 November 2015. Despite its comprehensiveness in promoting 
environmental sustainability, the RSPO has received comments regarding the stringency of 
principles and criteria also the ability to enforce economic agent compliance on the ground 
(Pacheco et al., 2017). For example, the noncompliance of the company to RSPO HCV (High 
Conservation Value) with no deforestation and no peatland criteria.  
According to the RSPO Certification System (RSPO, 2016), the estate is only certified 
if the company is not involved in converting forest elsewhere. However, research by 
Greenpeace (2007, 2015) could prove that the major group of RSPO members clearing tropical 
forests via subsidiaries in Indonesia. Furthermore, local nongovernmental organization 
Milieudefensie conducted research that showed “three Wilmar subsidiaries in Sambas 
commenced land clearing in customary right land without prior consultation and due to land 
acquisition process and affected to communities” (Milieudefensie et al., 2007). Despite the 
noncompliance to the principle of RSPO, all the company is remaining RSPO certified. 
Furthermore, despite after a decade of existence, the RSPO is not necessarily useful in 
certified the palm oil industry, and only a small number of growers becoming members of 
RSPO (Arcus, 2015). As a result, even though the RSPO are adopted new standards of 
prohibiting members from land clearing forest for palm oil plantation in 2018 failed to be 
promoting sustainable palm oil plantation.  Please refer to Table 1.3 for the RSPO coverage 
compare to the registered taxpayer in the palm oil business sectors.   
 
6 A voluntary effort that engages with RSPO member companies that have met the current requirements 
and guidance of the RSPO Principles and Criteria and in addition, through their voluntary policies and 
actions have exceeded them. RSPO NEXT component contained following categories: (1) No 
Deforestation, (2) No Fire, (3) No Planting on Peat, (4) Respect for Human Rights and Transparency.  
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TABLE 1.3 Comparison of Member of RSPO and Taxpayer in Palm Oil Plantation 
Years 
Number of RSPO Member - 
Plantation Grower 
Number of Taxpayer in Palm Oil 
Plantation  
2006  8   3,179  
2007  24   3,924  
2008  69   4,987  
2009  71   9,504  
2010  71   11,052  
2011  74   16,669  
2012  91   25,396  
2013  98   33,695  
2014  100   51,697  
2015  107   69,185  
 
Source: RSPO Website and Unpublished Tax Database   
 
1.3 ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATION (ASEAN) AGREEMENT  
Regional concern related to transboundary haze pollution has been becoming a 
framework for ASEAN countries in establishing ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution (AATHP) on 10 June 2002 and had been entered into force on 25 November 2003. 
The AATHP is the first regional arrangement that regulating member states in the ASEAN to 
work collectively address transboundary haze pollution resulting from land and forest fires. The 
Agreement has also been considered as a role model for the tackling of transboundary issues. 
Indonesia Government ratified the AATHP and approved by Indonesia House of Representative 
(DPR) through Law No. 26/2014 on 16 September 2014. Moreover, the instruments were 
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deposited in ASEAN Secretariat in January 2015 as a result of Indonesia becoming the final 
country in the region to join the AATHP7.  
The Agreement enacted a zero burning policy and embraced the implementation of 
domestic anti burning laws. Article 2 on the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution define the objective are: 
Prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution as a result of land and/or forest 
fires, which should be mitigated through concerted national efforts and intensified 
regional and international cooperation. This should be pursued in the overall 
context of sustainable development and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
 
The AATHP Article 3 (1) in the guiding principles has adopted a legal framework of 
states responsibility as follows: 
 The parties have […….], the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to environment and harm to human health of other states or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.  
 
The principle, as articulated in Article 3 (1), is conceptually based on the Charter of 
the United Nations and the core of international environmental law (Nurhidayah, 2013). The 
parties have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources on their territory, but the states 
also responsible for ensuring the economic activities not causing harm and damage to the 
environment beyond the limits of states border (Heilmann, 2015).   
 
7  http://haze.asean.org/2015/04/indonesia-deposits-instrument-of-ratification-of-the-asean-agreement-
on-transboundary-haze-pollution/, 22/11/2019 referred. 
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On the other hand, the Agreement also has several drawbacks in the area of 
enforcement and lack of incentives (please refer to Tan, 2015; Laode, 2015; Tacconi, 2007).  
ASEAN should play a significant role in enforcing policies and develop a liability regime in 
environmental law (Nurhidayah et al., 2015). Mushkat (2004) also argues that the agreement 
and integration initiatives remain elusive due to the absence of a rule-based system.  Moreover, 
the existence of non-interference of state-based governance deflects regional and global 
agendas, even those that have been initially agreed upon (Nesadurai, 2016).  Thus, taking the 
persistence of haze pollution in the region, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution has failed as a regional governance tool (Heilmann, 2015).  
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
The paper draws on the growing body of literature in deterrent based enforcement 
studies to resolve the queries which originated from necessity to enforce the comprehensive 
regulation in environmental management due to more than a decade haze pollution in Indonesia. 
Deterrence is a choice in which would-be offenders balance the benefits and cost of crime (Apel 
and Nagin, 2015). Moreover, the optimal level of deterrence may be reached when the expected 
liability faced by a market player is set at the level of the environmental harm created by the 
violation, the level that motivates regulator to act in the desirable manner (Oded, 2013). 
However, a single policy is not sufficiently flexible and resilient in addressing all environmental 
problems in all contexts (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999).  
Theoretical research has closely examined related to the policy influence of deterrent 
based enforcement. The Government will tend to choose market mechanisms instead of 
command and control regulation (Faure and Weishaar, 2012). However, due to the scarcity of 
previous studies in which considering taxation’s role in internalizing harm create from 
environmental violation, the analysis of the practical implementation of the mixed policy still 
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has plenty of room for improvement. The necessity for an improved regulatory framework has 
led scholars to develop an approach and must beyond a single policy in deterrence-based 
enforcement to induce regulatory compliance. According to Hawke (2002) and OECD (1989), 
the economic policy instrument as complementary to traditional regulatory control has the 
ability to providing flexibility and given grip the authorities will influence the actor behavior 
through:  
1. Raise revenue for financing environmental measures,  
2. Provide incentives to implement the associated regulation better, 
3. Have a possible impact on technical innovation. 
Tax as a market-based economic policy would be placing a direct cost on environmental 
damage; the polluter should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution according to the extent 
of either damage done to society or the exceeding of an acceptable level (OECD, 1975). A 
negative externality occurs when the prices to the customer of a good or service is less than the 
cost of that good or service to society (Pigou, 1932). 
Based on this context and given the industrial background, this research will be 
investigating a deterrent based using mixed policy to influence regulatory compliance in the 
case of haze pollution in Indonesia. Moreover, the main research question is as follows: What 
is the optimal mix of regulatory and market-based policies for pollution control that strengthen 
expected liability in deterring the Indonesia haze pollution case?  
The term optimal is a consideration to encapsulate of effectiveness and efficiency in 
improving environmental performance (Gunningham and Garbosky, 1998).  By effectiveness 
is meant the degree to which determined environmental objective is achieved using the specific 
policy. Efficiency is meant the static aspect and the dynamic ones (Opschoor and Tunner, 
1994).  Answering this question, the paper will be divided into three sub-questions that 
addressed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
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First, to enhance the expected liability in internalizing harm, it is necessary to 
investigate the deterrent effect from the existing policy in terms of tackling the haze pollution. 
One of the significant limitations of the previous study is its failure to understand policy 
intervention related to enforcement measures by a law enforcement officer. Carmenta et al. 
(2017), using Q factor, find that effective fire management intervention through employ hard 
measures against the large actor, including sanction, enforcement, and standards directed at 
large scale actors. However, the paper still has a limited study on policy intervention primarily 
related to enforcement deterrent effect. This study will extend previous investigations by 
analyzing the regulator power and enforcement capacity through law enforcement actor 
perceptions. Actor perspective in law enforcement is critical in improving the policy design and 
on-the-ground implementation (Game et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2016). The actor insights will 
provide a valuable part of the puzzle in helping to zoom in on the primary problem (Lo et al., 
2006). Sub-question 1: How do insufficient power and law enforcement capacity hamper 
deterrence in South Sumatra and Riau Province? 
In the next part, the paper will further investigate the dimension of harm that has been 
tackling by the current enforcement policy using judicial decisions in relation to criminal 
enforcement. Enforcement of criminal offenses is seen as a last resort applied when the harm 
to society or the benefit to the offender is significant, and the probability of detection is low. 
The critical criminal environmental policy is the prevention of unjustifiable harm, given that 
the expected sanction is equal to the harm caused by the offender and that loss of wealth will 
provide adequate deterrence (Cohen, 1992; Polinsky and Shavel, 1994; Garoupa, 2001). 
Although the limited body of theoretical research has developed exciting insight into judicial 
sanctioning decisions regarding environmental criminal violations, no study has explicitly 
investigated and provided a detailed analysis of defendants’ occupation and offense locations. 
Although this factor should not matter in principle, the analysis of Billiet and Rousseau (2011) 
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showed that there are marked differences in sanctioning decisions across judicial districts. 
Referring to a previous study on inadequate law enforcement in discussing the background of 
haze pollution in Indonesia, the chapter thus addresses the following question: Are variations 
in judicial sanctioning decisions with respect to defendants and burning site locations 
influenced by the gravity of environmental harm in the land/forest fire case?  
Finally, based on the understandings existing policy on haze pollution control, sub-
question 3 will seeks evidence mixed policy as pollution control in Indonesia. Environmental 
policy interactions with the fiscal system fundamentally influence the cost-effectiveness of 
addressing climate change and meeting other social objectives (Goulder, 2013). By considering 
fiscal capacity, this chapter will provide an empirical analysis whereby mixed regulatory policy 
between tax enforcement and the environmental policy may coexist and may complement 
regulatory action. This paper extends the Lim (2016) model while considering that of Besley et 
al. (2013), who found that including tax policy as a fiscal capacity revenue source increased 
regulatory action capacity. There are no previous studies on environmental policies in which 
regulatory action considers taxation’s role in enhancing fiscal capacity in addressing pollution. 
This paper contributes to the field by analyzing the dependent variable using hotspots as an 
indicator of active fire as a source of emissions that cause ozone and particulate matter (PM) 
pollution. As a result, the set of emission sources is broader than those in most previous studies. 
Sub-question 3: What is the impact of fiscal capacity on mixed regulatory action regarding 
hotspot development, which creates haze pollution in Sumatra and Kalimantan? 
By answering this question, this paper is expected to contribute to enhancing the study 
on mixed enforcement policy. Furthermore, the paper intends to suggest credible policy 
recommendations, which may have the potential for being used in implementing comprehensive 
environmental management in tackling the haze pollution in Indonesia.  
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1.5 ORGANIZATIONS OF THE THESIS 
The paper has six chapters; in chapter one, the paper will present general thesis 
information on the background and objective of the studies. The theoretical framework of 
deterrence-based enforcement also mixed policy would be discussed in chapter two. Past 
studies that had been carried out in attempts to enforce the haze pollution are also presented. 
Based on this chapter, a research framework applied to the three main chapters. The overall 
data structure of the main chapters is presented in Table 1.4. 
TABLE 1.4 Structure of the Main Chapters 
Chapter 
Research 
Question 
Data Methodology 
    
Chapter 3 Sub-question 1 Interview data transcript from 
12 respondent (five Law 
Enforcement Office, one 
Expert Witness, and three 
NGO) 
In-depth interviewed 
analysis with an open-
ended question 
Chapter 4 Sub-question 2 120 final court case within 
period 2009-2016 from 
Supreme Court Database 
Content analysis 
Chapter 5 Sub-question 3 Panel data from 14 provinces 
(2012 – 2016), Supreme 
Court Data, National Budget 
Data, Directorate General of 
Taxes and Indonesia Statistic 
Bureau 
Panel data - Fixed Effect 
 
Chapter three will investigate the obstacle in policy implementation in tackling haze 
pollution that will hamper perceived deterrence from law enforcement actor perceptions. The 
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analysis will be employed in an in-depth interviewed analysis with open-ended question funnel 
for detailed and subjective understanding in terms of detecting possible risk deterrence effects. 
The interview in Bahasa (Indonesia Formal Language) started with a prominent representative 
who has direct involvement in the law enforcement process in Riau and South Sumatra 
Province. Chapter four will be understanding the dimension of judicial decisions about criminal 
enforcement and environmental harm, adopting a qualitative approach. The paper conducted a 
document analysis using a content analysis methodology. The data were collected from a court 
case directory available online from the Indonesia Supreme Court and developed a documented 
protocol prepared through content analysis using QRS Nvivo software. Focusing on the 
expected liability on the land/forest fires, which create substantial emission in the southeast 
Asian region, Chapter five primarily aims to investigate the effect of Indonesia’s regulatory 
enforcement capacity. This study was conducted using various data on regulatory actions. The 
period of this study is 2012–2016. The data will be analyzed using panel data, similar to the 
approach employed by Lim (2016). In chapter six, the paper concludes the study and draw some 
policy recommendation to tackle haze pollution.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed;  
too severe seldom executed  
(Franklin, 1756) 
 
 
2.1  INDONESIA POLICY IN TACKLING HAZE POLLUTION 
The worst haze pollution has been impacting the Indonesian region, especially in the 
Sumatra and Kalimantan Islands, for more than twenty years. However, despite attempts to 
tackle haze pollution, the policy has failed to prevent the persistent source of this problem, 
which is land/forest fires. As a result, Indonesia continues to lose the war on haze pollution. 
Management or reduction of land/forest fires would go a long way towards eliminating the haze 
pollution that also significantly impacts the ASEAN Region. Indonesian government policy 
measures that have been taken will be discussed in the next subsection.  
2.1.1 Land and Forest Fires Management  
The Indonesian government realizes that land/forest fires are multidimensional 
problems that have attracted global attention in the past twenty years. The forces causing the 
land/forest fires are outpacing the policy effort to mitigate the disaster. Indonesia has adopted 
a zero-burning policy in Law No. 32/20098 of Environmental Protection and Management as 
an umbrella policy on environmental protection in Indonesia. Article 69 (1) h stated the 
following: 
Every person is prohibited from conducting burning activities in open land for 
plantation. 
 
8 Undang-Undang No. 32 Tahun 2009 tentang Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup 
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In parallel with combating land/forest fires that cause haze pollution, Indonesia is 
simultaneously developing the palm oil and forestry business sector as a key driver of economic 
growth. Thus, the role of plantation policy in responding to land/forest fire events will be 
significant. Law No. 18/2008, which was amended by Law No. 39/20149 on Plantations, stated 
that the environment is also becoming one of the focuses of the plantation business sector, as 
in Article 62 and Article 67 as follows:  
Article 62 (1): Plantation Development is carried out on an ongoing basis with due 
regard to (a) [the] economy, (b) sociocultural [issues], and (c) ecology.  
Article 67 (1): Every Economic Agent in the Plantation Business is obliged to 
maintain the preservation of environmental functions. 
Regarding the burning restriction, the policy is stated in Article 56 as follows:  
(1) Every Economic Agent in the Plantation Business is prohibited from opening 
and cultivating land by burning. 
(2) Every Economic Agent in the Plantation Business is obliged to have a system, 
facility, and infrastructure for controlling land and plantation fires. 
(3) [……..] 
Moreover, this policy regulates the environmental sustainability requirement to prevent future 
damage to daily plantation operations. Article 68 states the following: 
After obtaining a plantation business permit […….], Plantation Business Actors 
must implement: 
(1) environmental impacts analysis or environmental management and 
monitoring; 
(2) environmental risk analysis; and 
(3) environmental monitoring. 
 
9 Undang-Undang No. 39 Tahun 2014 tentang Perkebunan.  
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The plantation policy design has been comprehensively designed to prevent a negative impact 
on the environment or social aspects of palm oil plantations in Indonesia. The policy is a 
targeted economic agent in the plantation and forestry business sector, including smallholders 
and shifting cultivators (Haze Action Online, 2016). 
Peat fires have been identified as the most significant driver of major haze pollution 
and are a source of greenhouse emissions (Greenpeace, 2018; Shiel et al., 2009). The 
Indonesian government has also designed and enacted policy mitigation measures protecting 
the peatland area in Indonesia because peat fires are more impactful in the case land/forest fires. 
Article 9 in Presidential Decree No. 32/199010 mandate the protection as follows: 
The protection of the peatlands is intended to control the hydrology of the region, 
which acts as a water repellent and flood prevention, as well as to protect the 
unique ecosystem of the area. 
The preventive action policy for peatland also has been extended and enhanced in 
Government Regulation No. 71/2014, which has been amended with Government Regulation 
No. 57/201611 on Peatland Ecosystem Protection and Management. In Article 26, the protection 
of the peatland area is as follows: 
Every person is prohibited [from]: (a) clearing land in the Protected Peat 
Ecosystem; (b) making drainage channels resulting in Peat becoming dry; (c) 
burning Peatlands; (d) carrying out other activities that result in exceeding the 
standard criteria for damage to the Peat ecosystem [……]. 
The enactment of the policy on the peatland establish a more transparent legal basis for the 
protection of peat ecosystem and prevent the severe land and forest fire in Indonesia.   
 
10 Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 32 Tahun 1990 tentang Pengelolaan Kawasan Lindung. 
11 Peraturan Pemerintah Republik No. 57 Tahun 2016 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah 
No. 71 Tahun 2014 tentang Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Ekosistem Gambut.  
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In the institutional policy arrangement, the Indonesian government issued a 
Comprehensive Plan of Action in Dealing with Forest Fires through Presidential Decree to 
strengthen the collaboration between the national and provincial governments and quicken 
mitigation acts. Presidential Instruction No. 16/2011, which was an amended by Presidential 
Instruction No. 11/201512 , instructed governmental agencies, the military, and Indonesian 
national policy to work with regional governments to fight land and forest fires. The plan of 
action was brought together by more than seventeen ministries, agencies, and high-ranking 
officials to address the issue according to their respective areas and authority. The ministers 
that joined the task force include the following: Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and 
Security; Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs; Coordinator Minister for Human 
Development and Culture; Minister of Environment and Forestry; Minister of Agriculture: 
Minister of Health; Minister of Education and Culture; Minister of Religion; Minister of 
Research, Technology and Higher Education; Minister of Social Affairs; Minister of 
Communication and Information; Minister of State-Owned Enterprises; Minister of Home 
Affairs; Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/Head of Agency National Land; and 
Minister of Public Works and Public Housing. Moreover, the agency includes Head of the 
National Disaster Management Agency and Head of the Meteorology, Climatology, and 
Geophysics Agency. Moreover, the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, Commander 
of the Indonesian National Army and Head of the Indonesian National Police and the Governor 
are joining the force among the high-ranking officials. 
In addition to the coordination and collaboration of governmental agencies, prevention 
and control policy are the most important component in reaffirming Indonesia’s policy goal of 
preventing the yearly hotspots. Early warning systems and detection activities constitute the 
 
12 Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 16/2011 sebagaimana diubah dengan Instruksi Presiden 
Republik Indonesia No. 11/2015 tentang Pengendalian Kebakaran Hutan dan Lahan.  
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front lines of the program for land and forest fire control measures. In early 1984, a manual13 
bottom-up approach was used by Indonesia to monitor fire events and the size of burned areas. 
Moreover, from 1997 to 2010, Indonesia undertook centralized monitoring of land and forest 
fires, with cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency using NOAA14 and 
Terra Aqua15 (MODIS) Satellites. Thereafter, with advances in technologies capabilities, the 
hotspot early warning system in Indonesia has been using a combination of Landsat16 satellite 
images, data from NOAA, and Terra Aqua Satellites and considers field data derived from the 
Regional Government Office (MoEF, 2018).  
The policy in hotspot early response, as the next policy measure, is to comprehensively 
check the areas identified as hotspots. The early response for disaster emergency response in 
Indonesia (including forest and land fires), which is under the Indonesia National Board for 
Disaster Management (BNPB) 17 , was launched in 2009 by the Coordinating Ministry of 
People’s Welfare. The early response team was charged with tasks that included routine 
integrated land patrol and hotspot ground checks and the extinguishing of fires. The members 
of the response team are from various government agencies. The team membership of the 
response teams is as follows: Ministry of Environmental and Forestry Land Fire Brigades 
(Manggala Agni) 18 , Armed Forces Non-Commissioned Officer for Village Guidance 
 
13 Ministry of Environmental and Forestry Office and Local Environmental Agency across the provinces 
in Indonesia reported and scaled up the hotspot event reports of their scale and burned area. 
14 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration operates a fleet of environmental satellites that 
provide critical observation of the Earth, the atmosphere and space. 
https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/content/about, 04/09/2020 referred.   
15 Terra (EOS AM) and Aqua (EOS PM) are NASA satellites that use MODIS (or Moderate Resolution 
Imaging Spectroradiometer), which is a key instrument aboard to measure the Earth system. 
https://terra.nasa.gov/about, 04/09/2020 referred. 
16 The Landsat satellite program was created by NASA in 1965; it provides repetitive acquisition of 
high-resolution multispectral data on the Earth’s surface on a global basis. 
https://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/about/, 04/09/2020 referred.  
17 Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana. 
18 Manggala Agni is the Indonesian Forest Fire Control Brigade established by the Ministry of Forestry 
in 2003 based on Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry. This brigade was formed to carry out the task of 
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(Babinsa)19, National Police Officer for Public Order and Safety (Bhabinkamtibmas)20; Forest 
Management Unit and Regional Board for Disaster Management.  
The legal instrument for suppressive measures in postfire management activities 
addressing hotspots is discussed in the next section. The policy, which would be involved in 
law enforcement against individuals and corporate entities, focuses on the issue of disaster risk 
reduction and a suppressive approach to violations that have led to the haze pollution in 
Indonesia.    
2.1.2 Enforcement Policy on Law No. 1/1946 on Criminal Law 
The Indonesia Criminal Law originates from Dutch colonial law, namely, Wetboek 
van Strafrecht voor Nederlands-Indië. The purpose of the law is to govern the nation, upholding 
human rights, and guaranteeing that all in Indonesia shall have an equal status in law without 
exception. This policy does not have any specific chapter to regulate and address land/forest 
fires. Thus, the law recognizes that land/forest fire is part of environmental crimes that in 
general, endanger the security of the human right to livelihood of other people and goods. 
The law states in Article 187 that every person who intentionally causes a fire, 
explosion, or flood is threatened  
(1) with a maximum imprisonment of twelve years, if because of the violations as 
mentioned above [there] arises a general danger to the goods; 
(2) with a maximum imprisonment of fifteen years, if because of the violations as 
mentioned above [there] arises a danger to the lives of others; 
 
controlling forest fires. The brigade’s activities include the prevention, suppression and handling of 
post-forest fires. 
19 Babinsa is the structure of the military territorial commands under Military Rayon Command to 
maintain the security of its territory (Gunawan, 2004).  
20 Members of the Indonesian National Police to foster public security and order also are part of the 
Community Police function in villages. https://mediapurnapolri.net/2018/03/22/apa-itu-
bhabinkamtibmas/, 04/09/2020 referred.  
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(3) with a sentence of life imprisonment or for a specified period of no more than 
twenty years, if because of the acts as mentioned above there is a danger to 
the lives of others and [it] results in the death of persons. 
Furthermore, the crime related to the land/forest fire is not only stated in Article 187 
but also in Article 188 as follows: 
Every person who due to negligence causes a fire, explosion or flood, is threatened 
with a maximum imprisonment of five years or maximum imprisonment of one year 
or a maximum fine of four thousand five hundred rupiah if due to the act [there] 
arises a general danger to the goods, if because of the act [there] arises danger to 
the lives of others, or if because that action results in the death of persons. 
In the next part, the paper presents the enforcement of land/forest fire under the Environmental 
Protection Management Policy.  
2.1.3 Enforcement Policy on Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection Management  
The enforcement related to environmental protection is regulated in Law No. 23/1997, 
which was amended by Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection Management. The law 
enforcement for general violation of environmental standards in this policy introduces the threat 
of minimum penalties in addition to maximums, expansion of evidence, criminal punishment 
for environmental damage, the integrity of law enforcement for criminal offenses, and 
regulating corporate criminal acts. Moreover, enforcement for environmental criminal 
violations is still considered the ultimum remedium21 after the application of administrative 
enforcement law is deemed unsuccessful.  
In the case of land/forest fire, in Article 21, the policy defines that environmental 
damage related to the occurrence of land/forest fires is an effective change to the environment 
 
21 Ultimum remedium is a principle in criminal law that states that criminal policy should be a last resort 
in law enforcement (Husak, 2004). 
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in the form of damage or environmental pollution relating to land/forest fires caused by a 
business/activity. Moreover, the punishment for the crime of land/forest fire creating haze 
pollution is stated in Article 98 as follows: 
Every person who intentionally commits an act that results in exceedance of 
ambient air quality standards, [………], or environmental damage standard 
criteria shall be punished with imprisonment for a minimum of 3 (three) years and 
a maximum of 10 (ten) years and minimum fines of at least Rp3,000,000,000.00 
(three billion rupiah) and a maximum of Rp10,000,000,000.00 (ten billion rupiahs). 
In the case of negligence in Article 99, the punishment is as follows: 
Every person who due to his negligence has exceeded ambient air quality standards, 
[……….], or environmental damage standard criteria, shall be punished to a 
minimum of 1 (one) year imprisonment and a maximum of 3 (three) years and a 
minimum fine at least of Rp1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah) and a maximum 
of Rp3,000,000,000.00 (three billion rupiah). 
In the case of violation of land/forest fire prohibition stated in Article 69 (1) h, the 
punishment based on Article 108 is as follows:  
Every person who burns land as referred to in Article 69 paragraph (1) letter h, 
shall be sentenced to a minimum imprisonment of 3 (three) years and a maximum 
of 10 (ten) years and a minimum fine of Rp3,000,000,000.00 (three billion rupiahs) 
and a maximum of Rp10,000,000,000 (ten billion rupiahs). 
Despite the severe punishment in the environmental protection management policy, a 
policy based on the plantation business sector also provides additional enforcement measures 
in tackling the haze pollution from land/forest fires. In the next part, the paper discusses the law 
enforcement provision in the plantation policy.  
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2.1.4 Enforcement Policy on Law No. 39/2014 on Plantation 
Plantation law is one of the sectoral policies related directly to land/forest fires. As a 
result, the role of the plantation policy in reducing haze pollution is significant. Plantation Law 
No. 18/2008, which was amended by Law No. 39/2014, regulates enforcement on a land/forest 
fire violator that violates burning restrictions through the criminal sanction in Article 108 as 
stated:  
Every Economic Actor in the Plantation Business who clears and cultivates land by 
burning as referred to in Article 56 paragraph (1) shall be liable to a 10 (ten) year 
imprisonment and a maximum fine of Rp10,000,000,000 (ten billion rupiahs). 
The sanction would also be imposed on the violator that did not comply in managing 
the sustainable operation of a plantation in Article 109 as follows: 
Plantation Business Actor who is not implementing: 
(1) environmental impact analysis or environmental management and monitoring; 
(2) environmental risk analysis and; 
(3) environmental monitoring. 
As referred to in Article 68, shall be liable to a maximum imprisonment of 3 (three) 
years and a maximum fine of Rp3,000,000,000.00 (three billion rupiahs). 
In summary, the plantation policy as sectoral policy also has been considering land/forest fires 
as criminal activities and needs to be enforced by administering severe punishment to the 
violator.  
2.1.5 Review on Current Land/Forest Fire Policy  
Despite adopting zero burning policies that were incorporated in various legislation, 
land/forest fires continue to occur in Indonesia. In 2009, the Indonesia National Planning 
Agency (BAPPENAS) conducted analyses of the fundamental problems of Indonesian forest 
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management and found weak law enforcement that caused the destruction of remaining forest 
resources (BAPPENAS, 2009).  
Regardless of the antihaze policy being significantly enhanced, there are still 
deficiencies in the capacity to monitor and control land/forest fire occurrences (Simorangkir 
and Sumantri, 2002). In the response phase, different institutions and local governments in high 
hotspot areas have limited strategies and decision-making processes for land/forest fire 
emergency and response. Additionally, the capacity to implement a policy that involves vertical 
coordination is still too slow, bureaucratic, and uncertain (Nurhidayah and Djalante, 2017). 
Moreover, the complexity has become severe, with the implementation of autonomy 
decentralization in Indonesia that transfers authority to define policy at the regional level 
without proper guidance (Tacconi, 2007). 
Environmental crime is categorized into one of the white-collar crime forms; hence, 
the event of the crime tends to injure and destroy on a larger scale than a violation in a traditional 
felony (Muladi, 2002). Therefore, according to Muladi, in those frameworks, the existence of 
an environmental criminal sanction is no longer the last resort but becomes the first resort to 
make it a deterrent to committing a criminal offense. Moreover, there are problems with the 
current environmental crime policy in inducing the deterrence due to the absence of regulations 
on treatment (Matregel) (Zainal, 2010). The treatments are the order by the court to put a guilty 
company under trusty, retain the profit of a company, or disclose the company. However, the 
order cannot be applied if the violation belongs to the so-called certain formal criminal act, 
which is related to intentional violation (Yoserwan et al., 2019). 
Despite the severity of punishment based on the land/forest fire policy, without 
addressing the underlying driver of the haze, which is an advantage based on the efficiency of 
using fire, the current policy response will have limited impact to stop land/forest fires (Geh et 
al., 2018). The total estimated loss (cost) of haze pollution and land/forest fires in Indonesia in 
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the period 1997/1998 ranges between approximately US$2.3 billion and US$3.2 billion 
(Tacconi, 2003). Additionally, the losses of land/forest in 2015 increased dramatically to US$ 
16.13 billion. On the other hand, the study by Purnomo et al. (2017) using the value chain and 
social network analysis finds the interesting fact that the land/fires also generate massive 
income for several economic agents. The economic rent from surrounding the fire event per 
hectare added values were US$856 per hectare for ready-to-plant and US$3,800 per hectare for 
ready-to-harvest land for a palm oil plantation. The lack of initiatives in the current policy that 
take into account loss and economic rent of land/forest incidents will fail to tackle the 
development of hotspots in Indonesia.  
In the next section, the paper presents the detailed literature on policy development to 
fill the gap of the current policy weakness.  
2.2 PUBLIC POLICY  
Public policy is defined as the combination of necessary decisions, commitments, and 
actions made by those who hold or influence government positions of authority (Gerston, 2010). 
Aside from these definitions, there are three contemporary definitions: public policy as the 
study of what the government does, why it does it, and what difference it makes (Dye, 2008); 
Kraft and Furlong (2004) add that public policy is a course of government action taken in 
response to social problems; and finally, government is the independent variable not only in 
term of crafting current policies but also future policy demands (Robertson and Judd, 1989). 
In public policy, the term policymaking process is a system that translates policy ideas 
into actual policies as a cycle of problem-solving attempts. The policy process would cover all 
stages of the cycle, including issue emergence, agenda-setting, policy design, enactment, 
implementation, and evaluation (Dye, 2008; Dunn, 2004). The natural policy process would 
emerge in society through various means, such as disaster or concerned citizens or interest 
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groups, and then move up in an agenda to development of policy responses. From there, 
enactment regulation is issued to solve the problem, which then influences the outcome of the 
policy through policy implementation.  
Due to the importance of the process of designing policy and its implementation, the 
paper follows Richardson (1982) in differentiating those policies. By discussing policy design, 
the crucial point is in the aspect of monitoring and evaluation or policy learning to tackle the 
dynamic of emerging issues in sustainability transitions (Loorbach, 2007; Kemp, 2011). 
Furthermore, policy design is a policymaking process with highly political influence, 
particularly from actors with vested interests (Unruh, 2002).  
Furthermore, the study of policy implementation is concerned with what happened to 
a policy or program after it has been formulated (Ryan, 1995). Policy implementation is the 
arrangement by the regulator and other actors for executing and enforcing into action (Nilsson 
et al., 2012). Several elements are assumed present for implementation to occur: an entity with 
sufficient resources; regulators must be able to translate goals into operational plans; and the 
task is delivered based on assignment and accountability (Gerston, 2010).  
Due to the position of policy implementation on the back end of the process, the value 
of implementation is often overlooked and undervalued. Assumptions based on public policy 
decisions are automatically put into effect by the regulator. However, it is not so simple or 
automatic. The fact is that without consistent application with respect to its emergence issue 
and a well-regulated structure to implement the decision, the policy has neither substance nor 
significance (Gerston, 2010). Given the scale and complexity of sufficient implementation, 
political resistance might also contribute to an implementation failure that reflects widespread 
dissatisfaction with the policy in particular or the regulator in general. Policy failure will induce 
policy change through the learning process, thereby illustrating the close link between policy 
design and implementation (Birkland, 2011).  
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In summary, public policy is a translation from emerging issues into agenda-setting and 
policy design; however, the translation does not guarantee that an implementation will always 
be consistent with its original goal. Policies must be directed appropriately so that the regulator 
has a clear framework for the implementation. Incomplete implementation would hamper the 
public policy process for both the regulator and the public. In the next part, a discussion on the 
policy instrument in the environmental area will be presented to understand the policy design 
dimension of tackling the environmental problem.   
2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY    
The need to protect the environment with all its components from harmful activities has 
been magnified enormously in recent years. The evidence that pollution, deforestation, and 
climate change are creating irreversible damage to the environment is increasingly compelling. 
Developing flexible regulation to be undertaken by policymakers to enable severe damage to 
be slowed down, halted, or reversed is necessarily the most important means of environmental 
management. Such regulation is vital to take account of the broader social, economic, and 
country-specific context. The environment, as part of public policy, has to be conceptualized 
as a form of government regulation. The idea behind regulation is not to eradicate risk but to 
manage it and draw boundaries for the acceptable (Lidskog et al., 2005). Regulation is defined 
as any attempt by the regulator to control the behavior of individuals or organizations, 
corporations, or subgovernmental structures (Meir, 1985). Moreover, regulation is also defined 
as a rule, set out in law, and the process to ensure the regulation is implemented (activities of 
an environmental enforcement authority) (Farmer, 2007). The government has a broad range 
of policies available to be used in environmental regulation. Following OECD (2010), the paper 
categorizes policy into four different taxonomic distinctions as follows: regulatory, also known 
as command-and-control policy; voluntary policy; a market-based policy; and information.  
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Regulatory policies are the exercise of influence by imposing a standard backed by 
criminal sanction (Baldwin, 1997). An environmental standard, generally characterized as 
command control or regulatory policy, prohibits a particular form of conduct or lays down 
conditions for entry into the sector, for example, a limit on emissions of a pollutant and 
subsequent penalties that apply if the target is not met. Permits and licenses are often used to 
implement standards (Lidskog et al., 2005).  
Regulatory policy depends upon enforcement. In other words, the behavior expected 
of regulatees can be specified with clarity, making it relatively straightforward to enforce the 
law (McGarity, 1993). This specificity provides an economic agent with a more precise 
understanding of its regulatory obligation. Despite the strength of regulatory policy, researchers 
also have been widely criticized for the use of the policy. Issues include the following: the cost 
of enforcement, permit and licensing; equalization marginal pollution cost; not effective in 
transitory or firms that are challenging to identify; and rapid change of economic circumstances 
(see for instance: Hahn and Hester, 1989; Faure and Ubachs, 2003; Tietenberg, 2000; Faure 
and Weishar, 2012; Barde and Godard, 2012). An additional problem for regulatory policy is 
the absence of incentives for firms to go beyond minimum standards and its vulnerability to 
political manipulation (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).  
The voluntary policy comprises the government initiating social control based on 
individual firms undertaking to do the right thing unilaterally without coercion. At the general 
level, the policy embraces binding or nonbinding agreements between the government and 
individual businesses, thereby reducing the need for legislation (OECD, 1994). Commonly, 
voluntary approaches are initiated by the government and may involve government playing the 
role of coordinator and facilitator.  
The greatest strength of this policy is where the regulatees perceive their self-interest 
as being to protect the environment. Thus, the challenge is building the custodial ethic and 
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making environmental protection part of the community norm (Benner et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, a single policy, a regulatee agreement, is subject to a severe limitation that needs 
to be periodically renegotiated (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). 
Market-based policy: These policies rely on cost pricing of consumption or production 
to motivate firms to find the lowest cost means of abatement for the activity causing 
environmental damage. Economic theory indicates that this policy, principally taxes, and 
tradable allowances will impose less cost on the industry to achieve a given level of pollution 
reduction than command-and-control regulations (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Economists 
believe that this policy will efficiently achieve environmental objectives by delegating the 
decision making to the polluting firms with private information regarding the firm-specific cost 
of pollutant reduction (Crew and Parker, 2006).  
Taxes and tradable allowances, e.g., cap-and-trade schemes, are a part of market-based 
policies that are drawing attention due to their features and functions. The tax policies, in 
general, will establish a fixed cost for polluters; however, the tradable policies do not impose 
even partially auctioned costs (Milne and Andersen, 2012). Thus, taxes can be used to correct 
for market-based externalities when the prices to the customer of a good or service are less than 
the cost of that good or service to society (Pigou, 1932). Moreover, the tradable allowance is 
usually not subject to legal policies such as taxation; e.g., a European tax proposal must receive 
consent from the member states. Despite the choice of policy between taxation or tradable 
allowance, market-based incentives are not self-enforcing and may involve considerable control 
costs. Moreover, with respect to practical application, the policy would heavily rely on 
information and incorporate an eminent risk of market failure; also, regulatees may not respond 
rationally to the price signals (James, 1993; Bowers, 1994).  
The government has also typically undertaken public service through information 
dissemination to raise awareness about an environmental issue. This information will overcome 
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informational barriers and reinforce an environmentally related issue. Information policy 
approaches may be taken to include education and training, corporate environmental reporting, 
and product certification. Several countries also have introduced legislation intended to inform 
the community on the environmental impact of the firm’s activities and pollution abatement 
policies, for example, Emergency Planning and Community Right in the United States and the 
National Pollution Inventory in Canada (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). Furthermore, the 
viability of command-and-control and market-based policy is substantially dependent on the 
availability and quality of information. Thus, this policy is not dependable to protect the 
environment, especially when there is a significant gap between attitudes and behavior. 
Moreover, in most cases of policy implementation, this policy can be implemented with modest 
administrative burdens, thus improving its cost-effectiveness.  
In summary, in this part, the paper presents the theoretical foundation of policy 
instruments that are crucial to the reduction of environmental pollution. The extensive range of 
the policy instrument discussion has shown in the transition from a single policy towards the 
more pluralistic conception of policy options. The paper also shows that tax policy might be 
more appropriate in support of current policy, given the ability to assign a price to the 
externalities and distributive power issues in tackling the externalities of Indonesia haze 
pollution. In the next part, the paper will discuss in more detail the role of taxation as a market-
based policy in designing integrative practical environmental policy. 
2.4 ROLE OF TAXATION POLICY IN BROADER ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Tax as a market-based policy places a direct cost on environmental damage; the polluter 
should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution according to the extent of either damage 
done to society or the exceeding of an acceptable level (OECD, 1975). The tax design consists 
of increased cost for the emitter of carbon dioxide by assigning an explicit and implicit price to 
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encourage behavioral change (market-based driven) and leads to increased human welfare from 
the environmental benefit (Pigou, 1932; Ekins and Baker, 2001). Hence, Weitzman (1974) and 
Adar and Griffin (1976) also studied the linking of choice of economic instrument to 
uncertainty on the risk of improper calibration of the policy. 
Given the difficulty of designing and enacting the optimal22 Pigouvian tax, the scholar 
has invested significant effort to draw the line in the definitional arena of a market-based policy 
for the environment. In 1997, the European Union’s Eurostat and European Commission’s Tax 
Directorate (DG TAXUD) defined the environmental tax as a tax with a base of a physical unit 
(or a proxy of it) of something that has a proven, specific adverse effect on the environment 
(OECD, 1995). On the other hand, the OECD has adopted the term environmentally related tax 
as any compulsory, unrequited payment to the general government levied on the tax base 
deemed environmentally relevant (OECD, 2001). By focusing on unrequited payments, the 
definition excludes charges paid to the government for services, such as waste removal and 
treatment fees (Milne and Andersen, 2012). Following Milne and Andersen (2012), 
environmentally related taxes are, according to their relative environmental and fiscal 
functions, classified as regulatory taxes that are driven by environmental impact; environmental 
financing taxes are driven by their ability to finance environmental measures. In the last part, 
environmental taxes are also classified as taxes that are independent or complementary by 
evaluating their role relative to another policy instrument (Maata, 2006). 
Conceptually, a tax as a market-based instrument in environmental policy would 
minimize the total emissions cost by equalizing marginal abatement costs across polluters. 
Additionally, taxes provide further incentives to be more efficient in the pollution-abatement 
technique through stimulating reduction abatement cost and tax. The taxpayer’s stimulation is 
 
22  The optimal tax in addressing a negative environmental externality is equal to the marginal 
external damage from the polluting activity (Pigou, 1932). 
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to develop an environmentally friendly attitude by offering tax reductions if they behave in a 
way considered positive (David and Bohnert, 2000). Figure 2.1 presents the dynamic efficiency 
of an environmental tax in pollution abatement. 
 
  
 
 
 
                          
                     
                   
 
                      
                   
  
 
FIGURE 2.1: Components of Dynamic Efficiency of a Tax 
 
Source: Barde (2000) 
 
 
In Figure 2.1, if we assume that the taxpayers were developing advanced technological 
capabilities in the production process, the marginal abatement costs23 (MAC) would be reduced 
from MAC1 to MAC2. In the case of a command-and-control policy using an emission standard 
at P1, the level of emission would remain unchanged, and the polluter would only be safe in 
area B. However, if a tax is imposed using a market-based policy, the polluter would reduce 
emissions from P1 to level P2. An economically rational polluter will ideally react to an 
environmental tax by reducing emissions to the level where it assumes that it is cheaper to pay 
 
23 A Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve increasing from right to left represents that the more a 
pollutant is abated, the higher is the unit cost for abatement. 
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the tax than to abate emissions further. As a result, the shifting from MAC1 to MAC2 will 
provide double cost savings: abatement costs (area D+B) and reduced tax (area C).  
The other strong point of a tax as a market-based policy is the administrative cost-
saving. Tietenberg (1990) indicates several cases of least-cost policies being cheaper than 
command-and-control. Moreover, pollution taxes that use emissions as a tax base have a lower 
risk of evasion than a fixed emission standard that is controlled via regular onsite inspections 
(Faure and Weishaar, 2012). However, taxation policy implementation is dependent on trusting 
the citizen, and variations in political acceptability regarding the government policy may render 
the policy more expensive to administer and evaluate.  
Successful application of environmental taxes would depend on the ability of the 
government to redistribute the revenue from environmental taxes by spending the extra tax 
revenue on environmental improvements (earmarking revenue). Buchanan (1976, 1993) has 
argued that an optimal tax system24 cannot be designed without considering how its revenue 
will be spent. In practice, there are two principal arguments: first, provide certain circumstances 
to implement benefit principles, especially efficiency grounds, as a link between government 
expenditures and revenue; second, induce the public to support increased taxes by linking the 
taxes with the expansion of some government activity (Bird, 1992). Earmarking will thus 
enhance the behavioral effect that follows a regulatory tax intervention (Soares, 2012). 
Moreover, Pigou endorsed earmarking that aims to repair damage caused by taxed behavior 
rather than compensate victims (Pigou, 2002). 
As previously discussed, a broader policy framework is needed that provides 
policymakers with tools on what and who is being regulated. In the next part, we will discuss 
 
24 Optimal tax systems to refer to the normative theory of taxation that considers not only the choice of 
tax instrument to generate the revenue but also the enforcement of any available instrument that can be 
administered at minimum cost (Slemrod, 1990).  
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enforcement theoretical approaches to tackling the behavior of those who are deliberately 
noncompliant under the regulation and tax as market-based policy. 
2.5 ENFORCEMENT AS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
2.5.1 Regulatory Policy Enforcement     
Although in practice, as discussed in the previous section, it is not possible to separate 
regulatory from other policies of environmental control, in this part, the paper will focus on 
how regulatory, also known as command-and-control, policy should be legally binding and 
adequately enforced to guarantee a positive impact on the community. The enforcement 
dimension of the regulation is a vital aspect of every regulatory system, especially in 
environmental regulations, and has been widely studied. Enforcement indicates the criteria and 
variables that relate to decisions by the regulator on the deployment of available remedies in 
the event of noncompliance. Enforcement involves a range of activities that aim to ensure that 
the regulated comply with the law and acting against activities that are found to be 
noncompliant (Farmer, 2007). The volume and stringency of environmental regulations have 
increased rapidly since the 1970s (Knill et al., 2011). Becker (1968) has developed a 
compliance framework for the economic analysis based on the rational choice theory, in which 
individuals consider when the expected penalty is equivalent to the cost of doing business for 
a firm. Accordingly, the individuals will compare their expected compliance utility with the 
expected fines when they violate the law. Hence, punishment may efficiently deter individuals 
from committing crimes by changing the cost of crimes. 
Furthermore, the channels for regulatory enforcement are through administrative and 
criminal regimes (Oded, 2013). Criminal and administrative sanctions often have similar aims, 
aiming to punish and prevent future noncompliance. The administrative regime is undertaken 
by the administration, which issues a formal warning letter requiring the firm to come into 
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compliance. Moreover, monetary penalties or fines are a very commonly used sanction. In an 
administrative regime, firms can also be required to undertake remedial work or pay for the 
cost of restoration of the damage caused, or the permit of the facility may be revoked (Ogus, 
2004). 
On the other hand, criminal law is applied as a last resort in cases of noncompliance. 
This regime will be used where the range of administrative sanctions is not enough to ensure 
future compliance. Criminal sanctions that might be appropriate include repeated violations, 
intentional violations, falsification of information, or records (Farmer, 2007). Furthermore, 
coercive measures through criminal sanction are used to control unregulated activity; for 
example, polluting activity lies outside regulatory control, involving offenses where the burden 
of proof is on the prosecution. However, in previous environmental offenses, the onus of proof 
is usually reversed, and establishing causation is a potentially difficult challenge to meet due to 
the lack of evidence in proving many cases of polluting activities. 
Problems with the enforcement of regulated activity usually manifest as a failure to 
comply with the license, permit, or other regulatory authorization or condition attached to it. It 
is dependent on the regulator to transpose and determine the seriousness of noncompliance, 
choose other modes of enforcement or justify immediate action through criminal law. However, 
the administrative regime is often crucial, since it provides a valuable opportunity to impose 
requirements action in the face of an infraction. The noncompliant may seek to challenge the 
notice, in which case proceedings will occur by way of an administrative appeal to a tribunal 
or government. Whether the appeal can be regarded as a remedy is a matter of policy preference, 
which may be reflected in regulatory policy (Hawke, 2002).  
The scholarly literature points out enforcement regulations that significantly changed 
and motivated firms’ practice, for instance, the deterrence impact of fines has reduced many 
severe forms of air and water pollution (Scruggs, 1999; Shimsack and Ward, 2005) and 
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recycling policy (Feldman and Perez, 2012). Additional examples include the use of 
enforcement data from Norway to find that minor violations flourished because of lax 
enforcement (Nyborg and Telle, 2006); pulp and mills pollution (Gray and Shadbegian, 2005); 
and the effect of EPA’s waste regulations on firm compliance resulting in violations decreasing 
after a penalty charge (Stafford, 2007).  
Apart from the above, Harrington (1988) theoretically has also shown evidence seeming 
to indicate that firms comply to a much higher degree than is typically predicted. The 
phenomenon denoted the “Harrington Paradox” can be summarized in three statements as 
follows: for most sources, the frequency of surveillance is quite low; even when violations are 
discovered, fines or other penalties are rarely assessed; sources are thought to be compliant a 
large part of the time. However, another researcher suggests the presence of a paradox, given 
that the persistent of haze pollution in Indonesia appears to confirm the standard rational theory. 
Thus, in the next part, the paper will discuss the role of taxation as a market-based policy in 
designing integrative practical environmental policy enforcement.  
2.5.2 Tax Policy Enforcement 
For tax policy to operate effectively, it is necessary that all lawful revenues are 
collected. Earlier theoretical models emphasized that the economic nature of tax compliance is 
based on the assumption that an individual views tax compliance as a gamble, weighing the 
expected benefits of successful cheating against the risky prospect of detection and punishment 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). The standard conclusion from the classic model is that an 
individual not declaring income weighed that action against the fear of being caught and 
penalized. Empirical evidence is also mainly consistent with the “best practices” policy advice 
that greater enforcement (e.g., higher audit rates, and more significant fine rates) will improve 
compliance (Alm, 2019). However, Webley (2002) found other aspects influencing taxpayer 
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noncompliance: opportunity, perception of equal and fair treatment, individual differences in 
people’s personality, social norms, and knowledge of the tax system. Alm (2019) also found 
that even though individually-based financial considerations may well motivate many 
individuals, many other individuals are influenced by nonfinancial considerations (e.g., social 
considerations). In particular, Sandmo (2005) suggested that social costs should be considered 
in any compliance model and indicated the overall fairness of the tax enforcement system.  
Slemrod (2007) observed that the probability of being punished for noncompliance 
creates more-significant deterrent mechanisms and has an impact on tax compliance. 
Furthermore, studies by Klepper and Nagin (1989) indicated that the perceived risk of criminal 
prosecution was also found to act as a powerful deterrent affecting enforcement of taxpayer 
compliance. Other studies that investigated penalties as a deterrent by Gupta (2007) suggested 
that a penalty equated to a percentage or fraction of the evasion, ultimately reducing the ability 
to hide noncompliance and therefore improving overall deterrence. 
Based on a theoretical study on command-and-control and tax policy enforcement, the 
next part of the paper discusses the theoretical background on how enforcement is carried out 
and a regulator responds to noncompliance once it is detected. The regulator response in this 
context is the application of the sanction25. The extent and effectiveness of deterrence is based 
on the inherently coercive nature of remedies sought. Therefore, in economic studies, 
environmental regulation is characterized by bargaining for an acceptable level of 
environmental control (Gray and Shimshack, 2011). The low sanction level as an enforcement 
 
25 Macrory (2005) has argued the principle of sanctioning by the regulator as follows: (1) sanctions 
should change the behavior of the offenders; (2) sanctions should ensure that there is no financial benefit 
obtained by noncompliance; (3) sanctions should be responsive to specific violations and regulatory 
issues; (4) sanctions should be proportionate to the nature of violations and harm caused; (5) sanctions 
should aim to restore the harm caused by regulatory noncompliance; and (6) sanctions should aim to 
deter future noncompliance. 
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mechanism will induce industry to budget for the fine imposed for noncompliance instead of 
attempting to reduce pollution (Lynch, 2000).  
2.5.3 Deterrent-Based Enforcement  
Deterrence theory is embedded with the idea that individuals respond to changes in 
certainty, severity, and immediacy of punishment (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). Scholars have 
relied on the deterrence theory in understanding the regulation enforcement process. In general, 
the empirical deterrence literature consistently finds that regulatory enforcement action in 
preventing future noncompliance generates specific deterrence at the individual entity level and 
general deterrence from spillover at the community level (Firestone, 2002; Shimsack, 2014). 
However, consistent with maximizing social welfare, regulators would be more concerned, 
especially from economic studies, with estimating the optimal level of monitoring and sanctions 
that motivates regulatees to act in a socially desirable manner (Cohen, 1999). The term optimal 
is a consideration to encapsulate effectiveness and efficiency in improving environmental 
performance (Gunningham and Garbosky, 1998).  Effectiveness means the degree to which a 
determined environmental objective is achieved using the specific policy instrument. Efficiency 
means the static aspect and the dynamic ones (Opschoor and Tunner, 1994). 
The previous study also discussed the general approach on how sanctioning will 
influence the level of deterrence. The first notable approach is promoting gain-based sanction, 
in which the expected liability faced by market players should be set at the level of the 
offender’s expected benefit from law-breaking (Becker, 1968). The second approach proposes 
harm-based sanctions, in which the expected liability should be set at the level of the social 
harm created by the violation action by market players (Stigler, 1970). Given the progressively 
severe harm from haze pollution in Indonesia, the paper will follow the harm-based sanction 
determination with the goals of inducing market players to internalize the social consequence 
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or externalities of their activities (Polinsky, 1998); allowing efficient regulatory violations 
when private gain to the actor is higher than the social cost (Oded, 2013); imposing a similar 
sanction against various violations that differ from each other because the resulting social harm 
may distort offenders’ decisions and induce them to commit a crime (Stigler, 1970); following 
approaches broadly accepted by the literature on regulatory enforcement (i.e., Arlen and 
Kraakman, 1997). 
Furthermore, the paper follows Faure and Grimeaud (2003) in classifying the type of 
environmental harm or environmental damage that needs to be regulated as follows: 
1. Personal injury. Damage in the form of death, physical injuries, mental distress or pain, 
temporary or permanent handicap resulting in economic and earning losses.  
2. Property injury. Damage caused to property and damage linked to the uses of the 
property. For example, it concerns the inconvenience resulting from smells, noises, or 
loss of trees. In the context of insurability with study cases in Finnish 1994, 
compensation has been awarded for the loss of trees as part of a reasonable degree of 
nuisance to the victim for nonpecuniary losses. 
3. Pure economic losses are those that do not directly refer to personal or property injury, 
for example, in the case of land/forest fires creating haze pollution that may affect 
tourism by reduced tourist visits to Riau and cause revenue losses. The haze pollution 
may affect a wide array of private interests, including hoteliers, restaurants, or 
shopkeepers who may all sustain commercial losses following declines in tourist 
activity.  
4. Natural resource damages. Attention is required to damage caused to the biodiversity 
and the landscape. The addressing of natural resource concerns is often the preferred 
solution. The polluter then has to mitigate the damage, including remedying the source 
of the damage and restoring the environment to its original status. Therefore, it would 
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be essential to understand the notion of biodiversity damage defined in the future 
environmental policy.  
Although based on a harm-based determination in setting the level of sanction, given 
the stochastic nature of environmental violation, the regulator would still be facing 
complications to generate a deterrence effect. Departing from the Becker model, in theory, the 
social loss could be minimized by changing not only the level of sanction but also the 
probability for detection and conviction (Becker, 1968). An optimal level of deterrence may be 
reached when the expected liability faced by market players is set at the level of the social harm 
created by violations (Oded, 2013). Expected liability (EL) is the sanction imposed on violators 
and the probability of detection by enforcement authorities. Based on this approach, when 
expected liability equals the social cost of the misconduct, potential perpetrators internalize the 
social consequences of their conduct (Braithwaite, 2006).  
 
Social Harm (H)  =       Fine imposed/Actual liability (L)   X   Probability of detection (P)              
 
 
 
The existing literature based on deterrence has discussed the determination of the 
sanction (L) to induce a market player level of deterrence. The sanction is imposed transparently 
and is consistent with a series of principles for the application regime as follows: change the 
behavior of the offender; ensure that there is no financial benefit obtained by noncompliance; 
make the sanction proportionate to the nature of the offense and harm caused; restore the harm 
caused and deter future noncompliance (Macrory, 2005). The practical application of the type 
sanction described is a fine or, in another form, is an environmental liability. The sanctioning 
mechanism will have an effect, providing economic agents act rationally in deciding to obey 
Expected Liability (EL) 
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the law rather than violating it (Ogus, 2004). However, having the sanctions in place does not 
necessarily mean they are optimally implemented. Stigler (1970) found that imposing similar 
sanction violations may distort and induce violators to commit crimes that may result in 
increasing the social harm and reduce deterrence. In this research on the case of haze pollution 
in Indonesia, the sanction is related to the financial penalties or fines imposed in criminal 
enforcement by authorities for noncompliance that are sufficient to ensure future compliance.  
Furthermore, the probability of detecting (P) a violation is an additional consideration 
that may affect deterrence. Because potential violators' risk preferences are influenced by the 
probability of being caught, deterrence may be increased. The probability of detection is 
described as a function of enforcement effort made by enforcement authorities. Empirical 
research in Denmark on detection probability has shown that increasing the audit probability 
from a low level to a very high level positively affects compliance behavior with a modest 
magnitude (Kleven et al., 2011). 
One of the influential critiques of deterrence-based enforcement endorses a regulatory 
cat and mouse game between law enforcers and regulatory targets (Oded, 2013). Thus, if severe 
fines are applied for every violation, marginal deterrence is eroded. Similarly, the choice of the 
probability of detection may be subject to a constraint from the direct cost involved in 
monitoring actions. However, a higher probability of detection requires greater enforcement 
expenditure. As a result, in a case in which a regulator faces a limited enforcement budget, the 
deterrence might be below that which would be the optimal standard in a world in which 
noncompliance does not exist. Theoretically, if monitoring is costless, the probability of 
detection goes to unity (Becker, 1968).  
To summarize, the environmental deterrence literature increasingly explores the 
heterogeneity of enforcement responses to lawbreaking. As has been highlighted, a practical 
implication in a deterrent-based approach to policymaking is that the enforcement system still 
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is not optimal in achieving its end goals. The search for an improved enforcement framework 
has led scholars to develop an alternative approach, such as through possible policy 
combinations to compensate for the weakness of standalone environmental policies. Thus, in 
the next part, the discussion moves from a single policy to a mixed policy, especially in the 
implementation of enforcement policy, to overcome the environmental problem. 
2.6 MIXED POLICY INSTRUMENT 
Environmental policy, especially enforcement policy, is in a transition towards a much 
more pluralistic conception of policy design. There is no such thing as a single, perfect, 
universal solution to environmental problems. Moreover, environmental problems are complex, 
and the industrials and ecological context is varied; thus, the ideal solution will be context-
specific and will necessarily vary from case to case.  
The mixed policy is defined as configurations in achieving effectiveness and efficiency 
with a combination of policies to attain complementary interactions and compensate for the 
weakness of individual environmental policies (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). There are 
abundant law and economics literatures on the combination of various policy instruments that 
discuss the comparative benefits of various policies in given situations. Regarding climate 
change, please see Hansson and Skogh, 1987; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Faure and 
Weishaar, 2012; Lehman, 2012; and Rogge and Reichardt, 2016. Furthermore, the policy mix 
encompasses not only a combination policy instrument but also the processes by which such a 
policy emerges and interacts (Flanagen et al., 2011). 
The previous study supports a rational focus on policy mixes. Environmental liability 
can provide attractive incentives to reduce pollution while still leaving the industry with 
sufficient revenues. However, liability rules will only give rise to optimal behavior if victims 
can identify polluters and establish causal relationships between activities and damages caused 
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(Faure and Weishaar, 2012). A policy implication in energy intensities is not considering the 
effects of competitiveness of the industrial sectors. As a result, energy and CO2 taxes applied 
should be considered different policies to reflect their deterministic nature and long-term 
pattern (Agnolucci, 2011). Additionally, scholars analyzing control emissions from heavy-duty 
diesel trucks find that in a highly competitive market, a majority of firms are not investing 
beyond environmental compliance measures in the absence of an economic regime and 
regulatory control that raise public concern about the industry's environmental impacts. The 
previous literature highlights that there is no single policy that can confront all environmentally 
harmful activities or risks. Moreover, typically, different policy interventions are required to 
complement or replace government regulation in certain circumstances. Following 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998), the paper draws a table for the main observations of four 
mixed policies.  
As shown in Table 2.1, joint application in the form of regulatory and marked-based 
policies may be complementary and provide a mutually supportive signal to the market if they 
are used to target a different aspect of common environmental issues. However, if both policies 
target the same behavior, then to the extent that the command-and-control policy limits the 
choice of firms in making rationally individual decisions, the market-based policy will be 
compromised. As a result, the net cost of reducing the overall level of pollution will be lessened. 
However, for a variety of reasons, firms are unlikely to be purely rational actors. Thus, we 
cannot state in whether the policy instrument combination outcome will be positive or negative. 
Tax as a market-based policy would place a direct cost on environmental damage; the 
polluter should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution according to the extent of either 
damage done to society or the exceeding of an acceptable level (OECD, 1975). According to 
Hawke (2002) and OECD (1989), an environmentally related tax, as part of a complement to 
traditional regulatory control, has the ability to provide flexibility and give the authorities a tool 
48 
 
to influence actor behavior. Taxes will stimulate the reduction of pollution when abatement 
costs decrease. Moreover, a tax is a more substantial stimulus compared to developing more-
efficient pollution-abatement techniques (Barde and Godard, 2012).  
 
TABLE 2.1 Summary of Environmental Policy Mixed 
 
Regulatory or 
Command-and-
Control  
Voluntary Policy  
Market-Based or 
Fiscal Policy  
Information 
Policy  
Regulatory or 
Command-
and-Control 
Policy  
 
Complementing 
Positive (if 
environmental 
performance 
beyond 
compliance) 
Complementing -
Positive and 
Negative (if 
targeting the same 
aspect of 
environmental 
issue) 
Complementing 
Positive 
Voluntary 
Policy  
Complementing 
Positive (if 
environmental 
performance 
beyond 
compliance) 
 Contextual 
Complementing 
Positive 
Market-Based 
or Fiscal 
Policy  
Positive and 
Negative (if 
targeting the same 
aspect of 
environmental 
issue) 
Contextual   
Complementing 
Positive 
Information 
Policy  
Complementing 
Positive 
Complementing 
Positive 
Complementing 
Positive 
 
Source: Gunningham and Grabosky (1998)  
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Furthermore, the joint policy related to a voluntarism policy may be complementary, 
although a strict market-based policy would appear to make voluntarism redundant in the face 
of valid price signals. To the extent that firms behave in a less than sufficiently rational manner, 
voluntarism might be complementary to the market-based policy.  
In summary, the single policy approach continues to predominate, with an inability to 
operate effectively across the board (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). Thus, the policy mix 
will encompass a combination single policy instrument that emerges and interacts to confront 
all harmful environmental activities. However, the optimal combination should not result in an 
imposition of all policies at the same time, which might lead to ineffective and costly 
overdeterrence. The policy design should also reflect a careful assessment to determine the mix 
of incentives and disincentives that will result in the desired change in compliance (Rosenbaum, 
2005). However, the environmental policy to achieve the desired outcome also depends upon 
the enforcement process as policy implementation is actively changed to affect the firm's 
practice and meet the objective of the regulation (Farmer, 2007).   
2.7 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The investigation described throughout this study is intended to develop an effective 
environmental policy to tackle threats to the environment. Designing and implementing policies 
are complicated and unpredictable activities. The evidence that pollution, deforestation, and 
climate change are creating irreversible damage to the environment is increasingly compelling. 
Environmental policy as part of a public policy to protect the environment with all its 
components from harmful activities has been magnified enormously in recent years. However, 
when assessing policy implementation, no human activity can be viewed in isolation.  
As a result, developing and implementing flexible regulation to be undertaken by 
policymakers to enabling severe environmental damage to be slowed is the most important 
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means of environmental policy. A single policy is not sufficiently flexible or resilient in 
addressing all environmental problems in all contexts (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999). The 
mixed policy with combinatory and complementary interactions will compensate for the 
weakness of a single policy instrument. The policy discussion is presented in Figure 2.2. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     FIGURE 2.2 Discussion in the Policymaking Process 
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The previous literature on mixed environmental policy is in the stage of policy design 
and limited study in policy implementation, especially in the area of law enforcement. Please 
refer to Fullerton and Wolverton (1999), Wall and Palmer (2001), and Meyers et al. (2015). 
Policies must be designed appropriately so that the regulator has a clear framework for the 
implementation. The implementation of public policy requires specific behavior and 
coordination among actors. Moreover, incomplete implementation would hamper the public 
policy process for both the regulator and the public. No matter how elegantly policy design to 
encourage behavior changes, if the actor does not perform the tasks, nothing happens (Cohen, 
2006). 
The paper will draw on the growing body of policy implementation literature on 
deterrent-based enforcement studies to resolve the queries which originated from the necessity 
to enforce comprehensive regulation in environmental management. This relatively new area 
of research will be further advanced by uniquely examining the haze pollution case in Indonesia 
in the context of more than a decade. Deterrence is a choice in which would-be offenders 
balance the benefits and cost of crime (Apel and Nagin, 2015). Moreover, the optimal level of 
deterrence may be reached when the expected liability faced by a market player is set at the 
level of the environmental harm created by the violation or at a level that motivates the regulatee 
to act in the desirable manner (Oded, 2013). 
This study posits that mixed enforcement will strengthen law enforcement 
implementation of land/forest fire regulations in Indonesia. Please refer to Figure 2.3 for the 
conceptual framework of the study. Moreover, Hawke (2002) and OECD (1989) argue that 
economic policy as a complement to traditional regulatory control has the ability to provide 
flexibility and enough grip for the authorities to influence the actor behaviors to  
1. Raise revenue for financing environmental measures,  
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2. Provide incentives to implement the associated regulation better, 
3. Have a possible impact on technical innovation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   FIGURE 2.3 Research Conceptual Framework  
 
In the first part of the investigation, to enhance the expected liability in internalizing 
harm, it is necessary to distinguish the deterrent effect from the existing policy in terms of 
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to understand policy intervention related to enforcement measures by a law enforcement officer. 
Carmenta et al. (2017), using Q factor, find that effective fire management intervention employs 
hard measures against large actors, including sanctions, enforcement, and standards directed at 
large scale actors. This study will strengthen previous investigations by analyzing the 
deterrence through in-depth interviews to determine law enforcement actor perceptions. Actor 
perspective in law enforcement is critical in improving policy design and on-the-ground 
implementation (Game et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2016). The actor insights will provide a 
valuable part of the puzzle in helping to zoom in on the primary problem (Lo et al., 2006). 
Second, we will further investigate the dimension of harm that has been approached 
by the current enforcement policy through judicial decisions concerning criminal enforcement. 
Enforcement against criminal offenses is seen as a last resort applied when the harm to society 
or the benefit to the offender is significant and the probability of detection is low. The critical 
criminal environmental policy is the prevention of unjustifiable harm, given that the expected 
sanction is equal to the harm caused by the offender and that loss of wealth will provide 
adequate deterrence (Cohen, 1992; Polinsky and Shavel, 1994; Garoupa, 2001). Although the 
limited body of theoretical research has developed exciting insight into judicial sanctioning 
decisions regarding environmental criminal violations, no study has explicitly investigated and 
provided a detailed analysis of defendants' occupation and offense locations.  
Finally, based on the understandings of the effects of existing policy on haze pollution 
control, we will seek evidence of a mixed policy as pollution control in Indonesia. 
Environmental policy interactions with the fiscal system fundamentally influence the cost-
effectiveness of addressing climate change and meeting other social objectives (Goulder, 2013). 
However, due to the scarcity of previous studies that consider taxation's role in internalizing 
harm created from environmental violation, the analysis of the practical implementation of the 
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mixed policy still has much room for improvement. Research on environmental taxes has 
mainly been done for developed countries, where the income levels and tax systems do not 
witness rapid changes but are more or less stable (please see, e.g., Wier et al., 2005; Bork, 2006; 
Dresner and Ekins, 2006; Tiezzi, 2005; Callan et al., 2009). Additionally, most of the Indonesia 
carbon tax research case (with the source of pollution being burning fossil fuels) has been done 
in a theoretical, experimental study and distributional impact analysis, see Iskandar (2012); 
Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2015).  
This paper extends the Lim (2016) model while considering that of Besley et al. 
(2013), who found that including tax policy as a fiscal capacity revenue source increased 
regulatory action capacity. There are no previous studies on environmental policies in which 
regulatory action considers taxation's role in enhancing fiscal capacity to address pollution. The 
paper will contribute to the field by analyzing the dependent variable, using hotspots as an 
indicator of active fire as a source of emissions that cause ozone and particulate matter (PM) 
pollution. As a result, the set of emission sources is broader than those in most previous studies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ENFORCEMENT DETERRENCE IN TACKLING HAZE POLLUTION:  
INSIGHT FROM IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
 
 
Reaching a better understanding of the enforcement of current regulatory 
approaches will provide a baseline for enhancing future policy choices for deterring 
and controlling the devastating effects of haze pollution. Using in-depth interviews 
with prominent actors who have direct and indirect involvement in the law 
enforcement process (i.e., Investigators, Prosecutors, Experts Witnesses in Court, 
NGO), this paper investigates how insufficient power and law enforcement capacity 
could hamper and deter policies for tackling haze pollution. The paper shows that 
a low probability of detection for environmental offenses, especially in South 
Sumatra, causes economic agents to incorrectly receive signals to not engage in 
unsustainable and illegal activities. More specifically, the paper finds that the 
absence of a special arrangement for the recovery of environmental costs and direct 
financial mechanisms for how fines would be utilized has been hampering law 
enforcement. Moreover, a limited budget and coordination, as part of the 
government's capacity, provide a low probability of inspection and create a 
relatively high benefit for noncompliance, thus inducing the persistence of 
noncompliance. The establishment of a policy regime that is inclusive of fiscal 
provisions in mixed environmental management cannot be overlooked as a 
reference point for effective future solutions. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The palm oil plantation and industrial processing sector have been one of the leading 
sectors for the development of the Indonesian economy. However, at the same time, the 
Indonesian plantation sector has also been identified as the most significant driver of forest and 
peatland clearing, which creates major haze pollution and is a source of greenhouse emissions 
(Greenpeace, 2018; Shiel et al., 2009). The burnt areas that create haze pollution within the 
Riau and South Sumatra Provinces are in company concession areas (Lee et al., 2013; 
Budiningsih, 2017). Haze pollution is defined as smoke resulting from land/forest fires, which 
cause deleterious effects that endanger human health; harm living resources, ecosystems, and 
material property; and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the 
environment (ASEAN, 2016). The government of Indonesia has enacted command and control 
regulations for tackling the haze pollution issue but with limited success and a lack of public 
trust (please see: Iskandar, 2012; Varkkey, 2016). The need for regulatory enforcement policies 
that deter and control emissions by increasing the responsibility of the economic agents that 
pollute the environment is inevitable for future policy choices.  
By focusing on the enforcement deterrence, this paper primarily aims to identify the 
state of implementation of current policies, especially enforcement obstacles for land/forest 
fires, through the perceptions of actors. Deterrence theory draws on a rational choice 
phenomenon in which an economic agent is assumed to weigh the costs and benefits of an 
action to avoid a sanction; when the likelihood of detection and punishment outweighs the 
benefits, a deterrent effect can be observed (Paternoster et al., 1997). Understanding how to 
enhance deterrence is vital because in regulatory enforcement studies, improving enforcement 
in a country where the governmental capacity is limited and societal support is emerging is a 
puzzling task (World Bank, 1992; Dasgupta, 2000).   
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Simorangkir and Sumantri (2002) stated that the weak enforcement of laws and 
regulations is becoming the biggest problem in managing forest and land fires in Indonesia. 
Carmenta et al. (2017) analyzed the perceived effectiveness of Fire Management Interventions 
using the Q method to quantify contention and consensus among stakeholders. In the hard 
measures against substantial actor factors, the enforcement of diverse Fire Management 
Interventions, including sanctions, would be preferred as an effective solution. Even though 
there are discrepancies related to the sources of fires, the findings reveal that there is a need to 
move from an oversimplification of fire phenomena and blaming for setting fires to 
multistakeholder policy engagement that considers the environment, the economy, and health. 
Furthermore, Budiningsih (2017) showed that a lack of coordination among governmental 
agencies was less than optimal in the context of fire suppression.  
Based on existing studies of land/forest fires in Indonesia, this paper extends the results 
of Carmenta et al. (2017) and follows the study of Matland (1995) by distinguishing the 
obstacles in the regulatory enforcement process, including the implementation of policies and 
within internal enforcement agencies. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study on 
environmental policies has considered deterrence from the perspective of law enforcement 
actors for the study areas of the Riau and South Sumatra Provinces. This paper addresses the 
following question: how do insufficient power and law enforcement capacity hamper 
deterrence in South Sumatra and Riau Provinces? 
The actor perspective, consisting of both internal and external stakeholders and 
including regulatory enforcement policies to address deterrence, is critical for improving the 
design of policies and on-the-ground implementation (Game et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, actor insights can provide a valuable piece of the puzzle in helping to focus on 
primary problems (Lo et al., 2006).  
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The part of the paper is structured as follows: The first part, section 3.2, presents the 
enforcement process in the case of land/forest fire in Indonesia. Moreover, section 3.3 will 
discuss the in-depth interview analysis and provincial area selection. Section 3.4 presents the 
interview results, followed by the research findings and discussion. Section 3.5 contains the 
conclusions and highlights possible future policy options for tackling haze pollution. 
3.2 INDONESIA ENFORCEMENT ARRANGEMENT FOR LAND/FOREST FIRE 
3.2.1 Institutional Arrangement  
The land/forest fire has been creating haze pollution that resulted in disturbance to a 
significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions. The law enforcement process, as part of post-
fire management activities, will impose sanctions against individual and corporate entities 
engaged in violations that have led to fires.  
Indonesia Code and Procedure of Criminal Law in Law No. 8/198126 defines law 
enforcement institutions as essential components of the system comprising Kepolisian 27 
(Police), Kejaksaan 28  (Attorney General), Pengadilan 29  (Court), and Rumah Tahanan 
 
26 Undang – Undang No. 8/1981 tentang Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (KUHAP)  
27 Based on Article 5 (1) Law No. 2/2002 on National Police of the Republic Indonesia (Kepolisian 
Negara Republik Indonesia) stated that the National Police is a state instrument that plays a role in 
maintaining the security and order of the community, enforcing the law, and providing protection, 
protection and services to the community in the context of maintaining domestic security. In the criminal 
violation the National Police have the authority (Article 16 (1) for example as follow: make arrests, 
detention, search and seizure; prohibit anyone from leaving or entering the crime scene for investigation 
purposes; summons people to be heard and examined as suspects or witnesses; bring in the experts 
needed in relation to the examination case.   
28 Based on Article 2 (1) Law No. 16/2004 on Attorney General of the Republic Indonesia (Kejaksaan 
Republik Indonesia) stated that Attorney General Office is a government agency that exercises state 
power in the field of prosecution and other authorities based on law. Article 30 stated that the Attorney 
General Office related to criminal violation have the authority including as follows: prosecuting the 
criminal case in the court room; implementing the judge’s provision and court decisions that have 
inkracht legal force; investigating certain criminal acts based on the law.   
29 Based on Article 2 (2) Law No.48/2009 on Judicial Power (Kekuasaan Kehakiman) stated that State 
courts implements and enforces law and justice based on Pancasila. Article 2 Law No. 12/2011 on 
Legislation Formation stated that Pancasila is the basis and ideology of Indonesia as well as the 
philosophical basis of the state. 
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(Correctional Facilities/Prison). Additionally, in the case of land/forest fire, the President 
Republic of Indonesia through Presidential Decree No.16/2011 which amendment by 
Presidential Decree No. 11/2015 has explicitly been instructed Ministry of Environmental and 
Forestry, Head of the Indonesia National Police and Attorney General of the Republic of 
Indonesia also Governor of Regional Government to improving the law enforcement and 
providing strict sanctions against individuals or companies that involved in land/forest fire 
activities. 
Indonesia National Police is instructed to increase pre-emptive and preventive 
measures in the context of controlling forest and land fires as well as being repressive in the 
context of law enforcement against land/forest fire violators. Moreover, the decree also directed 
the Civil Servant Investigator in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to carry out law 
enforcement against the violators together with Forest Rangers. Meanwhile, Prosecutor in 
Attorney General Office also needs to optimizing law enforcement in handling forest and land 
fire crime. Governor of Regional Government also has specific instruction from the President 
for enforcing severe sanctions to agricultural businesses that do not implement land fire control 
in their concession area. 
The institution of environmental enforcement will not be able to function adequately 
in implementing the enforcement policy without appropriate actor supporting in tackle the 
land/forest fire cases in Indonesia. Thus, in the next section, the paper will be discussing the 
law enforcement actor in the case of the land/forest fires in Indonesia. 
3.2.2 Criminal Enforcement Actor 
Enforcement of environmental law will be closely related to the ability of the 
enforcement actor and the community's perceived compliance with laws and regulations. 
Hence, the investigator, as enforcement actors, has a vital role in facts finding and gathering 
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substantial evidence in the environmental criminal violation to induce the enforcement 
deterrence in Indonesia.  
Definition of investigator according to Code and Procedure of Criminal Law in Law 
No. 8/1981 is stated in Article 6 (1) as follows: 
The investigator is (a) Officers of Republic of Indonesia National Police; 
(b) Assigned Official from Civil Servant who is given special authority by law.  
In the case of land/forest fire, the Investigator will from a Police Officer, Civil Servant 
Investigator from the Ministry of Environmental and Forestry (based on Article 94 Law No. 
32/2009) and Investigator from Local Government (based on Article 257 Law No. 23/201430) 
on Local Government.    
Police Investigator has the authority based on the consideration of the proof gathering 
need and determination of the causality of the criminal offense, as stated by Article 7 (1), Law 
No. 8/1981. The range of authority are from receiving a report of a crime; order to stop the 
crime suspect; making arrest, imprisonment, search and seizure; bringing the expertise needed 
to the examination case to stopping the investigation. On the other hand, Article 7 (2) Law 
No.8/1981, Investigators from the Assigned Official from Civil Servant have only had the 
authority under their respective law in performing their duties with coordination and 
supervision from Police Investigator. What is meant by "under their respective law" is, for 
example, Environmental and Forestry Investigator officials who carry out investigative duties 
only under the authority granted by the Indonesian Environmental and Forestry Law, which the 
investigator respective legal grounds were based. In Article 94 (2) Law No. 32/2009 stated the 
investigator's authority was similar to Article 7 (2) Law No. 8/1981.  However, Article 94 (3) 
 
30 Undang-Undang No.23 Tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah  
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in Law No. 32/2009 also limit the authority to making arrestment of the violator by Civil 
Servant Investigator as stated: 
In making arrests and imprisonment [………………], Civil Servant Investigator 
coordinates with Investigators from the Republic of Indonesia Police Officers. 
The next actors that also intensively related to the process of criminal enforcement 
offenses are prosecutors from the Attorney General in the prosecution's stages. The 
investigation's results that been carried out by Investigators are pass on to the Public Prosecutor 
for prosecuted in the judicial system. In Article 2 Law No. 16/200431 on the Attorney General's 
Office of the Republic of Indonesia, the Attorney General is the government agency that 
exercises state power in the field of prosecution and other authorities based on the law. In 
addition, the definition of Public Prosecutor according to Code and Procedure of Criminal Law 
in Law No. 8/1981 is stated in Article 13. Moreover, the authority of the Public Prosecutor is 
stated in Article 14. The detail articles are stated as follows: 
 Article 13: Public Prosecutors are Prosecutors who are authorized by this law to 
conduct prosecutions and implement judges' verdicts. 
Article 14:  
a. Receiving and examining the investigation case file from the Investigator; 
b. Conducting pre-prosecution if there are deficiencies in the investigation 
[……….], by giving instructions in the context of perfecting the investigation of 
the investigator; 
c. Provide an extension of imprisonment, carry out imprisonment [………]; 
d. Making Indictment Letter; 
e. Bestowing case to Court; 
f. Delivering notification to the defendant [………….]; 
g. Prosecuting 
[…………………] 
 
31 Undang-Undang No. 16/2004 tentang Kejaksaan Agung Republik Indonesia 
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Judges in the adjudication are the final stage of the criminal process in judicial action 
based on prevailing laws and regulations. The criminal law enforcement process is a series of 
legal proceedings that start from the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication process. Also, 
the sanctioning policy of the prosecution of criminal offenses or enforcement in the judicial 
process will be presented during the discussion in Chapter 4. 
Due to a vital role in gathering substantial legal evidence 32  to revealing an 
environmental criminal violation, law enforcement actors, i.e., investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges, are often confronted with a problem that cannot be resolved by themselves because 
beyond the limits of the actor expertise. Hence, during the enforcement process, the assistance 
of an Expert Witness is needed in obtaining and assessing evidence based on the truth of the 
facts. 
In the Law No. 8/1981 the definition of expert testimony by Expert Witness, as 
follows:  
Article 1 (28): Expert testimony is a description given by someone who has special 
expertise about the things needed to make clear a criminal case for examination. 
Article 186: An Expert's testimony is what an expert stated in a court hearing. 
Expert testimony has become one of the "strengths" of law enforcement actors to prove the 
occurrence of criminal violations. Even though Experts Witness not in the crime scene to see 
or hear directly during the criminal event, the law enforcement process often relies on expert 
testimony that has the specific knowledge related to the case.  
In the next section, the paper will be presenting an initial review of the law 
enforcement process in the case of the land/forest fires in Indonesia. 
 
 
32 Article 184 (1) Law No.8/1981 defines the legal evidence is: (a) Witness testimony; (b) Expert 
testimony; (c) Letter; (d) The Clue; (e) The defendant's testimony. 
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3.2.3 Initial Review on Enforcement Arrangement 
Despite the anti-haze legislation and institutional arrangement also law enforcers 
activity being enhanced, the enforcement capacity to addressing the root cause of land/forest 
fire has remained weak.  The persistence of land/forest fire has been showing the indication that 
the occurrence of lack of coordination among law enforcement institutions.  
Heroepoetri (2016) explained that the existing laws related to law enforcement in the 
case of land/forest fire have been excessive. However, its implementation is still very weak, 
including the capacity of law enforcement officers in investigating, prosecuting, and making 
court decisions (Trinirmalaningrum et al., 2015). One interesting case that dragging the citizen 
intention on the land/forest fire enforcement is in the case of palm oil plantation company 
released from the charge of burning down the forest and the obligation to pay Rp9.2 Trillion in 
South Sumatra Province. Kompas (2016), capturing the unique logic impression from Judge 
that has created a massive reaction to society is as follows: 
Burning the forest is not a problem; after all, burning land can still be planted and 
overgrown with acacia.  
By reading the verdict, the inability to prove the ecological losses, i.e., calculation of nutrient 
loss and biodiversity loss, and the absence of land damage in the burned land during the trial, 
creating the violations by the corporation cannot be proven. The case has been shown that both 
legal and enforcement capacity also capability is important, especially in criminal law 
enforcement. Hence, according to Hamzah (2005), proof systems due to environmental 
pollution or damage should not only by the element of error (deliberate or negligent elements).  
 Furthermore, Carmenta et al. (2011) described the inconsistent policy between the 
cause of fires and proposed policy management solutions in addressing the problem. In 
principle, the destruction of the environment and natural resources is an act of crime that causes 
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state losses, both in economic terms and ecological terms. However, the lack of policy by the 
government to push the balance between economic interests and losses that have to be recovered 
from land/forest fire will weaken the law enforcement on haze pollution. In the next part, the 
paper will present a detailed methodology in analyzing the enforcement deterrence based on 
the perspective of law enforcement actors.  
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 In-depth Interview Approach 
The paper uses in-depth interview analysis, a technique that includes intensive 
individual interviews with a few respondents to elaborate on their perspectives, in the context 
of detecting possible risk deterrence issues. Moreover, these interviews were designed to be 
semi-structured, with open-ended questions funneling the discussion from general law 
enforcement experience in land/forest fires to the incidence of hotspots and a discussion of 
obstacles to the enforcement of deterrence.  
Once the obstacles have been discussed, the respondent is asked to describe, in more 
detail, their subjective perceptions about the nature of the obstacles, especially in the context of 
political implementation and regulatory capacity. Follow-up questions then stimulate 
discussion with the respondent and a spontaneous inquiry about the probability of enhancing 
deterrence. Using qualitative in-depth interviews allows for a broader subjective understanding 
of deterrence that includes the detection of perceptions and the severity of sanctions. The 
interviews were conducted in Bahasa (the formal language of Indonesia), and supporting data 
were gathered through fieldwork in the Riau and South Sumatra Provinces in Indonesia during 
October 2018.  
3.3.2 Case and Respondent Selection Criteria 
The Riau and South Sumatra Provinces were selected as a background of the study 
because they provide opportunities to observe the complexities of haze pollution in Indonesia. 
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First, the Riau and South Sumatra Provinces are among the 14 provinces in Indonesia located 
on Sumatra Island, which has been profoundly influenced by the occurrence of hotspots. 
Second, both provinces have been critical in exposing the natural forest through land-use 
changes and forest destruction. The 2017 land cover quality index33 (Indeks Kualitas Tutupan 
Lahan) values for both provinces is among the lowest on Sumatra Island, with 51.89 points for 
Riau Province and 42.55 points for South Sumatra Province. 
On the other hand, the National Peatland Ecosystem Areas34 in the Riau and South 
Sumatra Provinces are the most extensive areas on Sumatra Island at 5,042,561 hectares and 
1,955,103 hectares, respectively. Previous studies have shown that aggressive human-made 
burning practices to clear and convert the land for palm oil plantations, especially in peatland, 
are a driving factor for haze pollution (Gaveau et al., 2014; Lestari et al., 2014)  
Due to interviewees were critical determinants of the data and to reduce the interview 
biased law enforcement representatives were selected for interviews based on the endorsement 
of their respective office, which assigned a specific officer as a respondent for the in-depth 
interview. Unfortunately, the Riau Local Environmental Agency did not respond to inquiries 
related to interviews with law enforcement representatives. The respondents were selected from 
among various law enforcement stakeholders to enable the elaboration of different perspectives. 
The selected enforcement officers were knowledgeable and experienced in enforcing 
environmental externalities, especially for haze pollution. Please refer to Table 3.1.  
 
33 The index is calculated by the existing forest area as one of the crucial components in the ecosystem 
divide by provincial or municipality area. Hence, forest cover in the province which has a value of 30 
percent will gets the score of 50, while the ideal forest cover has a value of 84.3 percent gets a maximum 
score of 100. As a forest cover with the ideal value is taken from Papua forest cover in 1982 covering 
84.3 percent of the provincial area. The data are derived from Indonesia Statistic of Environmental and 
Forestry 2017.   
34 Based on the Ministry of Environmental and Forestry Decree No. 
SK.130/MENLHK/SETJEN/PKL.0/2/2017 on Establishment Map of National Peatland Ecosystem 
Function.  
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The interviews started with prominent representatives who have direct involvement in 
the law enforcement process, namely, an Investigator and a Prosecutor who handle cases in the 
Riau and South Sumatra Provinces. The Investigator is a Police and Government Official (Civil 
Servant Investigator in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and Local Government) who 
has been given exclusive authority by law35 to conduct investigations. 
TABLE 3.1 Respondents for In-depth Interview  
ID Respondent Role  
D-1-RPolice Riau Regional Police  Investigator 
D-7-SSPolice South Sumatra Regional Police Investigator 
D-2-RAttorney Riau High Attorney General  Prosecutor 
D-6-SSAttorney South Sumatra High Attorney General Prosecutor 
D-5-SSLocalEA South Sumatra Local Environmental Agency Investigator 
D-3-MinEAF Ministry of Environmental and Forestry Investigator 
D-4-ExpertW Professor in Forest Fire from Bogor 
Agricultural University 
Expert Witness in 
Criminal Court 
ID-2-EnvNGO Coordinator – JIKALAHARI NGO 
ID-3-EnvNGO Executive Director – Green Trade Initiative  NGO 
ID-4-EnvNGO Forest Campaigner – GREENPEACE NGO 
Source: Author 
Moreover, the Prosecutor is a Public Prosecutor who is authorized by law to conduct 
prosecutions in the courtroom and execute the decisions of judges 36 . Furthermore, we 
interviewed an Expert who gives statements in the courtroom related to land/forest fire cases37 
and people in a nongovernmental organization who independently monitor the law enforcement 
process, specifically for haze pollution in Indonesia. 
The interview data were coded using Microsoft Excel and Word. The conversations 
were recorded after obtaining permission from the interviewees through written consent. Notes 
 
35 Article 6, Law Number 8 / 1981 on Code and Procedure of Criminal Law. 
36 Article 13, Law Number 8 / 1981 on Code and Procedure of Criminal Law. 
37 Article 186, Law Number 8 / 1981 on Code and Procedure of Criminal Law. 
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were also taken to complement and emphasize the critical points expressed by the respondents. 
The raw interviews were analyzed by developing a raw table of essential aspects and a summary 
of the interviewees' answers. Each important aspect of the study was organized and coded. 
3.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.4.1 The Incidence of Hotspots in Indonesia 
In the first part of this chapter, the paper discusses the points of view of the respondents 
as they relate to the nature of hotspots. The subjective knowledge of respondents in identifying 
the primary source of a land/forest fire is becoming an essential foundation for building 
enforcement policies.  
An Investigator from the Ministry of Environmental and Forestry (D-3-MinEAF) 
argued that the fires in Indonesia are 100 percent triggered by humans. He believed that the 
tropical rainforest in Indonesia, compared to the temperate forest, is unlikely to burn naturally. 
Moreover, the Investigator from the Riau Regional Police (D-1-RPolice) stated that based on 
legal fact-finding during criminal investigations, land/forest fires are deliberately initiated by 
palm oil companies and smallholder plantation farmer. The Expert in the criminal court for haze 
pollution cases from Bogor Agriculture University (D-1-ExpertW) stated that humans trigger 
99.9 percent of fires, and in most cases, cigarettes and mosquito repellent, which are used as a 
timer, are connected to a matchstick starter and placed in a stack of wood and branches that 
have been cut down. The Forest Campaigner from Greenpeace (ID-4-EnvNGO) argued that 
land forest fires in the peat areas are mainly caused by changes in the land-use change to 
plantations by extensive peatland draining through the opening of canals.  
In contrast, the paper also identified a counternarrative related to intentional land/forest 
fires from South Sumatra Regional Police Investigator (D-7-SSPolice), who made the following 
argument:  
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Investigator: In my opinion, there is no intentionally burning except by 
smallholders who use fire to clear their plantation efficiently. Moreover, it is 
unlikely for a palm oil plantation to carry out a deliberate burning because it will 
result in the loss of productive palm oil trees that burns down.  
 
With regard to further detail on the area of burning, the coordinator of JIKALAHARI, 
an Environmental NGO based in Riau (ID-2-EnvNGO), stated that most of the fires in Riau 
Province occur inside the concessions of companies. Table 3.2 shows the Plantation Companies 
that have HGU38 and IUPHHK39 with fires occurrence in their concession areas during 2015-
2017 in Riau Province. In 2017, seven companies with HGU, or 54 percent of the companies, 
had three consecutive years of burning on their land. A total of 65 companies with IUPHHK 
had burned land in 2017, and 82 percent of the companies with IUPHHK or 53 companies 
burned their land during the 2015-2017 period. As a result, the coordinator argued that 
plantation companies should be responsible for maintaining and extinguishing fires on their 
concession areas. 
In general, the first finding on the nature of hotspots shows that almost all respondents 
agreed that the land/forest fires that create haze pollution are triggered by intentional human 
action to clear and convert land for palm oil plantations, consistent with previous studies (please 
see: Miettinen et al., 2012; Gaveau et al., 2014; Lestari et al., 2014). However, the interviews 
also reveal a different law enforcement perspective related to the nature of fires, which is critical 
in the context of gaining a common understanding of officer perceptions about potential 
responsibility and observable policy implementation gaps (Anderson et al., 2016).   
Furthermore, before presenting further respondent perceptions on the nature of hotspots and the 
 
38 HGU: The right to cultivate land that is directly controlled by the state, for a certain period of time, 
for agriculture, fisheries or animal husbandry (Hak Guna Usaha).  
39 IUPHHK: Business License for Utilization of Timber Forest Product (Ijin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil 
Hutan Kayu) 
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detection probability of current policies, this paper presents an overview of enforcement action 
data in the Riau and South Sumatra Provinces for land/forest fires by law enforcement actors. 
Please refer to Tables 3.3a and 3.3b.  
 
TABLE 3.2 Hotspots in Concession Area – Riau Province  
 Hotspot in Concession Area  
Number Repeated Companies with 
Concession Area that has the Hotspot 
(3 Years Observation) 
 
Hotspot 
(Number of 
Company 
HGU) 
Hotspot (Number of 
Company IUPHHK) 
HGU – Repeated 
Hotspot – 2 Years 
(3 Years) 
IUPHHK 
Repeated 
Hotspot- 2 Years 
(3 Years) 
2015 389 (41) 3,641 (108) 
12 (7) 23 (53) 2016 111 (21) 1,859 (76) 
2017 28 (13) 902 (65) 
Source: Author Calculation and JIKALAHARI dataset.  
Tables 3.3a and 3.3b show a downturn pattern related to the number of hotspots and 
burning areas in the Riau and South Sumatra Provinces in the 2015-2017 period, but 
interestingly, the latest data in the year 201840 show a dramatic increase. However, the tables 
also present a low pattern in the enforcement coverage and monitoring process from the year 
2015 until 2017 for the case of land/forest fires. On average, the Police were able to apprehend41 
a suspect in only 8.10 percent of hotspot cases in Riau Province and 0.13 percent of hotspot 
cases in South Sumatra Province. 
 
40 The latest data from SiPongi (Karhutla Monitoring System) show 296 hotspots in Riau Province (an 
increase of 275 percent) and 394 hotspots in South Sumatra Province (an increase of 39 percent), 
<http://sipongi.menlhk.go.id/home/main> as of 01/27/2019.  
41 The apprehension data for the period 2015-2017 in Riau and South Sumatra Province by Ministry of 
Environmental and Forestry Civil Servant Investigator were not available. However, the criminal 
enforcement statistical data from Ministry of Environmental and Forestry only present the cases 
progressed to the judicial stage were as follows: 2015 (0 cases); 2016 (1 cases) and 2017 (1 cases) 
(MoEF, 2018).  
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TABLE 3.3a Enforcement on Land and Forest Fires in Riau Province  
Year Hotspot 
Plantati
on 
Area 
(000) 
Ha 
Total Burning 
Area  
Apprehension by 
Riau Regional 
Police 
Court Decision on Land/Forest Fire Ratio 
Area 
(000) 
Ha 
% to 
Plantati
on Area 
Suspect 
Company 
Suspect 
Individual 
Company Proved 
Guilty 
Individual Proved 
Guilty  
Monitoring Process 
(%) 
Enforcement 
Coverage (%) 
Burning 
Area (Ha) 
Number 
of 
Company 
Burning 
Area 
(Ha) 
No of 
Indivi-
dual 
Apprehe
nsion to 
Hotspot  
Punished 
Defendant 
to 
Apprehen-
sion 
Punished 
Burning 
Area to 
Total 
Burning 
Area 
Punished 
Burning 
Area to 
Plantation 
Area 
1 2 3 4A 4B 5 6 7A 7B 8A 8B 9 [(5+6)/2] 
10 [(7B+9B / 
(5+6)]  
11 
[(7A+9A)/ 
4A]  
12 [(7A+9A) / 
3] 
2015 1,927.0 2,290.7 183.8 8.0 19.0 56.0 21,418.0 1.0 2,366.0 26.0 3.89 36.00 12.94 1.04 
2016 393.0 2,430.5 85.2 3.5 2.0 77.0 120.0 1.0 2.8 3.0 20.10 3.80 0.14 0.01 
2017 79.0 2,493.2 6.9 0.3 0.0 21.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 1.0 0.31 4.76 0.16 0.00 
Average 8.10 14.85 4.41 0.35 
Source: Ministry of Environmental and Forestry; Supreme Court Database; Riau Regional Police Investigation Data 
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TABLE 3.3b Enforcement on Land and Forest Fires in South Sumatra Province  
Year Hotspot 
Plantati
on 
Area 
(000) 
Ha 
Total Burning 
Area 
Apprehension by 
South Sumatra 
Regional Police 
Court Decision on Land/Forest Fire Ratio 
Area  
(000) 
Ha 
% to 
Plantati
on 
Area 
Suspect 
Company 
Suspect 
Individual 
Company Proved 
Guilty 
Individual Proved 
Guilty  
Monitoring Process   
(%) 
Enforcement 
Coverage (%) 
Burning 
Area 
(Ha) 
Number 
of 
Company 
Burning 
Area 
(Ha) 
No of 
Individual 
Apprehen
sion to 
Hotspot  
Punished 
Defendant 
to 
Apprehen-
sion 
Punished 
Burning 
Area to 
Total 
Burning 
Area 
Punished 
Burning 
Area to 
Plantation 
Area 
1 2 3 4A 4B 5 6 7A 7B 8A 8B 9 [(5+6)/2] 
10 [(7B+9B / 
(5+6)]  
11 
[(7A+9A)/ 
4A]  
12 [(7A+9A) / 
3]  
2015 3,264.0 1,002.2 646.3 64.5 1.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 6,104.0 4.0 0.00 80.00 0.94 0.61 
2016 266.0 1,064.4 8.8 0.8 1.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 203.7 1.0 0.10 11.11 2.32 0.02 
2017 283.0 1,020.3 3.6 0.3 1.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.30 9.09 0.01 0.00 
Average 0.13 33.40 1.09 0.21 
Source: Ministry of Environmental and Forestry; Supreme Court Database; South Sumatra Regional Police Investigation Data 
72 
 
Furthermore, given the higher hotspot occurrence in South Sumatra Province, as shown in Table 
3.3b, the coverage of punished burning land to the overall burning area based on a court case 
in South Sumatra is lower compared to Riau Province (Table 3.3a), with values of 4.41percent 
compared to 1.09 percent. However, in the same table, the paper also shows that the court was 
likely to punish guilty individual suspects and companies that had already been apprehended 
by the Police in South Sumatra Province compared to Riau Province.  
The data reveal that the less stringent actual enforcement and low detection 
probability, especially in South Sumatra Province, highlight the inadequacy of deterrence for 
environmental offenses. As a result, economic agents do not correctly receive signals not to 
engage in unsustainable and illegal activities. In the next section, more detail on how 
enforcement obstacles shape deterrence perceptions is presented.  
3.4.2 The Political Implementation of Regulatory Approaches 
In policy implementation, securing compliance is an essential part of ensuring that 
goals are reached and not thwarted by opponents of the policy. Moreover, compliance depends 
on whether or not regulators have enough power over others. The more regulatory power 
required for an action, the more likely it is that an economic agent will comply with a request. 
As a result, the central principle of political implementation states that implementation 
outcomes are determined by power (Matland, 1995).  
A fine, as part of the regulatory power in enforcing compliance, which equals a 
percentage or fraction of the evasion, ultimately reduces the ability to hide noncompliance and 
therefore improves overall deterrence (Gupta, 2007). However, the inability to execute a fine 
as part of a lack of power will hamper the enforcement deterrence.  
Three major laws have been enacted in Indonesia to punish the violators in the case of 
land/forest fire as follows: 
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1. Law No. 1/1946 on Criminal Law. The defendant will be facing punishment for 
intentionally causes a fire or explosion faces a minimum of 12 years and a maximum of 
20 years imprisonment  
2. Environmental Management Law No. 23/1997, which was amended by Law No. 32/ 
200942  on Environmental Protection Management. The defendant who causes haze 
pollution and intentionally commits an action that violates the ambient standard will be 
criminally prosecuted with a minimum punishment of three years and a maximum of 10 
years imprisonment as well as a minimum fine of Rp3,000,000,000 and a maximum fine 
of Rp10,000,000,000 (Article 98 and Article 99). 
3. Plantation Law No. 18/2004, which was amended and strengthened by Law No. 
39/201443, imposes criminal sanctions through severe fines and sentencing for burning 
opening plantations. The punishment on the offender who uses the burning method in 
opening/cultivation plantation land (Article 108) faces imprisonment for ten years and 
a maximum fine of Rp10,000,000,000. 
The interviewee, a Prosecutor from the Riau High Attorney General Office (D-2-
RAttorney), explained the existence of obstacles in the execution of environmental recovery 
fines based on court verdicts, not including detailed regulations in the Act related to the 
land/forest fire. Furthermore, there are no special arrangements in the case of defendants 
proposing installments, as part of state debts, for paying ecological recovery costs. The 
Investigator from the Ministry of Environmental and Forestry (D-3-MinEAF) also strengthened 
the argument by giving an example: 
 
42 Undang – Undang No. 32/2009 tentang Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup. 
43 Undang – Undang No. 39/2014 tentang Perkebunan. 
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Investigator: I am using an example from the criminal cases related to a palm oil 
plantation company that was found guilty by the court. The company was fined Rp1 
billion and required to restore the burning environment at the cost of 
Rp13,000,000,000 or USD916,331 44 . However, this verdict has become an 
"advantageous" for the company as a defendant because there is no direct financial 
mechanism that clearly stated how these fines will be utilized implemented, and as 
a result, the Rp13,000,000,000 restoring cost has never been paid by the company.  
 
In contrast, the Investigator from South Sumatra Local Environmental Agency (D-5-
SSLocalEA) noted the existence of obstacles in the early stage of the law enforcement process, 
namely, high political pressure on the Environmental Agency. As a result, the Local 
Environmental Agency could not independently build law enforcement cases on land/forest 
fires in South Sumatra Province; instead, they could only provide a monitoring and fire 
prevention function. Moreover, the Investigator argued that the lack of support and 
prioritization on land/forest fire cases by the provincial government had undermined his role in 
the South Sumatra Environmental Agency.  
Furthermore, given the high political and economic costs to the local government, the 
obstacles will also create lower incentives for agriculture development (Potter, 2016; McCarthy 
et al., 2012). The Executive Director of Green Trade Initiative (ID-3-EnvNGO) argued that an 
incentive mechanism must be built in to provide "rewards" for those who are already effectively 
developing the sustainable palm oil sector. For example, local governments that are able to 
manage highly productive palm oil plantations in their region without fire outbreaks or 
environmental damage will be rewarded an additional transferable fund (General Allocation 
 
44 The Bank of Indonesia transaction exchange rate in June 21, 2019 is 1 USD = Rp14,187.  
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Fund 45 ) from the National Budget. Also, palm oil companies that maintain proper 
environmental governance and prevent fire in their concession areas will be given a channel to 
strengthen their investments or provided further financing schemes. Commodity governance is 
still needed as a safeguard to prevent the negative spillover on the environment. 
In all, the present study analyzed obstacles to enforcing deterrence and reaching policy 
goals. Thornton et al. (2005) studied deterrence and found that economic agents will reassure 
their compliance when someone else is caught and penalized. The paper identified insufficient 
fine enforcement in the Riau and South Sumatra Provinces, which is critical in the context of 
building regulatory deterrence. The existence of obstacles to enforcing penalties reflects the 
inability of law enforcement to send a signal of deterrence not to violate legal procedures and 
influence compliance. Furthermore, the paper also identified a patronage network that creates 
failure for the government to uphold effective policies against influential companies who ignore 
illegal commercial fires. The high pressure and political influence in the region, especially in 
corporate criminal cases, is one of the reasons that regional investigators are not as strong as 
investigators from the Police and Central Government Office. This finding is in line with 
Varkkey (2016), who discussed the difficulty of overturning the system of patronage politics. 
The collusion of local elites and plantation owners at the local level creates a failure to comply 
with formal legal permit procedures (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2014). 
3.4.3 The Regulator Organization Capacity 
The central principle in administrative policy implementation to ensure desired 
outcomes is through sufficient organizational capacity or resources (Matland, 1995). Therefore, 
law enforcement must have adequate financial and political capital support from government 
 
45 Law No. 33/2004 defined the General Allocation Fund (DAU) as a Central Government transferable 
fund to Local Governments from the National Budget, with the aim of equalizing the distribution of 
financial capacity between regions in Indonesia in the context of decentralization. 
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agencies to implement regulations successfully. Gajduschek (2015) defined regulatory 
enforcement capacity as the ability of regulatory agencies to deter potential externalities. 
Furthermore, a normative mechanism that induces compliance through the legitimacy of the 
person requesting an action is generally sufficient in administrative implementation. However, 
administrative policy implementation problems may occur because of poor coordination, 
insufficient resources, or insufficient time (Etzioni, 1961). In order to identify the real obstacles 
in law enforcement implementation, the interviewees were asked to describe their own 
experience in their respective offices.  
The majority of the respondents indicated insufficient budget resources in the Budget 
Execution (Allotment) Document46 as a challenge in enforcing land/forest fire cases. Moreover, 
the Investigator from Riau Regional Police (D-1-RPolice) stated that the enforcement process 
is without specific budget allocation but only under a routine budget. However, the Prosecutor 
from Riau High Attorney General Office (D-2-RAttorney) stated that land/forest fires are 
treated as individual cases, and there is a specific allocation for law enforcement in the Budget 
Execution (Allotment) Document. However, the expenditure allocation is for the completion of 
only two land/forest fire cases per year. As a result, given the insufficient budget, the 
Investigator from Riau Regional Police (D-1-RPolice) and the Forest Campaigner from NGO 
– Greenpeace (ID-4-EnvNGO) stated that gathering substantial evidence to determine the actor 
that triggered a land/forest fire is challenging for law enforcement.  
The Prosecutor from South Sumatra High Attorney General (D-6-SSAttorney), in line 
with Budiningsih (2017), pointed out that coordination is also a problem in the land/forest fire 
enforcement process.  
 
46 Article 1, Ministry of Finance Decree No. 171/PMK.02/2013 define Budget Execution Document 
(DIPA) is a budget implementation document prepared by budget user (government institution) and 
served as the base for budget execution or implementation.  
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Prosecutor: The existence of an egocentricity and lack of coordination between 
public prosecutors and police investigators has resulted in a limited number of 
land/forest fire cases prosecuted in the Criminal Court. 
 
There is another point of view when discussing coordination to tackle haze pollution. 
The Expert Witness (ID-1-ExpertW) argued that establishing a multidoor enforcement 
coordination approach to handle land/forest fire cases is the crucial answer due in part to the 
complexity of cases and the limited capacity of law enforcement, for example, in identifying 
the extent of a plantation area with an illegal status occupied by plantation companies. 
Expert Witness: There was a company that received cultivation right in 2014 but 
had been operating since the early 1990s. Moreover, there are non-sustainable 
plantation areas that have been harvested to supply the existing market demand for 
fresh fruit brunch but only operate with location permits.  
 
In parallel to the multidoor coordination arrangement, the Investigator from the 
Ministry of Environmental and Forestry (D-3-MinEAF) also indicated the necessity of 
multidisciplinary knowledge in tackling haze pollution: 
Investigator: the economic valuation for the lost benefit in the case of land/forest 
fires is needed because the burning creates fertile land that is ready to be planted. 
In addition, the value of the ecological or recovery losses should use an economic 
valuation to avoid double counting and to increase data accuracy. 
 
In sum, this paper found that the obstacles that shape deterrence were not solely based 
on political implementation but also emerged from the implementation of administrative 
policies. The obstacles emanate from budgets and a lack of coordination among law 
enforcement officers and institutions. Law enforcement interventions involving the deployment 
of an investigation and prosecution in the case of land/forest fires need more support, especially 
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in terms of financial resources, to avoid deterrence failure among violators. Previous studies 
have shown that a lack of sufficient financial resources for the enforcement of environmental 
regulations creates low deterrence (Sparrow, 2008 and Kagan et al., 2003). Furthermore, the 
outcomes of the paper, which include a lack of coordination between law enforcement 
institutions in South Sumatra Province, extend the study by Budiningsih (2017). The chance of 
environmental policy violators being caught or punished is reduced by ineffective law 
enforcement coordination. Moreover, enforcement that creates deterrence is related to not only 
the severity of penalties but also the probability of detection as a crucial element that drives 
compliance (Cohen, 2000). 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Deterrence emanates from the probability of detection and the severity of sanctions. 
This paper investigates how insufficient power and law enforcement capacity could hamper and 
deter policies for tackling haze pollution. The paper uses in-depth interview analysis, a 
technique that includes intensive individual interviews with a few respondents to elaborate on 
their perspectives, in the context of detecting possible risk deterrence issues. The in-depth 
interviews reveal that current regulatory enforcement is still limited in sending a strong signal 
about the punishment of intentional fire behavior.  
Previous studies have been analyzed that the hard measures against substantial actor 
factors, the enforcement of diverse Fire Management Interventions, including sanctions, would 
be preferred as an effective solution. This paper is extending the results through analyzed in a 
more comprehensive view by considering deterrence from the perspective of law enforcement 
actors with the study areas of the Riau and South Sumatra Province. This paper is revealing the 
enforcement obstacles that hamper deterrence and create the persistence of haze pollution at 
South Sumatra and Riau Provinces. The average apprehension by Police is only 8.10 percent, 
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with 4.41 percent punished burning area in Riau Province. Moreover, South Sumatra Province, 
the enforcement coverage, and monitoring are lower compared to Riau Province, 0.13 percent 
and 1.09 percent, respectively. The lack of special arrangements for environmental recovery 
costs and direct financial mechanisms for how fines are to be utilized has hampered the 
enforcement of deterrence. Moreover, the limited budget and lack of coordination of agencies 
indicate a low probability of being inspected. As a result, the benefit of noncompliance is 
relatively high, and noncompliance practice prevails.  
There are many ways to strengthen regulatory enforcement policies, especially when 
dealing with substantial political influence. The establishment of policy regimes that include a 
fiscal policy for environmental management cannot be overlooked as a reference point for the 
best future solutions. The ability to impose taxes to regulate pollution and generate revenue for 
the government should be considered, and an improved capacity can enhance the enforcement 
of haze pollution deterrence in Indonesia.  
In the next chapter, this paper will be further investigating the actual environmental 
harm that has been internalized by criminal enforcement in the case of land/forest fire. 
Subsequently, enforcement of criminal offenses is seen as a last resort applied when the harm 
to society or the benefit to the offender is significant, and the probability of detection is low. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL HARM: ASSESSING                                                              
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON HAZE POLLUTION USING                                      
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF COURT DECISION 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, enforcement is a method of securing compliance 
with the policy. Enforcement with greater certainty of deterrence, severity, and 
clarity of punishment is more likely to drive people to comply with the law because 
they fear legal sanctions. This chapter will investigate the influence of the gravity 
of haze pollution as environmental harm on judicial sanctioning decisions in the 
case of land/forest fires. We adopt a novel approach to analyze judicial sanctioning 
decisions on criminal offenders based on different types of defendant occupations 
and burning site locations. By using a qualitative approach based on content 
analysis, we observe that the actual gravity of environmental harm does not 
consistently affect the pattern of judicial sentencing decisions. More specifically, 
the gravity of the judicial sanction imposed on the plantation company and its 
director and manager is less consistent with internalizing the harm caused by the 
offense. In contrast, in the case of the estate employee, laborer, and 
farmer/landowner, the judicial sanction is relatively consistent with the gravity of 
the environmental harm. Overall, judicial sanctioning decisions that are insensitive 
to the degree of the environmental harm that should be internalized underlie the 
persistent and devastating haze problem in Indonesia. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Land/forest fires in Indonesia have become a severe and prominent problem that 
represents a regional environmental crisis. The problem's devastating effects include 
transboundary haze pollution, with a Pollutant Standard Index greater than 2,000 in the 
Southeast Asian Region. In addition, haze pollution contributes to widespread respiratory 
infection and premature deaths (Hsu et al., 2016). Indonesia is adopting command-and-control 
regulatory policies in addressing haze pollution (Varkkey, 2016). A regulatory or known as 
command-and-control is one of the policies in environmental management that includes 
legislative development, strategic planning, permitting, monitoring, inspection, enforcement, 
and reporting (Farmer, 2007). The previous chapter has examined various types of instruments 
in environmental policy, such as regulatory, voluntarism, market-based instruments, and 
information (for a detailed comparison, see Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Faure and 
Weishaar, 2012).     
Despite adequate environmental policy regulations, the hotspot data suggest that burns 
have been and remain frequent and persistent pollution-causing events within Sumatra and 
Kalimantan. The persistence of haze pollution in Indonesia is due to a lack of enforcement by 
appropriate actors who could have exerted a lasting impact on the problem (Varkkey, 2016). 
For example, in the year 2000, two burners from South Sumatra, believed to have been hired 
by a plantation company (Varkkey, 2013), were sentenced to 20 months in prison for allegedly 
setting fire to concession lands (Saharjo et al., 2003). In contrast, plantation companies are 
rarely prosecuted because they have cultivated strong patronage linkages with key figures in 
the ruling government elite who have shielded them from responsibility for their role in causing 
environmental problems (Varkkey, 2013). Aligned with this background, the main aim of the 
paper is to analyze law enforcement concerning haze pollution, especially in the judicial system, 
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adopting a qualitative approach. The aim is to understand the dimension of judicial decisions 
in relation to criminal enforcement and environmental harm. 
To the best of our knowledge, most of the previous studies by economists have 
understood enforcement as a method of securing compliance with policy (e.g., Gray and 
Shimsack, 2011; Kagan et al., 2003). However, in environmental policy, enforcement also 
requires ensuring that preventative action is taken to protect the environment and mete out 
appropriate sanctions for criminal offenses (Farmer, 2007). Enforcement of criminal offenses 
is seen as a last resort applied when the harm to society or the benefit to the offender is 
significant, and the probability of detection is low. Enforcement with greater certainty of 
deterrence, severity, and clarity of punishment is more likely to drive people to comply with 
the law because they fear legal sanctions (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Thus, stimuli (e.g., 
punishments and rewards) drive people to engage in or desist from crime (Becker, 1968). This 
assumption is based on logical choice models of crime whereby actors are generally rational 
such that social conditions can be manipulated to reduce crime (Cornish and Clarke, 2014). 
Courts are critical elements in the enforcement of criminal law. They can impose 
stricter sanctions and punish noncompliance (Farmer, 2007). Moreover, a court in a judicial 
system acts as an independent arbiter of the interpretation and implementation of the law. A 
significant study on the frame of the common law and an economic viewpoint was performed 
to help understand judicial behavior (please see Spiller and Gely, 2007, in a US-based overview; 
Monsieurs et al. 2009 in Belgian case). However, in the environmental offense context, there 
are limited studies that discuss the issue of enforcement from the perspective of the judicial 
system regarding the prosecution of environmental crime. One of the studies using an empirical 
method, Billiet et al., (2014), analyzed the details of different judicial policy options and a path 
to the appellate court in the case of Flanders. The analysis determined that the sanctioning 
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policies of judges varied and consisted of balancing environmental and criminal law, whereas 
penalties increased with the level of harm. 
Furthermore, Fogel and Lipovsek (2013) performed an analysis of 29 legal cases filed 
in Ontario, Canada, between 2008 and 2012. They found that the court's decision to determine 
the ability of environmental crime evidence to overcome the challenges of the limited scientific 
evidence and expert testimony 47  in a trial is critical. Finally, White (2010) studied the 
development of the prosecution of environmental crime. Using socio-legal development case 
studies, this researcher observed that consistency in the sentencing of environmental offenses 
determines the deterrent effect of legislation. If the sanctions are perceived to be low, this will 
potentially weaken environmental law enforcement efforts.  
Furthermore, although the limited body of theoretical research has developed exciting 
insight into judicial sanctioning decisions regarding environmental criminal violations, no study 
has explicitly investigated and provided a detailed analysis of defendants' occupation and 
offense locations. Although this factor should not matter in principle, the analysis of Billiet and 
Rousseau (2011) showed that there are marked differences in sanctioning decisions across 
judicial districts. Referring to a previous study on inadequate law enforcement in discussing the 
background of haze pollution in Indonesia, the current study thus addresses the following 
question: Are variations in judicial sanctioning decisions with respect to defendants and 
burning site locations influenced by the gravity of environmental harm in the land/forest fire 
case?  
The notion of harm in the context of this paper follows Brickey (2008), who perceived 
it as an axis connecting criminal conduct and the punitive sanction. The critical criminal 
environmental policy is the prevention of unjustifiable harm, given that the expected sanction 
 
47 In the Indonesia case, Art. 184 Law No. 8/1981 states that one type of legal evidence in a criminal 
court is expert testimony. The evidence verification of the expert testimony in trial will be necessary to 
elucidate the case (Art. 186 Law No. 8/1981). 
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is equal to the harm caused by the offender and that loss of wealth will provide adequate 
deterrence (Cohen, 1992; Polinsky and Shavel, 1994; Garoupa, 2001). Furthermore, the 
sanction should be affected by gravity consideration whereby certain conduct warrants more 
severe sanctions (Brickey, 2008).  
There are several benefits of using court decisions to understand judicial sanctioning 
decisions within various contexts. First, courts constitute a public forum for a person with a just 
claim to bring evidence and have it heard and acted upon (Preston, 2016). Second, courts' 
decisions help us understand the dimension of law enforcement. Courts enforce the law made 
by the government and hold executives responsible for their decisions (Preston, 2016). Third, 
courts' decisions as the outputs of enforcing environmental laws provide feedback of clarity, 
certainty, predictability, and effectiveness regarding the actual implementation of the law 
(Preston, 2012). Fourth, courts' decisions contain reasoned arguments and explicitly exhibit 
rationality and logical decision (Preston, 2016). The discussion on judicial sanction decisions 
in this chapter is fine and imprisonment in the case of land/forest fire.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents an overview of 
domestic law and Indonesia's legal system. Next, the chapter will discuss content analysis and 
data collection. Then, the paper presents the analysis followed by research findings and a 
discussion. In the last section, the study's conclusions are presented. 
4.2 OVERVIEW OF INDONESIA DOMESTIC LAW  
4.2.1 Indonesia Criminal Legislation  
This part would be discussing the policy design related to the land/forest fire. The 
discussion will start with an overview of Indonesia's legislation construction, primarily related 
to criminal law. The standard ground for the separation of powers in the Indonesian 
government, known as the Trias Politica, is based on the 1945 Constitution, which distributes 
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power between the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. The Supreme Court and other 
general courts constitute the judicial branch, which carries judicial power and is an independent 
entity, along with the legislative and executive branches (Law No. 48/2009 on Judicial Power). 
The judicial power of the courts is to adjudicate criminal and civil cases according to the 
provisions of laws and regulations (Article 25, Law No. 48/2009).  
Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP), which is outlined in Law No. 1/1946, 
and Kitab Undang–Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (KUHAP), which is outlined in Law No. 
8/1981, together constitute the Indonesian code of Criminal Law and Procedures. KUHAP 
defines law enforcement institutions as essential components of the system comprising Police, 
Attorney General, Court, and Correctional Facilities/Prison. This paper follows the definition 
of 'defendant' stated in KUHAP as a suspect prosecuted, investigated, and adjudicated in court 
(Article 1 (15), Law No.8/1981). Additionally, the criminal law should suspect a person who 
committed an act or was negligent based on initial evidence of a violation (Article 1 (14), Law 
No.8/1981). 
Indonesia's criminal justice process encompasses three main stages. In the first stage, 
police authorities conduct an examination and investigation, as stated in Law No. 2/2002 on 
National Police. Furthermore, there is a predefined condition as start base for criminal justice 
process: a report of a crime (Article 1 (24), Law No.8/1981), a complaint of a crime (Article  
1(25), Law No.8/1981), or a crime caught in action (Article 1 (19), Law No.8/1981). Then, the 
Attorney General, as a public prosecutor, triggers the next stage of the criminal justice process 
through the prosecutorial function, as stated in Law No.16/2004 on the Indonesian Attorney 
General. One of the primary functions of the public prosecutor is a completion on the file of a 
case and conducts an additional examination before it is passed by a court (Article 30, Law No. 
16/2004). Moreover, the public prosecutor also prosecutes the case to the relevant court having 
jurisdiction over the matter. Law No. 8/1981 Article 143 (1) requires the prosecutor to prepare 
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a letter of conviction, presenting the case at trial and for executing the sentence from the court 
decision. 
Adjudication is the final stage of the criminal justice process that involves judicial 
action that determines matters equally and honestly based on prevailing laws and regulations. 
The panel of judges is appointed based on the case submitted by the prosecutor. Furthermore, 
the verification of evidence in the court hearing serves as a basis for the judges to decide 
whether the defendant is guilty (Article 183, Law No. 8/1981). Criminal judges may shape the 
sanctioning policy based on facts proven in the court hearing. Article 191 (1) Law No. 8/1981 
defines that the defendant will be released from punishment when no substantial evidence is 
underlying the crime presented in the courtroom, as stated as follows: 
If the court in it is of the opinion that from the results of the examination at the 
courtroom, the defendant's guilt for the actions committed against him was not 
legally and convincingly proven, then the defendant is given acquittal verdict.  
 
However, when the evidence is sufficient to prove the violation of the offense, then the judge 
will decide to impose the sanction on the defendant, as stated in Article 193 (1) Law No. 8/1981 
as follows: 
If the court believes that the defendant is guilty of doing a criminal offense was 
indicted, then the court handed down the crime verdict. 
 
Based on the judicial decision, the prosecutor and the defendant or his lawyer have the 
right to appeal (Article 223, Law No.8/1981). The appeals shall not be subject to the decision 
of acquittal (putusan bebas) or the judgment of dismissal of all allegations (putusan lepas dari 
segala tuntutan hukum) (Article 67, Law No. 8/1981). A high court in the appeals and cassation 
process may overturn the judgment of all criminal cases other than those of the Supreme Court. 
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The element of court decision letter in the criminal verdict as stated in Article 197 (1) 
Law No. 8/1981 as follows: 
a. The letterhead of the verdict is written: FOR JUSTICE BASED ON ALMIGHTY 
GOD (Demi Keadilan Berdasarkan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa); 
b. Full name, place of birth, age or date, gender, nationality, residence, religion, 
and occupation of the defendant; 
c. The indictment, as contained in the indictment; 
d.  Concise considerations about facts and circumstance along with the 
evidentiary tools obtained from the examination at the courtroom which is the 
basis for determining the violation of the defendant; 
e.  Criminal prosecution, as contained in the letter of prosecution; 
f.  The statutory provisions which are the basis criminal sanctions or actions and 
articles of law and regulations which form the legal basis of the decision 
accompanied aggravating circumstances and alleviating the defendant; 
g. The day and date when the panel of judges convenes unless a single judge 
examines the case;  
h. Statement of the defendant's violation, the statement has been fulfilled all 
elements in the formulation of a crime are accompanied by the qualifications 
and penalties or actions imposed; 
i. Provision to whom the court fee is charged with stated the exact amount and 
provisions regarding evidence; 
j. Statement that all the letters turned out to be fake or statement where lies, if 
there is an authentic letter considered fake; 
k. An order for the defendant to be imprisonment or remain in prison or to be 
released; 
l. day and date of the decision, name of the public prosecutor, name of the judge 
who decides and names the secretary of the court; 
 
The decision letter is signed by the Judges and the court secretary immediately after the verdict 
is pronounced (Article 200, Law No. 8/1981). 
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4.2.2 Domestic Law on Haze Pollution  
The broader framework of legislation related to land/forest fires has adopted a zero-
burning policy with disaster risk reduction and preventive and repressive approaches 
(Nurhidayah, 2013). Three major laws have been used to criminalize land burners in Indonesia. 
The first is Law No. 1/1946 on Criminal Law. An offender who intentionally causes a fire or 
explosion faces a minimum of 12 years and a maximum of 20 years imprisonment (Article 187). 
In the case of negligence, the offender faces a minimum of one year and up to five years of 
imprisonment (Article 188).  
The second law is Environmental Management Law No. 23/1997, which was amended 
by Law No. 32/200948 on Environmental Protection Management. An offender who causes haze 
pollution in Indonesia and intentionally commits an action that violates the ambient standard 
also breaches the standards of environmental damage. It will be criminally prosecuted under 
the law. The offender punishment is a minimum of three years and a maximum of 10 years 
imprisonment as well as a minimum fine of Rp3,000,000,000 and a maximum fine of 
Rp10,000,000,000 (Article 98). Furthermore, in the case of negligence (Article 99), the lowest 
sanction is one year, and the maximum is three years imprisonment; the minimum fine is 
Rp1,000,000,000 and the maximum Rp3,000,000,000. 
 In addition, Plantation Law No. 18/2004, which was amended and strengthened by 
Law No. 39/201449, imposes criminal sanctions through severe fines and sentencing for burning 
opening plantations. The punishment on the offender who uses the burning method in 
opening/cultivation plantation land (Article 108) faces imprisonment for ten years and a 
maximum fine of Rp10,000,000,000. 
 
48 Undang-Undang No. 23/1997 sebagaimana terakhir diubah dengan Undang-Undang No. 32/2009 
tentang Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup.  
49 Undang-Undang No. 39/2014 tentang Perkebunan. 
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4.3 METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Content Analysis Approach  
We argue that in understand better-sanctioning decisions and determinant factors in 
evaluating the enforcement process, it is necessary to analyze and interpret court decisions in 
the case of land/forest fire using content analysis. Content analysis is one of the numerous 
research methods used to analyze text data. Content analysis is an empirically sound technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from texts that follows an exploratory process 
(Krippendorff, 2012). The content analysis flexibility for classifying a comparative and 
standard material is a fundamental rationale for the paper's assertion that the method is a 
meaningful approach to analyze the enforcement process. Moreover, the content analysis also 
context-specific in sharing interpretive orientation that is used in symbolic material requiring a 
degree of interpretation (Schreier, 2012). Furthermore, content analysis reliability is consistent 
and systematic, also transparent in the coding frame (Groeben and Rustemeyer, 1994).  
We conducted a careful document analysis using a content analysis methodology. The 
data were collected from a court case directory available online from the Indonesian Supreme 
Court50. The analysis initially screened 2,826 court case decisions on criminal cases51 related 
to environmental crimes in natural resources, environmental and plantations, and forestry. Due 
to the court data are vital determinant, we are identifying and selecting the data source that 
related to content to be analyzed with the selection process as follows:  
1. We excluded unsettled court cases or ongoing cases without a legal verdict due to a lack 
of a judicial argument. 
 
50  Indonesia Supreme Court Database page <https://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/>,10/27/2017 – 
11/20/2017 referred. 
51  Case related special environmental crime involve in natural resources: 599 cases; special 
environmental crimes involve in plantation: 2,007 cases; special crime involves in forestry: 220 cases.    
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2. We were used several keywords to locate relevant cases within the initial data. Since 
the study primarily investigates haze pollution from land/forest fire, several keywords 
were used as follows: asap dan bakar52 (haze and burning), lahan dan hutan53 (land and 
forest), and perkebunan54 (plantation). 
Through a careful search, we selected 180 criminal cases that are closely related to the focus of 
this study. 
Furthermore, we conducted an initial review of the court case content to determine the 
information available meets the objective of the investigations. The review process is as 
follows: 
1. We drop the cases that had incomplete information needed to be analyzed using 
document protocol.  For example, the case without information on the source of fire, 
reason for burning, letter of prosecution, expert testimony.  
2. We drop the case that involved in multiple court decisions from the District Court to the 
Supreme Court55. We counted and analyzed only final court case decisions56.  
 
52 In keywords bakar (burning), we were also using other words that have the same meaning as follows: 
terbakar, kebakaran, pembakaran, membakar, dibakar, api (fire).  
53 In keywords lahan dan hutan (land and forest), we were also including other word that have same 
meaning or related as follows: tanah, areal, kehutanan, kayu (wood), and gambut (peatland).   
54 In keywords perkebunan (plantation), the same with footnote No. 52 and No. 53, we also included 
other words as follows: kebun, sagu (sago), sawit (palm oil), and blok (block).  
55 To fulfil a sense of justice, the judicial system in Indonesia is divided into two levels, the first level 
of tribunal (court in original jurisdiction) namely District Court in Municipal Level and appellate courts 
(courts with appellate jurisdiction), namely High Court in Provincial Level (Article 26, Law No. 2/1986 
that had been amended by Law No.8/2004 and Law No. 49/2009 on General Tribunal). Moreover, 
Appellate court decisions can also be appealed to the Supreme Court by the parties concerned, unless 
the law determines otherwise (Article 23 and Article 26, Law No. 2/1986 that had been amended by 
Law No.8/2004 and Law No. 49/2009 on General Tribunal). 
56 In the law there are provisions governing the understanding of final decisions or decision that have 
permanent legal force (inkracht van gewijsde) relating to criminal cases, Article 2 (1) Law No. 22/2002 
concerning Clemency which stated that: 
The definition of meant by "court decisions that have permanent legal force" are: 
1. A court decision of the district court which is not appealed or appealed within the time 
determined by the Law on Criminal Procedure; 
2. Appellate court decisions that are not appealed within the period determined by the 
Law on Criminal Procedure Law; or 
3. Cassation decision. 
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In total, the analysis included 120 final cases within the period 2009-2016. In the paper, the 
observation period is the year when a court verdict is pronounced to the public by the judge in 
the courtroom. 
4.3.2 Court Decision Document Protocol  
We developed a documented protocol prepared through content analysis using QRS 
Nvivo software. The software will support organizing and managing qualitative court decision 
data from the Indonesia Supreme Court database. 
The analytical codebook protocol development starts with pilot codes to categorize the 
data and then formulate the variable. The underlying coding process in content analysis is to 
organize large quantities of text into smaller content categories (Weber, 1990). In this paper, 
the pilot variable code was follows Ozymy and Jarrel (2016). We developed five codes: Case 
Summary, Charges, and Statutes, Location of Offence, Sentencing Information, and 
Defendants, which merged from the variable of indictment and sentencing. Then, as we are 
going through highlighted the impact of environmental harm in the court decision document, 
the text or data was coded using predetermined code wherever possible. The data that could not 
be coded into one of the categories will be coded and identified also analyzed later to determine 
if they represent the analytical unit of an existing variable. The detailed final code and analytical 
units of the codebook are presented in Table 4.1.  
Once all documentation has been coded, we examined all the data within a strictly 
defined analytical unit for coding. The analysis explains a clear and concise definition of the 
analytical unit in the study on the coding sheet as a factor related to judicial enforcement. After 
that, the detailed codebook contents of the document were analyzed and categorized. The 
advantage of this approach in content analysis is that existing theory in enforcement can be 
extended further (Hsieh and Shanon, 2005).  
92 
 
TABLE 4.1 Content Analysis - Analytical Codebook on Enforcement  
Code Analytical Unit 
Case Summary  The case summary defined to the source of fire (e.g., burning the wood, the 
grass, the tools to burn), reason of burning (e.g., opening palm oil plantation, 
paddy field, burning trash, clear the land), period of burning (when the 
burning started, e.g., the date, month and year). 
Charges and Statutes  Statutes associated with Public Prosecutor Letter of Prosecution or 
Requisitoir (e.g., violation of environmental and criminal law; the proposed 
fines and imprisonment). Charges calculated by Expert Witness in the court 
(Saksi Ahli) related to Environmental Loss (e.g., carbon release, NOx, CO2, 
particle, the monetary unit of restoring the burning site) 
Defendants The background of defendants (farmer, landowners, the plantation company, 
director, estate manager, estate employee). Moreover, related legal action 
was taken by law enforcement (e.g., arrestment, detention) 
Location of Offence  Detail location of offense (e.g., peatland, plantation company area, backyard, 
forest) 
Sentencing 
Information 
An aggravating factor in judge decision (e.g., environmental harm, health 
impact, third party's loss) and other forms under the term of mengadili 
(adjudicate) like fines and imprisonment.  
 Source: Frame adopted from Ozymy and Jarrel (2016) with improvement from Author.  
4.4 FINDINGS 
In this section, the paper presents the results of the investigation of judicial decisions 
regarding land/forest fire that created severe haze pollution in Indonesia using the predefined 
content analysis frame. First, we present the case summary that generally discusses the source 
of the fire and the reason for burning. Second, to capture the dimensions of judicial decisions 
in criminal enforcement and environmental harm, this relation is presented based on 
aggravating factors in judicial sanctions. Finally, we extend the investigation of judicial 
sanctioning decisions to the types of defendants and locations of burning sites. 
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4.4.1 Summary of Background of the Case  
Previous studies and detail Chapter 1 have shown that the source of haze pollution is 
human-made burning (Wooster et al., 2012). Court decisions confirm some of this finding and 
provide a detailed picture of how fire is initiated and intensified in a short period. In most cases, 
the defendants were using gasoline and grease to burn twigs, wood waste, and dry grass. One 
of the critical findings is that most of the burning is prepared well before the fire is started. 
Twigs and grass are dried for two weeks to six months before the burning process. As a result, 
a fire mixed with wind and dry weather creates a severe short-term impact. According to court 
decisions, we find that most burnings occurred in September (23 percent), June (18 percent) 
and February (17 percent). 
The reasons for burning are one of the most extensively studied areas. Studies of court 
decision documents reveal four main categories of reasons for burning: land clearing and tree 
replanting for a palm oil plantation (confirming previous studies, e.g., Lestari et al., 2014; 
Vadrevu et al., 2014); illegal logging in conservation areas; land clearing for other plantations 
or agricultural development (e.g., rubber, corn, paddy fields, pineapple, vegetation), thereby 
confirming Langner et al. (2007); and other reasons (e.g., family conflicts and indigenous 
people traditions).  
4.4.2 Criminal Court Sanction Decisions  
Indonesian criminal law requires criminal judges to impose a sanction that is supported 
by at least two solid pieces of evidence and relies on a high level of certainty that convicted 
defendants are guilty of committing a crime (Article 183, Law No.8/1981). Moreover, in their 
decision, judges should explicitly describe the severity of the defendant's violations. The 
general findings of judicial sanctions in 120 court cases are as follows: not guilty (7 percent), 
guilty (90 percent), and other decisions (3 percent).  
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One of the best tools for achieving environmental compliance is adequate and 
consistent judicial enforcement to internalize the harm severity caused by the offense. However, 
determining the magnitude of the harm is not easy. Although the harm cannot be precisely 
quantified, the law provides judges broad discretionary freedom in deciding on the level of the 
sanction in a criminal case57. The paper captures and investigates in detail the dimension of 
environmental harm presented in the courtroom and aggravating factors that judges consider in 
their verdict. The aggravating factor that will merit a harsh sentence is one crucial element in 
the defendant punishment determined by the court decision (Article 197 (f), Law No. 8/1981). 
Table 4.2 reports the case distribution of judicial sanctions based on environmental harm as an 
aggravating factor that influences the sentencing decision.  
As shown in Table 4.2, there is an unusual pattern in which only 86 cases of a total of 
120 cases in the dataset report environmental harm as an aggravating factor of the judicial 
decision. Furthermore, the same table also shows that only 38 cases of a total of 86 cases 
specifically present the ecological recovery cost58 of environmental destruction in monetary 
units. Analyzing the details of court decisions on these 34 cases, it appears that major 
aggravating factors are a public concern (19 cases), as are third parties' monetary loss (eight 
cases). In only a small proportion of the cases did judges identify aggravating factors as 
 
57 Article 4, Article 5 and Article 53 Law No. 48/2009 on Judicial Power (Kekuasaan Kehakiman).  
58 Environmental Ministry Decree No. 13/2011 that has been amended with Ministry Decree No. 7/2014, 
define the ecological recovery cost is the cost issued to restore the ecology in the original stage before 
the occurrence of the destruction. The decree defines the ecological recovery cost due to ecological 
damage is include as follows: (1) the cost of procuring substitute materials for damaged ecosystems 
(real costs); (2) revegetation costs; (3) reservoir construction costs; (4) nutrient recycling costs; (5) waste 
decomposition costs; (6) biodiversity costs; (7) genetic resource costs; (8) carbon release costs; and (9) 
carbon reduction costs. 
In addition, Article 4 in Environmental Ministry Decree No. 13/2011 that has been amended with 
Ministry Decree No. 7/2014 also has been pointed out that the calculation of the losses is carried out by 
experts in field of Environmental Pollution and/or Damage; economic valuation of the environment. In 
the case of land/forest fire the environmental recovery cost were based on the testimony by the Expert 
Witness in court room that had been stated and comprised in court decision. 
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irresponsible actions, including not extinguishing the fire and being uncooperative during the 
trial. 
In order to put criminal fines severity comparable between the case in the dimension 
of judicial decision, the paper is controlling the fire severity through differentiate the case with 
the burning area less than two hectares destruction and more or equal than two hectares59 
destructions (severe land/forest fire). For the criminal case with a burning area of fewer than 
two hectares, the mean fine60 ranged from Rp119,684,211 for the case without identification of 
ecological recovery cost to Rp637,282,220 for the case with ecological recover cost. In an 
unexpected finding, the table presents that in the criminal case in which environmental harm 
does not serve as an aggravating factor, have a relatively high mean fine of Rp137,812,500 and 
the high maximum fine for Rp1.000.000.000 compare to other judicial decision.  
However, this pattern is changing in the criminal case with burning are more or equal 
than two hectares. The lowest mean criminal fine is in the judicial sanction without 
environmental as aggravating factor for Rp667,805,556 ranged to Rp1,749,305,364 in the case 
of environmental harm as push factor with the availability of ecological recovery cost in the 
court decision. The maximum criminal fine was considerably higher compared to the burning 
area less than two hectares: Rp5,000,000,000 for non-aggravating factors, Rp6,000,000,000 for 
cases with environmental harm as aggravating factor and Rp8,773,718,002 for case the 
availability of ecological recovery cost. As noted above, there is some preliminary evidence 
that level criminal fine tends to be increased with the level of severity of land/forest fire.  
 
59 The two hectares boundaries are based on the explanation of Article 69 Law No. 32/2009 that stated 
“controlled fire” with firebreaks to prevent the spread of fire and destruction to the surrounding land 
area are maximum of two hectares per household. These boundaries are part of local wisdom in burning 
land to be planted with local varieties of plants. 
60 The mean fine is the average criminal fine calculated by adding the environmental criminal fine and 
then divided by the number of cases in judicial sanction criteria based on environmental harm as an 
aggravating factor.  
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TABLE 4.2 Judicial Sanction Decision and Environmental Harm 
 
Environmental 
Harm NOT as 
Aggravating 
Factor 
Environmental Harm as Aggravating 
Factor 
NO 
Identification of 
Ecological 
Recovery Cost 
Case with 
Identification of 
Ecological 
Recovery Cost 
Criminal Act No. 1/1946    
Article 187 9 4 2 
Article 188 9 8 0 
Environmental Protection Management 
Law No. 23/1997 Amended by Law No. 
32/2009 
   
Article 98 8 6 14 
Article 99 1 2 3 
Plantation Law No. 18/2004 Amended by 
Law No. 39/2014 
5 24 19 
Another Act 2 4 0 
Total Number of Case 34 48 38 
Case with Burning Area < 2 Hectares    
Mean Criminal Fines (Rp) 137,812,500 119,684,211 637,282,220 
Median Criminal Fines (Rp) 0 5,000,000 60,000,000 
Maximum Criminal Fines (Rp) 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 3,000,000,000 
    
Case with Burning Area > 2 Hectares    
Mean Criminal Fines (Rp) 667,805,556 1,547,894,737 1,749,305,364 
Median Criminal Fines (Rp) 0 1,000,000,000 1,250,000,000 
Maximum Criminal Fines (Rp) 5,000,000,000 6,000,000,000 8,773,718,002 
Number of Individual Jailed  27 43 32 
Average Prison Time (Year) 1.380 1.410 1.570 
 
Ratio Fine Multiple 
for 38 Cases with Identification of Ecological Recovery Cost  
 Case with 
Burning Area 
< 2 Hectares 
Case with 
Burning Area 
> 2 Hectares 
All Cases 
Mean  0.917 0.443 0.630 
Median  0.055 0.006 0.008 
Overall 0.029 0.009 0.011 
Source: Author Calculation 
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Although this increase was shown for criminal fines, it is unclear whether the increase fines 
parallel with the increase of environmental harm.   
Another way to compare harms is to compute the relationship between monetary harm 
and criminal sanction for judicial case in which ecological recovery cost as monetary harm has 
been estimated. This relation is following Cohen's (1992) method to summarize the information 
by computing a fine multiple - the ratio between the fine in the case of ecological recovery costs 
to the ecological recovery cost as monetary environmental harm. The mean fine multiple in the 
paper is computing by the average from the ratio fine multiple every case with the identification 
of ecological recovery cost. Moreover, the term overall fine multiple is computes by the total 
imposed criminal sanction by the court divided the total ecological recovery cost as monetary 
harm.  
Table 4.2 present the relation for the 38 cases in which ecological recovery costs are 
identified; the mean fine multiple for all cases is 0.630, while the overall fine multiple for all 
cases is only 0.011 or only 1.1 percent of the ecological recovery cost. Moreover, as also shown 
in Table 4.2, the case with a burning area < 2 hectares relatively has a higher ratio fine multiple 
compare to the case with a burning area > 2 hectares.  For 38 cases convicted, the overall fine 
multiple for case less than 2 hectare is 0.029, while the overall fine multiple for case more than 
2 hectare is 0.009. That is, the defendant that punished in judicial sanctioning will only expect 
to pay a sanction of 2.9 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively, from harm as part of ecological 
recovery cost.  As a result, the gravity of the environmental harm does not equal influence 
judicial sanctioning decisions across different cases.  
4.4.3 The Variation of Defendants in Judicial Sanction Decisions   
In this section, we discuss environmental crimes from a comprehensive perspective of 
judicial sanctioning decisions by analyzing environmental harm with different types of 
defendants and locations of burning sites. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of the occupation 
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of defendants61 involved in committing burning; 69 were farmers/landowners, 23 worked in the 
private sector (plantation company – 4 cases, director – 4 cases, manager – 13 cases, estate 
employee – 2 cases), 16 were laborers, and 12 had other occupations.  
As Table 4.3 interestingly shows, the plantation company and its director and manager 
were liable for the maximum and meant of the ecological recovery cost. The maximum 
ecological recovery cost imposed on the plantation company and its manager was 
Rp1,046,018,923,000, far exceeding that imposed on other types of defendants. Furthermore, 
the plantation company was liable for the highest mean ecological recovery cost, which reached 
Rp504,617,469,900. It appears that the plantation company committed severe violations that 
posed threats to the environment. 
The robustness of the argument is also supported by the verdicts of these defendants, 
where the highest percentage of cases incurred measurable ecological recovery costs compared 
to other defendants. Although the plantation company and its manager were liable for the 
highest measurable ecological recovery cost, the maximum fine imposed on them was far less 
than that imposed on the estate employee and farmer/landowner.  
Another interesting pattern that emerges is related to the fine multiple. The overall fine 
multiple for the plantation company and its director and manager were low compared to those 
incurred by other defendants. In the case of the plantation company, the overall fine multiple is 
0.004. In other words, the plantation company was convicted in a case involving inestimable 
harm and was fined an amount that was equal only to approximately 0.400 percent of the 
ecological recovery cost. 
 
61 A director is a person who leads business functions in the plantation company. A manager is a person 
who supervises the other staff in the plantation company. (e.g., Estate Manager, Estate Supervisor, 
Divisional Manager, Plantation Chief Assistant, Operational Manager). An estate employee is a staff 
person in the plantation company. A laborer is a person who works as a wage laborer and is paid for 
maintaining the oil palm tree; he/she is typically a landless farmer. A farmer/landowner is a person who 
cultivates palm oil plantations with land ownership. 
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TABLE 4.3 Judicial Sanction Decision Based on Defendant Occupation 
 
Plantation 
Company 
Director 
Plantation 
Company 
Manager 
Plantation 
Company 
Estate 
Employee 
Laborer 
Farmer / Land 
Owner 
Others (e.g., 
Gov't Officer; 
Teacher) 
Maximum Criminal Fine (Rp) 3,000,000,000 5,000,000,000 3,000,000,000 8,773,718,000 3,000,000,000 6,000,000,000 3,000,000,000 
A. Number of Case with Fine  4  4  8  2  12  48  7  
Average Prison Time (Year) N/A 2.417 2.416 1.500 1.250 1.417 1.333 
Maximum Prison Time (Year) N/A 4.000 4.000 2.000 3.000 5.000 3.500 
B. Number of Case only 
Imprisonment  
N/A 0 0 0 3 19 5 
C. Number of Case Convicted 
Not Guilty  
0 0 5 0 1 2 0 
Total Number of Case (A+B+C) 4 4 13 2 16 69 12 
 
Case with Identification of Ecological Recovery Cost 
Mean Ecological Recovery Cost 
(Rp) 
504,617,469,900 
 
204,810,050,933 
 
408,069,716,733 
 
8,773,718,002 
 
2,068,630,924 
 
4,156,056,645 
 
9,402,095,876 
 
Maximum Ecological Recovery 
Cost (Rp) 
1,046,018,923,000 
 
439,018,402,800 
 
1,046,018,923,000 
 
8,773,718,002 
 
2,281,652,743 
 
24,638,944,370 
 
24,638,944,370 
 
Number of Case  3  3 6 1 2 20 3 
Ratio Fine Multiple        
Mean  0.008 0.003 0.005 1.000 0.003 2.130 0.635 
Median 0.008 0.001 0.006 1.000 0.003 0.651 0.001 
Overall 0.004 0.005 0.004 1.000 0.003 0.233 0.106 
Source: Author Calculation 
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Regarding the estate employee, the judges imposed the highest maximum fine, 
although the mean and maximum of the ecological recovery cost were far less than those faced 
by other types of defendants. Furthermore, the analysis finds that the maximum fine equals the 
value of the measurable ecological recovery cost, with overall fine multiple ratios of 1.000.  
Moreover, in a relatively similar pattern, the lengthiest imprisonment term, five years, 
imposed through a judicial sanction involved the farmer/landowner. The seriousness of judicial 
sanctioning on environmental harm was also reflected in the mean fine multiple, which was 
2.130 for farmer/landowner. In other words, the mean compensating fine for farmer/landowner 
was equal to approximately 213 percent of the ecological recovery cost.  
4.4.4 The Variation of Locations in Judicial Sanction Decisions   
In the next part, the analysis investigates judicial sanctions based on burning site 
locations in two significant islands. Table 4.4 distinguishes between defendants sentenced in 
Sumatra and those sentenced in Kalimantan. The paper's investigation on the enforcement of 
the Criminal and Environmental Act for haze pollution based on the burning site location will 
show the variation in judicial sanction decisions at the regional level as well as the possible 
influence of the environmental harm level.  
As shown in Table 4.4, the number of cases in Sumatra, by comparison, is observed 
more higher than in Kalimantan. Moreover, the judges also impose a significantly higher 
sanction in Sumatra relative to Kalimantan. The average criminal fine imposed on defendants 
in Sumatra and Kalimantan is Rp1,172,379,596 and Rp605,452,381, respectively. The average 
prison time also exhibits the same pattern, with a significantly higher in Sumatra than in 
Kalimantan. Furthermore, based on a detailed investigation, the paper finds that the most severe 
judicial sanction was imposed in Riau Province, Sumatra, with a fine of Rp8,773,718,000 and 
two years of imprisonment.  
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TABLE 4.4 Judicial Sanctioning Decision Based on the Location                                                   
of Environmental Offences 
 
 Sumatra Island  Kalimantan Island 
Mean Criminal Fine (Rp) 1,172,379,596  605,452,381 
Median Criminal Fine (Rp) 800,000,000 500,000 
Maximum Criminal Fine (Rp) 8,773,718,000 5,000,000,000 
A. Number of Case with Fine   71 21 
Average Prison Time (Year) 1.500 0.833 
Maximum Prison Time (Year) 4.000 5.000 
B. Number of Case only Imprisonment  20 0 
C. Number of Case Convicted Not Guilty 5 3 
Total Number of Case (A+B+C) 96 24 
Case with Identification of Ecological Recovery Cost 
Mean Ecological Recovery Cost (Rp) 115,558,894,299 192,984,214,275 
Maximum Ecological Recovery Cost (Rp) 1,046,018,923,000 285,688,135,200 
Number of Case  34 4 
Ratio Fine Multiple   
Mean  1.200 0.008 
Median 0.008 0.008 
Overall  0.012 0.004 
Source: Author Calculation 
Similar to the observation regarding defendant types, further analysis will also 
examine the relationship between the severity of the harm of haze pollution and the judicial 
sanction based on the burning location. The data distribution shows that the number of verdicts 
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for defendants and the measurable value of environmental harm is significantly higher in 
Sumatra than in Kalimantan. The maximum ecological recovery cost in Sumatra and 
Kalimantan is Rp1,046,018,9123,000 and Rp285,688,135,200. Moreover, the mean fine 
multiple for the convicted defendant in Sumatra was 1.200. Unlike the mean multiple, the 
overall ratio is only 0.012. Hence, this ratio suggests even though the majority of the judicial 
sanction is equal to the measurable environmental harm from the offense, several cases causing 
harm and receive sanction much less than the value of the harm. Hence, it is interesting to note 
that the gravity of measurable environmental harm in Sumatra was generally consistent with 
the judicial sanction. 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
The analysis and findings presented in the previous section provide a unique view of 
the judicial policy developed by criminal courts in Indonesia concerning the sanction of 
land/forest fires that create severe haze pollution as part of the enforcement of environmental 
crimes. Following Billiet et al. (2014), who noted that the severity of the sanction is expected 
to internalize the harm caused by the environmental offense, the paper's analysis finds evidence 
that the determinate factor in judicial sanctioning decisions and the seriousness of sentencing 
is inconsistent. In most of the cases, the aggravating factor in a judge's decision is the 
environmental impact of the land/forest burning. Surprisingly, as shown in Table 4.2, in 38 
cases, did the verdict identify the detailed financial harm in the form of ecological recovery 
costs. Furthermore, the sentencing pattern for all cases is not consistently influenced by the 
actual gravity of environmental harm. As another insight into the case sentencing pattern, only 
in case number 27/Pid.Sus/201562 did the judge impose an additional sanction in the verdict 
 
62 The case No.27/Pid.Sus/2015; in this case, the defendant is a plantation company (PT. NSP). The 
reason for burning is land clearing for the plantation. The burning area is in Riau Province. The judge 
decision on 01 June 2015 is guilty as charged. 
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that required defendants within one year to improve the fire prevention and mitigation system 
under the supervision of the Regional Environmental Impact Agency. The analysis suggests 
that the severity of environmental harm is not necessarily positively related to a higher judicial 
sanction. The judge mostly considers the environmental impact of land/forest fire as an 
aggravating factor in his or her judicial sanction without recognizing the core value of the harm 
and with little reflection on the gravity of the decision. 
Inspecting the relationship between the gravity of the environmental harm and the 
judicial sanction was given the variations in defendant occupations suggests that the sentencing 
patterns are also skewed, at least to a certain extent, and are less consistent with the goal of 
internalizing the harm caused by the offense. The paper presents a detailed ecological recovery 
cost breakdown as a function of different types of defendants. By establishing the seriousness 
of the environmental harm, we find that the plantation company and its director and manager 
were liable for most of the ecological recovery costs.  
We expected that judges would impose a sanction based on the seriousness of the 
destruction caused by the defendants. The paper observes that the plantation company and its 
director and manager were subject to severe sentences equal to the mean and median of the fine 
and imprisonment terms. However, the treatment of the plantation company and its director and 
manager exhibited the weakest relation between the gravity of the environmental harm and the 
fine imposed based on the mean fine multiple. Furthermore, the manager was also the highest 
defendant in the judicial line convicted, not guilty. Moreover, somewhat unexpectedly, the 
analysis finds that there are cases with an "outlier" judicial sanction imposing a fine less than 
100 million. One of the detailed punishment patterns is found in case number 
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1266.K/Pid.Sus/201463. This case, involving a director as a defendant, presented the court 
substantial evidence that before the fire, the defendants had received a warning letter from the 
Regional Environmental Impact Management Agency in Riau Province requiring them to 
improve the standard of their operating procedures and their company resources to address the 
risk of burning in the plantation. The defendants' disobedience resulted in an uncontrollable fire 
that caused an ecological recovery cost of approximately Rp87,705,875,000. Regardless of the 
defendants' disobedience and the seriousness of the environmental harm presented to the court, 
the defendants' punishment consisted of a fine of Rp100,000,000 (far less than the ecological 
recovery cost) and an imprisonment term of one year. Based on this example, although proof 
was presented in the courtroom that the director "knowingly" engaged in prohibited conduct, 
the judicial sanction failed to internalize the harm. One possible explanation for this decision is 
that the court, aware of the uncertain legal standard relating to the requirement of "knowingly 
violates," may have been relatively lenient on the defendants who contested the criminal charge.  
However, although the gravity of the environmental harm was relatively low in the 
case of the estate employee and farmer/landowner, the highest maximum fine and imprisonment 
reported were imposed on them. Furthermore, interestingly, the mean fine multiple of those 
defendants is higher, reflecting the gravity of the environmental harm. For further insight, the 
paper investigates in detail a case with a maximum fine in the judicial sanctioning decision. In 
case number 212/Pid.Sus/201464, the burning site was in the concession area of PT RPI (the 
plantation company). In this case, the defendants claimed to have conducted land clearing 
 
63 The case No. 1266.K/Pid.Sus/2014; in this case, the defendant is the director of a plantation company 
(PT. MAL). The burning area is in Riau Province. The reason for burning in the verdict is land clearing 
for a palm oil plantation. The judge decision on 05-03-2015 is guilty as charged. 
64 The case No. 212/Pid.Sus/2014; in this case, the defendant is a farmer/landowner. The reason for 
burning is an order from the landlord to clear land for the plantation. The burning area is Riau Province. 
The judge decision on 22-10-2014 is guilty as charged. 
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outside the company's plantation concession. The seriousness of the environmental harm was 
reflected in the ecological recovery cost, which amounted to Rp7,510,220,200, aligned with the 
judge imposing on the laborer a severe fine of Rp3,000,000,000 and an imprisonment term of 
three years. It is noteworthy that the judicial sanction regarding the environmental violations 
was not in line with the signature pattern, especially when compared to other individuals of the 
same type as the defendants who committed similar violations. This treatment is explained by 
the fact that in this case, the defendants were burning land/forest on or near a company 
plantation concession area. This suggests a trade-off between judicial sanctions and a robust 
possible influence by a corporate entity, leaving out consideration of the internalization of the 
environmental harm. 
The final major issue is the variation of judicial sanction decisions based on the 
burning site location. The data show that law enforcement in Sumatra is significantly higher 
than that in Kalimantan. Together with the higher mean fine multiple, this variation in Sumatra 
can be explained by the fact that pressure from organized public interest groups (e.g., 
Greenpeace, 2017) has been increasing public awareness on the devastating environmental 
conditions caused by unsustainable palm oil plantations. The effect of greater haze pollution 
concerns among the public is urging an increase in governmental efforts to prosecute actors 
who engage in environmental violations. The uneven judicial sanction decision pattern between 
Sumatra and Kalimantan complements the picture of law enforcement patterns based on 
variations in burning sites.  
All in all, the judicial process is critical for the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental law; however, this system will only work if judicial sanctions are sufficiently 
robust so that economic agents wish to avoid them (Farmer, 2007). Due to the general failure 
to internalize environmental harms, especially those related to land/forest fires, the sanction 
fails to repair the harm caused by offenders and to deter future noncompliance. Under the 
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current enforcement policies, the plantation company and its director and manager perceive the 
low risk of criminal prosecution and the possibility of being subject to minimal fines as the cost 
of doing business.  
Hameiri and Jones (2013) through the study, found that local policymakers and the 
prosecutor will tend to side with plantation companies as ways to bring development also 
continued support for the community. Additionally, Varkkey (2016) has been found that the 
patronage system within the palm oil sector would not necessarily make the government 
decisions based on what rational at the level of society but would benefit the well-connected 
minority. Therefore, well-connected companies are able to continue to use fire as a cost-
efficient way to clear land while disregarding environmental implications. Hence the role of 
cultural patronage instrumentally will be weakening state capacity to implement effective 
policies to prevent and mitigate land/forest fires and haze pollution. The higher level of 
corruption will reduce, systematically, the quality of environmental policy (Damania et al., 
2003; Het et al., 2007). It is essential, therefore, that the judiciary understands the 
environmental problem and takes the issue more seriously. The current practices thus fail to 
take affirmative steps to prevent harm to the environment. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Land/forest fires have hampered the environment through haze pollution over the last 
three decades in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Given the failure of the current enforcement 
policy to tackle the issue, criminal law enforcement is a last resort to address it, providing 
greater certainty of deterrence, severity, and celerity of punishment and thereby constituting a 
preferred policy choice. The paper uses a content analysis approach that has painted an exciting 
picture and provided insights into judicial sanctioning decisions with detailed variations in the 
defendant and burning location types.  
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The analysis in this study indicates that Indonesia's judicial sanctioning decisions in 
cases of land/forest fires diverge from the pattern suggested in the law and economics literature. 
The actual gravity of environmental harm does not consistently influence the sentencing pattern 
for all cases. The overall fine multiple is 0.011, or in other words, the convicted case involving 
land/forest fire was fined an amount that only equally to 1.1 percent of the ecological recovery 
cost. Judges mostly consider the environmental impact of land/forest fire as aggravating factors 
in their judicial sanction decisions without identifying the core value of the harm and reflecting 
it in the gravity of their sanction decision; thus, they do not adhere to the goals of environmental 
law.   
The current study also has been developed a unique view of judicial sanctioning 
decisions in Indonesia criminal courts. In particular, the gravity of the judicial sanctions 
imposed on the plantation company and its director and manager is less consistent with 
internalizing the harm caused by the offense. This finding is supported by the fact that although 
defendants had a relatively high mean and median fine, the mean fine multiple is low and is 
inconsistent in specific cases; additionally, it accounted for most, not guilty sentences. On the 
other hand, in the case of the estate employee, laborer and farmer/landowner, the judicial 
sanction generally reflected the gravity of the environmental harm. In that case, the judicial 
sanction decision was set at the maximum fine for environmental severe harm violations. With 
respect to the burning site location factor in two islands, we find that the judicial sanction policy 
in Sumatra is more stringent and more reflective of the level of the environmental harm 
compared to Kalimantan. 
To conclude, the current rigid policy does not always lead to higher levels of 
deterrence and is ineffective in internalizing environmental harm. The paper results are verified 
by the facts we provide on a general description of cases as well as case specifics. Finally, 
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because this study only discusses judicial sanctioning decisions in criminal courts, additional 
studies on enforcement considering mixed policy enforcement, influencing the monitoring and 
enforcement inland/forest fires would be useful comprehensively resolving the problem. Taking 
this into account, the next chapter will carefully investigate tax policies that influence 
environmental management during the implementation stage of the law enforcement process as 
part of mixed policy instruments for land/forest fires that create persistent haze pollution in 
Indonesia.   
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CHAPTER 5 
FISCAL CAPACITY AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTION 
ON HAZE POLLUTION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 
 
 
Haze pollution in Indonesia is a harmful environmental crisis in the Southeast Asian 
region. This paper investigates the impact of fiscal capacity in the context of a mixed 
policy instrument on haze pollution. By considering fiscal capacity, this paper 
provides an empirical analysis whereby tax enforcement may coexist and may 
complement environmental regulatory action. In the first finding, the paper 
observes evidence that an increase of 1-unit in fines as a share of GRDP imposed 
by the court decreased hotspot development by approximately 0.217 units. In the 
main finding, an increase of 1-unit Fines as a share of GRDP will reduce the 
Hotspot development as the Tax Enforcement on identified tax evasion as a share 
of GRDP increases by 1-unit. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that 
environmental regulatory action capacity should not be approached as a single 
policy due to the growing complexity of land/forest fires. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Indonesian government has enacted stringent environmental laws over the past 
several years to address land/forest fires that create severe haze pollution in the region. Haze 
pollution is defined as sufficient smoke, dust, moisture, and vapor suspended in the air to impair 
visibility (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). However, the current responses to land/forest fires are 
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not sufficiently comprehensive to address the risk of severe haze episodes in the future 
(Mudiyarso et al., 2004). Moreover, even under strict policies, the persistent problem of haze 
pollution remains due to a lack of enforcement by the appropriate regulator to address the 
problem (Varkkey, 2016). The fire65 in 2012–2016 produced 47,519 Mt of CO2, 8,809 Mt of 
particulate matter, and 108,104 Mt of CO. 
Focusing on the minimization of haze pollution, this paper primarily aims to 
investigate the effect of Indonesia's regulatory enforcement capacity on the land/forest fires, 
which create substantial emission in the southeast Asian region. According to Gajduscheck 
(2015), regulatory enforcement capacity is defined as the ability of regulatory agencies to deter 
potential externalities. Furthermore, the main approach in the regulatory enforcement model is 
based on a logical and rational choice of the regulated person and the stimuli that will drive 
people to engage in or desist from crime (Becker, 1968). 
The previous literature, pioneered by Stigler (1971), which analyzes government 
regulatory enforcement capacity, has been extensively studied. Please see, e.g., Gray and 
Shimshack (2011). The optimal level of the pivotal role of regulatory action in monitoring and 
enforcement is undoubtedly the most challenging question in this field of study. Laboratory 
research designs and empirical analyses using air pollution data have shown that interaction 
with greater enforcement and predicted inspections are critical elements in increasing 
compliance (Deily and Gray, 2007; Shadbegian and Gray, 2005). Empirical analysis by Lim 
(2016) on the effect of monitoring and enforcement by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency on criteria pollutants (NOx) indicates that sanctions have a robust deterrence impact on 
emission, where NOx concentrations decline as sanction increase. The study also shows that 
different regulatory actions can have different impacts in different contexts and that the 
 
65 Verdict Data <https://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/>,10/27/2017 – 11/20/2017 referred. 
111 
 
regulator should develop country-specific regulatory strategies to overcome externalities. As a 
result, no single model is universally applicable to all enforcement policies. 
Environmental policy interactions with the fiscal system fundamentally influence the 
cost-effectiveness of addressing climate change and meeting other social objectives (Goulder, 
2013). In the fiscal system context, limited studies are discussing the issue of current regular 
tax (e.g., income tax, value-added tax, personal income tax, land, and building tax) policy from 
the perspective of mixed policy in addressing externalities.  
Besley et al. (2013) analyzed a dynamic approach to the investment of state capacity. 
They found that low fiscal capacity in supporting a state arises from the combination of a lack 
of institutional cohesivity and political instability. Fiscal capacity represents the state's ability 
to raise taxes and monitor tax compliance. Additionally, the paper suggests that a secure budget 
base is essential for government policy implementation on the ground. A fiscal capacity 
interaction with regulatory action will magnify the deterrence of monitoring and the 
enforcement capacity. The findings of the paper undoubtedly reveal that there are potential 
needs for a mixed policy model in comprehending the regulatory enforcement action capacity 
for addressing environmental externality issues. The combination of economic policy and 
liability rules is an optimal and efficient policy in controlling environmental externalities 
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999). 
Based on existing studies of regulatory action, this paper extends the Lim (2016) model 
while considering that of Besley et al. (2013). They found that including tax policy as a fiscal 
capacity revenue source increased regulatory action capacity. There are no previous studies on 
environmental policies in which regulatory action considers taxation's role in enhancing fiscal 
capacity in addressing pollution. This broad-based policy instrument is essential for optimal 
regulatory action to function efficiently and equitably, especially in Indonesia's case. This paper 
also contributes to the field by analyzing the dependent variable using hotspots as an indicator 
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of active fire as a source of emissions that cause ozone and particulate matter (PM) pollution. 
As a result, the set of emission sources is broader than those in most previous studies.  
A hotspot66 is a term to describe a location with an active fire that releases high 
temperatures (radiation), as captured by a satellite thermal detector, and sent to a receiving 
station. Hotspot parameter data were derived from NOAA-18/19 NASA satellite imagery 
acquired during the haze period. 
Referring to the previous study on regulatory enforcement policy that has been 
ineffective in addressing haze pollution, this paper addresses the following question: What is 
the impact of fiscal capacity on mixed regulatory action regarding hotspot development, which 
creates haze pollution in Sumatra and Kalimantan? 
5.2 INDONESIA FISCAL CAPACITY 
Fiscal policy has a central role in mobilizing fiscal capacity to promote growth and in 
managing a sustainable macroeconomy through strengthening the allocation, distribution, and 
stabilization function. Hence, the potential ability of the government to raise the revenue would 
be an important factor to increase the regulatory capacity in addressing land/forest fires.  
Indonesia's fiscal policy is based on the constitution, specifically, Article 23 paragraph 
(1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The President, as the head of state, 
holds the power to manage state finances as part of a government authority. As the President's 
assistant in the financial sector, the Minister of Finance is essentially the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Article 2 (a) Law No. 17/200367 on 
States Finances describes the power of finance as follows: 
 
66  ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre data page <http://asmc.asean.org/asmc-hotspot/>, 
07/08/2017 referred. 
67 Undang-Undang No. 17 Tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara.  
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The right of the state to collect taxes, issue and circulate money, and make loans. 
 
Indonesia's state fiscal capacity is carried out through the policy in collecting the 
revenues. Therefore, an increase in government revenue from taxes will increase policy output 
through the effect of government spending. The Indonesia tax-to-GDP ratio shows a relative 
stagnation pattern from 2010 until 2017 compared to neighboring economies. Please refer to 
Figure 5.1. Indonesia's tax-to-GDP ratio in 2017 has the lowest ratio, only reaching 11.5 percent 
compared to Thailand, which reaches 17.6 percent. Moreover, the developed countries have 
greater comparable percentages; e.g., in Japan, the tax revenue generated reached 30 percent of 
GDP in 2017. 
 
                    Notes: Tax to GDP Ratio = (Tax Revenue in national currency / GDP) *100 
 
FIGURE 5.1 Cross-Country Comparison of Tax Ratio (1998–2017) 
 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistical – Asian and Pacific Economies Data and Author Calculation 
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Fiscal analysis has shown that this trend is critical and involves actively broadening 
the tax base; in the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals, the country's ability to 
mobilize revenue has a central role (Addison et al., 2018). In the next section, the paper will 
present the empirical research design of regulatory action on haze pollution in Indonesia.  
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 Empirical Research Design  
Monitoring and enforcement data are analyzed using panel data, similar to the 
approach employed by Lim (2016). That analysis overcame reverse causality by including 
a wide range of control variables, such as gross regional domestic product (GRDP) growth 
(e.g., Magat and Viscusi, 1990). This paper uses a fixed effect in controlling heterogeneity 
across the province and thus relies on differences within facilities across time for 
identification. The fixed effect has been used as a method to account for reverse causality; 
e.g., please refer to Shimshack and Ward, 2008, and Lim, 2016. The model is represented 
by the following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝓊𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Since the paper has multiple observations for each province, running the base model of 
regressions would be shown as follows: 
𝐻𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑁_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽4 𝐿𝑁_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑁_ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛾1𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿 2𝑌𝑟2013
+ 𝛿 3𝑌𝑟2014 + 𝛿 4𝑌𝑟2015 + 𝛿 5𝑌𝑟2016 +  𝓊𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
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Due to the important policy implementation in comprehending the regulatory enforcement 
action, the model includes interaction terms as follows: 
1. Adding interaction terms between Fine (Environmental Enforcement) and Budget 
Local Government (Resources Assigned Capacity in Monitoring).  
 
𝐻𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑁_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽4 𝐿𝑁_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑁_ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝜷𝟖 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒊𝒕  𝑳𝑵_𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒕𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕  +   𝛾1𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿 2𝑌𝑟2013 + 𝛿 3𝑌𝑟2014 + 𝛿 4𝑌𝑟2015
+ 𝛿 5𝑌𝑟2016 +  𝓊𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
  
2. Adding interaction terms between Fine (Environmental Enforcement) and Tax 
Enforcement (Fiscal Capacity). 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑁_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽4 𝐿𝑁_𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑁_ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝜷𝟗 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒊𝒕  𝑻𝒂𝒙𝑬𝒏𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕  +   𝛾1𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛾3𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿 2𝑌𝑟2013 + 𝛿 3𝑌𝑟2014 + 𝛿 4𝑌𝑟2015
+ 𝛿 5𝑌𝑟2016 +  𝓊𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
The value of the hotspot in the burning area i in year t is represented by 
Hotspotit. The time-invariant provincial fixed effect characteristic of the province is captured 
by 𝛼𝑖 . 𝛿 𝑡  estimates the common change/difference (to all provinces) in the hotspot 
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density as km2 from the provincial area in year t relative to the year 2012. Yr2013, 
Yr2014, Yr2015, and Yr2016 are indicator variables for the year 2013 to the year 2016. 
Another control variable Xit varying at the province level controls for the change in hotspots 
unrelated to regulatory action. The 𝛽  is the estimated regulatory action on the hotspots 
controlling for province-specific time-invariant characteristics and yearly specific effects. 
Furthermore, in this paper, the mixed regulatory action capacity is expected to reduce the 
number of hotspots; thus, the coefficient of the regulatory variable is expected to be negative. 
5.3.2 Selection of Provincial Area 
There were 34 provinces in Indonesia during the period of observation, but 80 
percent of the sources of the fires that created severe haze pollution in the region only come 
from 14 provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan Islands (Yulianti and Hayasaka, 2013). The 
high intensity of fires in the 14 provinces closely relate to the rate of degradation and 
conversion of forests and tropical peatlands. The 2012-2016 land cover68 quality index 
(Indeks Kualitas Tutupan Lahan) average ratio for both islands is among the highest 
degraded in Indonesia, with -1.39 points for Sumatra Island and -1.46 points for Kalimantan 
Island. Table 5.1 presents the ratio calculation. 
Previous studies have shown that aggressive human-made burning practices to 
clear and convert the land for palm oil plantations, especially in peatland, are a driving 
factor for haze pollution (Gaveau et al., 2014; Lestari et al., 2014). The fires on the peat 
soil area easily spread out of control and can become challenging to extinguish.  
 
68  The land cover describes the condition of the land surface appearance physically, both natural 
appearance in the form of vegetation and man-made appearance. The quality of land cover is currently 
measured based on the presence of forests as an important component in the ecosystem. In addition to 
functioning as a guardian of water management, forests also have the function of preventing soil erosion, 
regulating the climate and growing areas of various germplasm that are very valuable for the 
advancement of science and technology. The state of land cover in Indonesia is obtained from the 
interpretation, classified as forested area and non-forested area, of Landsat 8 OLI satellite imagery. The 
index calculation please refer to footnote number 33. 
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TABLE 5.1 Land Cover Quality Index in Indonesia Major Island 
Island 
Average Provincial Land Cover Quality Index 
Change 
2016 - 
2012  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
       
Sumatera  49.83 49.37 49.44 49.15 48.44 -1.39 
Kalimantan  64.13 63.42 63.43 63.40 62.67 -1.46 
Sulawesi 68.38 68.19 68.11 68.02 67.85 -0.54 
Papua 98.54 98.47 98.40 98.41 98.45 -0.09 
Indonesia 58.54 58.28 58.21 58.07 57.64 -0.89 
Source: Ministry of Environmental and Forestry  
 
The average speed for a surface peat fire (at a depth of 0-20 cm) was 92 cm per day 
and in deep peat (at a depth of 20-50 cm) was 29 cm per day (Usup et al., 2004). Heil (2007) 
demonstrates that fires in peat deposits predominate overall emission production by fires in 
Indonesia, contributing an estimated 58 percent of the total amount of carbon, 78 percent 
carbon monoxide, and 88 percent total particulate matter released throughout 1960 to 2006. 
The study highlights that the emission inventories of fire activity in Indonesia and related 
emission production are large. Thus, peat fires in Indonesia may influence the interannual 
budget of climatically and atmospherically active trace species globally. Based on those 
studies and the importance of maintaining a sustainable peatland area, the paper selected 
the province in Indonesia with the highest peatland area to investigate regulatory 
enforcement capacity in preventing the land/forest fires. The provincial peatland area and 
hotspot occurrence in the three major islands is presented in Table 5.2. The higher hotspot 
occurrence in 2012–2017 was observed within a provincial area that has a large peatland 
ecosystem area. 
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TABLE 5.2 Peatland Ecosystem and Hotspot in Provincial Area 
Province  
Hotspot 
Occurrence  
(2012 – 2017) 
Peatland Ecosystem Area 
Hectare Percentage 
Sumatra Island 9,179,066 37.90 
Riau  16,588 5,042,561 20.82 
South Sumatra  15,154 1,955,103 8.07 
Jambi 6,649 1,053,910 4.35 
North Sumatra  3,599 408,168 1.69 
Bangka Belitung 2,993 98,517 0.41 
Lampung 2,680 97,786 0.40 
Aceh  2,572 339,282 1.40 
West Sumatra 1,737 158,356 0.65 
Bengkulu  669 8,943 0.04 
Kepri  279 16,437 0.07 
Kalimantan Island  8,408,163 34.72 
West Kalimantan  19,440 2,817,262 11.63 
Central Kalimantan  16,416 4,598,745 18.99 
East and North Kalimantan  8,765 693,396 2.86 
South Kalimantan  4,388 298,758 1.23 
Papua Island  6,571,094 27.13 
INDONESIA 24,218,491 100.00 
 
Source: Ministry of Environmental and Forestry Decree No. SK.130/MENLHK/SETJEN/PKL.0/2/2017 
 
 
5.3.3 Variable Measures and Data Sources 
This study was conducted using various data on regulatory actions. The period of 
this study is 2012–2016. The dependent variables in the analysis are the number of hotspots, 
as proxies of air pollution that primarily arise from human interventions. The variable is 
measured by the density of hotspots in km2 of the provincial area. The hotspot data are from 
NOAA69 18/19 satellite imagery reported in Environmental and Forestry Statistics from the 
 
69 NOAA is National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
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Indonesia Ministry of Environment and Forestry. A hotspot is one of the most effective 
tools used by the Indonesian government in detecting land/forest fires in large areas by 
using remote sensing satellites. LAPAN70 and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry used 
NOAA-AVHRR (Advanced Very High-Resolution Radiometer) data with spatial resolution of 
1.1 km for their fire monitoring activities and research (Thoha, 2008). Ratnasari (2000) stated 
that NOAA would provide reliable data hotspots as an indicator for crown fire, surface fire, 
and ground fire.  
Even though hotspots are an indication of fire, not all hotspot information indicates 
fire, and vice versa due to interference with or limitations on the satellite data hotspot recorder. 
Therefore, field checking a hotspot is necessary to check directly on the data to confirm the 
occurrence of land/forest fires (Vetrita and Harjani, 2012). Ministry of Environmental and 
Forestry Decree No. P.8/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/3/2018 has been providing the field 
checking procedures through visual confirmation of hotspots in the case of land/forest fires. As 
a result, it can be argued that the paper employs reliable sources of data. In this paper, the 
hotspot density unit of the number of hotspots per km2 was used. The paper counts two fires 
that occur in the same km2 as two hotspots. Hence, the area with higher hotspot density is 
assumed to have a higher concentration of land/forest fires compared to the areas with lower 
numbers of hotspots. The calculation can be obtained by dividing the number of hotspot 
occurrences in the province by the provincial area. 
For the independent variable, understanding the role of regulatory agency 
enforcement capacity as a driving factor to punish violators with a long history of violations 
is critical. Karpoff et al. (2005) found that legal sanctions and enforcement are the most 
important factors in deterring environmental violations. Moreover, Stafford (2007) 
 
70 LAPAN is Indonesian National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (Lembaga Penerbangan dan 
Antariksa Nasional). 
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examined the effect of EPA sanctions on violations of hazardous waste found that violations 
decreased after the penalty, fines and custody change. The fine deterrence impact in a state 
is almost as strong as on the sanctioned plant (Shimsack and Ward, 2005). The fine imposed 
by the court for environmental crime was used to measure sanctions in deterring violations. 
The variables are measured by fine imposed for the year in a rupiah base divided by Gross 
Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in thousands of rupiah. Moreover, imprisonment as 
part of penalties is measured by number of conviction days of the defendant as enforced by 
the police, prosecutor, and judge for an environmental criminal violation as a proportion of 
the total population in thousands of people in the provincial area. The fine and 
imprisonment71 data are derived from the Indonesian Supreme Court Database72 in the case 
of land/forest fires. 
Resources Assigned Capacity in Monitoring. The availability of resources is more 
determined by the frequency with which the economic agent is monitored and inspected by 
the regulatory agency. Furthermore, the regulator possibly is motivated by budget 
constraints. According to Decker (2006), an increase in expenditure of state budget per 
facility environmental management will increase inspections and change the per capita 
emissions. Firms may feel compelled to invest more in pollution control equipment as the 
enforcement budget of the regulator increases (Regen and Seldon, 1997).  
Moreover, Colson and Menapace (2012) argued that being budget-driven could 
also generate positive spillover effects for noncompliance, which is perfectly discoverable 
 
71 Based on the persistent haze problem, Indonesia adopted a zero-burning policy in Law No.32/2009. 
The law recognizes that land/forest fire is part of criminal offences. The fine and imprisonment are 
imposed based on three major laws used to criminalize land burners in Indonesia as follows: (1) Law 
No. 1/1946 on Criminal Law (Hukum Pidana); (2) Law No. 23/1997, which was amended by Law No. 
32/2009 on Environmental Protection Management (Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan 
Hidup); and (3) Law No. 18/2004, which was amended and strengthened by Law No. 39/2014 on 
Plantation (Perkebunan). A detailed discussion on the law is presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.  
72 <https://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/>,10/27/2017–11/20/2017 referred. 
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through regulatory monitoring. The variables, Central Government Budget and Local 
Government Budget, are measures by rupiah amount of environmental function 73  in 
spending of Central Government Budget (APBN 74 ) based on province and Local 
Government Budget (APBD75); divide GRDP in thousands of rupiah. The environmental 
functions in central and local government are spending related to arrangement, 
development, monitoring, and implementation of environmental policy in tackling 
externalities (e.g., waste, land management, and pollution) (Ministry of Finance, 2019). 
Moreover, the paper relies on the spending of environmental function data as an alternative 
because a more reliable source of data related to the environmental policy enforcement 
budget was unavailable. The budget for central and local government data are from the 
Directorate General of Budget and Directorate General of Fiscal Balance 76 , Indonesia 
Ministry of Finance. 
Fiscal capacity. The availability of the budget ensures that regulatory enforcement 
capacity needs are met. The revenue from taxation ensures environmental sustainability by 
 
73  Environmental function expenditures are part of government spending in Central and Local 
Government Budget according to the function. Government expenditures are used to carry out 
government functions as follows: public service functions, defense functions and security functions, 
economic functions, housing functions and public facilities, health functions, tourism functions, 
environmental functions, religious functions, education functions, and social protection functions. 
74 APBN (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara) is approved annual government financial budgets 
by the House of Representatives (Article 1 (16), Law No. 33/2004 on Financial Balance between the 
Central Government and Regional Government (Perimbangan Keuangan Pemerintah Pusat dan 
Pemerintah Daerah). 
75 APBD (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah) is local government's annual financial budgets, 
which are jointly discussed and agreed upon by the regional government and the Regional House of 
Representatives and stipulated by a Regional Regulation. (Article 1 (17), Law No. 33/2004 on Financial 
Balance between the Central Government and Regional Government (Perimbangan Keuangan 
Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintah Daerah). 
Based on Article 13 Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government, Local Government in Provincial and 
Municipality including development planning and control implementation of public order; environmental 
control provision of public facilities and infrastructure; handling the health sector [……]. Furthermore, 
Article 22 (k) stated that one obligation of local government in implementing autonomy is protecting and 
preserving the environment.   
76 https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/informasi-publik/anggaran-dan-realisasi-keuangan-kemenkeu/?page=2 
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addressing externalities. The greater the state fiscal capacity, the greater is the ability to 
promote sustainable development (Crenshaw and Jenkins, 1996). The tax administrator's 
actions will support and strengthen regulatory action capacity. However, a combination is 
necessary to make optimal use of the instrument to provide adequate monitoring and 
enforcement in addressing environmental harm. With imperfect monitoring and fines, 
individual polluters would choose how much to pollute and how much risk of being caught 
is worth taking (Alesina and Passarelli, 2014). The absolute compliance limit shows the 
range of relevant taxes that the government can collect (Shiota, 2014).  
Tax Revenue will be used as the first variable of fiscal capacity. Tax Revenue as a 
proxy is a measure by revenue collected by the Indonesia Tax Administrator77 by rupiah 
amount as a fraction of GRDP in thousands of rupiah. The revenue is generated from Income 
Tax 78 , Value Added Tax 79 , Sales Tax on Luxury Goods, Land and Building Tax for 
Plantation Forestry and Mining 80  , and Document Duty 81 .  For the policy to operate 
effectively, it is necessary that all lawful revenues are collected. Hence, maintaining the 
level of compliance of taxpayers requires identifying noncompliance and applying 
 
77 In this paper, the administrator for the tax that is managed by the central government. The tax 
administrator is the Directorate General of Taxes under the Ministry of Finance based on the Presidential 
Decree No. 28/2015 on Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Finance Decree No. 234/PMK.01/2015 on 
Organization and Working Procedure of Ministry of Finance.  
Due to the limitations of the study on data gathering, the paper was not included by the Local Provincial 
and Municipal Tax Administrator in Indonesia. The Local Tax Administrator is based on Law No. 
18/1997, which has been amended by Law No. 34/2000, and Law No. 28/2009 on Local Tax and 
Retribution administers local taxes such as, for example, Vehicle Tax, Fee of Motor Vehicle Ownership 
Transfer, Surface Water Tax, Cigarette Tax, Hotel Tax, Restaurant Tax, Advertisement Tax, Parking 
Tax, and Street Lighting Tax, etc. (Article 2). 
78 Based on Law No. 7/1983 which has been lastly amended by Law No. 36/2008 on Income Tax (Pajak 
Penghasilan). 
79 Based on Law No. 8/1983, which has been for the third time amended by Law No. 42/2009 on Value 
Added Tax and Sales Tax on Luxury Goods (Pajak Pertambahan Nilai dan Pajak Penjualan atas 
Barang Mewah).  
80 Based on Law No. 12/1985 which has been amended by Law No. 12/1994 on Land and Building Tax 
(Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan).  
81 Based on Law No. 13/1985 on Document Duty (Bea Materai).  
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enforcement measures. Tax enforcement is the second variable in fiscal capacity. Slemrod 
(2007) has determined that the probability of being punished for noncompliance creates a 
more significant policy deterrent. The amount of tax evaded as a fraction of GRDP in 
thousands of rupiah would be the proxy of Tax Enforcement. The identification of tax 
evaded is based on the tax audit82 conducted by the Directorate General of Taxes.  
Moreover, the paper also uses the Number of Taxpayer as the third variable as a 
proxy in capturing tax regulator action in expanding the tax base. The ability of tax 
administrations to identify entities subject to a tax as the underlying structure in tax policy 
design will increase the strength factors in identifying noncompliant economic agents. Based 
on crowding theory, how a tax administration identifies a taxpayer (as external intervention) 
has an impact on the taxpayer's behavior (as intrinsic motivation) (Frey and Feld, 2002). 
The tax administration will be able to tag personal characteristics83, income, and land ownership 
records from data pool integration84 and measure the economic value of the benefits lost to 
land/forest fires. The variable is measured by the registered taxpayer as part of the population 
in the provincial area. The Tax Revenue, Tax Enforcement, and Registered Taxpayer are 
from Directorate General of Taxes, Ministry of Finance unpublished data.  
 
 
82 Based on Article 1 (25) Law No. 6/1983, which was last amended by Law No. 16/2009 on General 
Provisions and Tax Procedures (Ketentuan Umum dan Tatacara Perpajakan) and stated that the tax 
audit is a series of activities in collecting, processing data, information, and evidence to measure tax 
compliance and / or for other purposes in the context of implementing the provisions of tax legislation. 
The tax audit examines the accuracy of the income declared by a taxpayer and verifies whether the 
income is completely reported on the tax return.  
83  Following Mirrless’s concept that the optimal tax depends on the identification of personal 
characteristics (Mirrless, 1971; Arkeloff, 1978). 
84  Based on Government Regulation No.31/2012 Government Agencies (Including: National Land 
Agency and Ministry of Domestic Affairs), Institutions (Including: Bank and Financial Industry), 
Associations and other agencies must provide data to the Directorate General of Taxes at the Tax 
Administration.   
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This paper also considers the effect of haze pollution by including GRDP Growth, 
Crime Rate, and Rainfall as control variables. The GRDP is used to capture the economies 
of scale expansion that contributes to the probability of burning violations that create haze 
pollution. These variables are similar to those employed by Lim (2016) and Magat and 
Viscusi (1990). Furthermore, the crime rate is reflected as a community characteristic, 
following Earnhart (2004). The criminal activity associated with violations of regulations 
appears to influence the burning that creates haze pollution. Another control variable, 
productivity, was removed because of exceptionally poor internal consistency.  
The previous study has shown that there is a good and statistically significant 
correlation between rainfall variations and the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
phenomenon and the severity of fires in Indonesia (Hope et al., 2005; Hayasaka et al., 2014; 
Field et al., 2009; Langner and Siegert, 2008; Wooster et al., 2012). The ENSO 
phenomenon refers to cyclic variations in oceanic and atmospheric quantities across the 
equatorial Pacific Ocean, such as sea surface temperatures, convective rainfall, surface air 
pressure, and atmospheric circulation (McPhaden et al., 2006). The ENSO indices can, 
therefore, be used as a predictor for the Indonesian rainfall anomaly. The paper includes 
rainfall per km2 provincial area in the regression to control for the ENSO effect. The rainfall 
information was obtained from the Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistic.  
Figure 5.2 presents the overall precipitation and ENSO occurrence in Indonesia. 
The pattern of rainfall and ENSO occurrence for the years 2012-2016 are shown; in general, 
ENSO has an inverse relationship with rainfall. As results, when the year of ENSO 
occurrence shows a low pattern, the precipitation it reports is a high pattern.  
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FIGURE 5.2 Indonesia Precipitation and ENSO 2012-2016 
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Table 5.3 shows the details concerning the summary statistics. Moreover, Table 5.4 
presents the summary variable definitions. Table 5.3 reports mean, standard deviation, and 
minimum/maximum for the 70 observations. These tables provide an overall picture of the 
environmental enforcement action and fiscal capacity with respect to regulatory 
enforcement actions in Indonesia.  
 
TABLE 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Regulatory Action Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean (Std. Dev) Min/Max 
Hotspot  70 0.0189 (0.0163) 0.0010/0.0695 
Control Variable      
GRDP Growth 70 4.8632 (1.9148) -1.2100/8.2100 
Crime Rate (Crime) 70 0.0057 (0.0072) 0.0000/0.0496 
Rainfall (Rain) 70 0.0793 (0.0957) 0.0135/0.4201 
Environmental Policy Enforcement     
Fine  70 0.0058 (0.0143) 0.0000/0.0623 
Imprisonment (Imprist) 70 7.41e-0 (0.0000) 0.0000/0.0003 
Resources Assigned in Monitoring    
Log_Budget Central Government (CB) 70 -0.0542 (0.7057) -1.6695/1.3285 
Log_Budget Local Government (LB) 70 -0.3553 (0.6222) -1.7460/0.9312 
Fiscal Capacity     
Log_Tax Revenue (TRev) 70 3.4624 (0.4981) 2.6958/4.7428 
Tax Enforcement (TEnforce) 70 0.0262 (0.0365) 0.0000/0.1496 
Number of Taxpayer (NoTP) 70 0.0278 (0.0192) 0.0023/0.1009 
    
 
Source: Author Calculation 
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TABLE 5.4 Definition of Variables Used in The Analysis 
Variable Description 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Hotspot  The number of hotspots is measured by the density of Hotspots in km2 
of the provincial area. The hotspot data are from the Ministry of 
Environmental and Forestry. 
Hotspot = number of Hotspots from NOAA 18/19 satellite in province i 
at year t/Provincial Area i in km2 (Luas Wilayah).  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE  
  
Fine  The value fine imposed for the year in rupiah base as a share of GRDP 
(Nominal) in thousands of rupiah. The fine data are from Indonesia 
Supreme Court Decision data.  
Fine = the value of fines in environmental criminal violations on 
land/forest fire cases in province i at year t/GRDP Nominal (000) in 
province i at year t. 
Imprisonment The total number of conviction days enforced by the police, prosecutor, 
and judge for environmental criminal violators divided by the total 
population in thousands of people. The fine data are from Indonesia 
Supreme Court Decision data. 
Imprisonment = the total number of days of defendant convictions for 
environmental criminal violations on the land/forest fire case in 
province i at year t/number of populations in province i at year t. 
Budget Central 
Government 
(CB) 
The amount of environmental functions in central government spending 
based on the province as a share of GRDP (Nominal) in thousands of 
rupiah. The environmental function spending data are from the 
Directorate General of Budget. 
CB = the natural log of the total rupiah amounts of environmental 
function spending in the Central Government Budget (APBN 85 ) in 
province i at year t/GRDP Nominal (000) in province i at year t. 
Budget Local 
Government 
(LB) 
The amount of environmental functions in local government spending 
divides GRDP (Nominal) in thousands of rupiah. The environmental 
function spending data are from the Directorate General of Fiscal 
Balance. 
LB = the natural log of the total rupiah amounts of environmental 
function spending in the local government budget (APBD86) in province 
i at year t/GRDP Nominal (000) in province i at year t. 
 
85 Please refer to footnote number 74, page 121. 
86 Please refer to footnote number 75, page 121. 
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TABLE 5.4 Definition of Variables Used in The Analysis (continued) 
Variable Description 
Tax Revenue (TRev) The amount of total tax revenue administered by the Directorate General 
of Taxes as a share of GRDP (Nominal) in thousands of rupiah. The tax 
revenue data are from the Directorate General of Taxes. 
 TRev = the natural log of total rupiah amounts of Tax Revenue 
generated from Income Tax, Value Added Tax, Sales Tax on Luxury 
Goods, Land and Building Tax for Plantation Forestry and Mining and 
Document Duty in province i at year t/GRDP Nominal (000) in province 
i at year t. 
Number of 
Taxpayers (NoTP) 
The number of taxpayers is Taxpayers registered in the Directorate 
General of Taxes as part of the population in the province. The Number 
of Taxpayer data are from the Directorate General of Taxes. 
NoTP = the number of taxpayers registered in Directorate General of 
Taxes - Taxpayer Identification Number in province i at year t/number 
of populations in province i at year t. 
Tax Enforcement  The amount of tax evaded as a share of GRDP (Nominal) in thousands 
of rupiah. The tax evasion data are from the Directorate General of 
Taxes. 
TEnforce = the amount of total rupiah amounts of tax evasion identified 
by an audit conducted by the Directorate General of Taxes in province i 
at year t/GRDP Nominal (000) in province i at year t. 
GRDP Gross regional domestic product measure by growth; used to capture 
economies of scale expansion. The GRDP growth data are from the 
Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Crime Rate (Crime) The number of crimes is associated with violations of regulations as part 
of the population in the province. The crime data are from the Indonesia 
Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Rainfall (Rain) Rainfall measures the amount of rain in km2 of the provincial area. The 
rainfall data are from the Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Source: Author  
 
Table 5.5 shows the correlation between variables. Some variables report a 
statistically significant correlation—for example, Budget Local Government and Hotspot, 
Imprisonment and Hotspot, and Number of Taxpayers and Hotspot. Additionally, variable 
Rainfall and Number of Taxpayers have the highest correlation coefficient, 0.7456.  
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TABLE 5.5 Correlation between Variables 
Variable Hotspot Ln (CB) Ln (LB) Fine 
Imprison-
ment 
Ln 
(TRev) 
NoTP TEnforce GRDP Crime Rain 
            
Hotspot 1.0000           
Ln (CB) -0.1833 1.0000          
Ln (LB) -0.4126 0.4737 1.0000         
Fine -0.1054 -0.0497 0.0990 1.0000        
Imprisonment 0.2298 -0.2745 -0.2422 0.0623 1.0000       
Ln (TRev) -0.0240 0.3073 0.4095 0.1095 -0.1279 1.0000      
NoTP -0.2861 -0.3048 0.0546 -0.0206 0.0468 -0.0655 1.0000     
TEnforce -0.0679 -0.0909 0.1314 -0.1836 -0.1008 0.0332 0.1053 1.0000    
GRDP 0.0597 0.3096 0.1224 -0.3820 -0.1986 0.2206 0.1481 0.1595 1.0000   
Crime 0.1356 0.1838 0.1405 0.0996 0.1065 0.2922 -0.0834 -0.1433 0.0261 1.0000  
Rain -0.2732 -0.0639 -0.1743 -0.2101 -0.1220 0.1807 0.7456 0.0170 0.3269 -0.2825 1.0000 
Notes: Correlations that are in boldface are significant at p<0.05 
Source: Author Computation  
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5.4 REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 5.6 presents our main regression results. Because this statistical test revealed 
differences in the significance of the relationships among the variables, the paper conducts 
four separate regression analyses. Column 1 shows the base model fixed effect of regulatory 
action on the hotspot (without interaction policy and yearly effect). In Column 2, the paper 
adds the yearly effect to the model. In Column 3 and Column 4, the paper adds an interaction 
variable in the mixed regulatory enforcement action. The interaction variables are Fine X 
Budget Local Government and Fine X Tax Enforcement. In Column 3–Column 4, the yearly 
effect also enters the model of mixed regulatory enforcement actions on the hotspot. 
Moreover, in both columns, the paper removes the variable Number of Taxpayers in the 
analysis due to poor internal consistency.  
The model test (F) value in Column 1–Column 4 is less than 5 percent. The results 
of the Hausman test for Column 1–Column 4 also show that the p-value is less than 5 
percent. Thus, this paper rejects the null hypothesis. As a result, the fixed effect is the 
appropriate and correct model. Furthermore, the Wald test was performed to estimate the 
heteroscedasticity of the model, and the results show that the p-value is less than 5 percent. 
Hence, this paper rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the heteroscedastic residuals.  
The paper also tests cross-sectional dependence on whether the residuals are 
correlated across variables using Pesaran CD. The Pesaran test of cross-sectional 
independence results in Column 1–Column 4 showing a rejection of the null hypothesis; 
therefore, there is no cross-sectional dependence. The highest explanatory power was found 
in Column 4 compared to Column 1–Column 3, with an adjusted R2 of 0.557 and within an 
R2 of 0.647.  
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TABLE 5.6 Regression Coefficient of Regulatory Action 
 
Dependent Variable: Hotspot 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Constant  0.1415** 
(0.0554) 
0.1522** 
(0.0632) 
0.1490** 
(0.0658) 
0.1503** 
(0.0643) 
Control Variable      
GRDP  -0.0001 
(0.0016) 
-0.0033* 
(0.0017) 
-0.0032* 
(0.0017) 
-0.0032* 
(0.0016) 
Crime Rate (Crime) 0.5995*** 
(0.1907) 
0.4614** 
(0.2170) 
0.4499** 
(0.2084) 
0.4668** 
(0.2026) 
Rainfall (Rain) -0.1016 
(0.0886) 
-0.0345 
(0.0993) 
-0.0254 
(0.0865) 
-0.0242 
(0.0862) 
Independent Variable      
Environmental Enforcement 
• Fine  
 
-0.2112** 
(0.0832) 
 
-0.2431** 
(0.1062) 
 
-0.2443** 
(0.0994) 
 
-0.2179* 
(0.1080) 
• Imprisonment  13.1605 
(21.6343) 
-12.6339 
(28.5595) 
-16.2843 
(24.7725) 
-10.2703 
(30.0359) 
Resources Assigned Capacity in 
Monitoring 
• Ln (Budget Central 
Government)  
• Ln (Budget Local 
Government) 
 
 
0.0005  
(0.0054) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0032) 
 
 
-0.0027 
(0.0061) 
-0.0000 
(0.0032) 
 
 
-0.0024 
(0.0060) 
-0.0001 
(0.0032) 
 
 
-0.0025 
(0.0062) 
-0.0004 
(0.0033) 
Fiscal Capacity 
• Ln (Tax Revenue)  
 
• Number of Taxpayer (NoTP) 
 
• Tax Enforcement 
 
-0.0328** 
(0.0149) 
-0.1614 
(0.2297) 
-0.0698*** 
(0.0235) 
 
-0.0299* 
(0.0174) 
0.0636 
(0.1581) 
-0.0445* 
(0.0247) 
 
-0.0289 
(0.0181) 
 
 
-0.0442 
(0.0258) 
 
-0.0294* 
(0.0177) 
 
 
-0.0414 
(0.0272) 
Interactions      
• Fine X Ln (Budget Local 
Government) 
  0.0249 
(0.0861) 
 
• Fine X Tax Enforcement    -3.1476 
(2.6987) 
Marginal Effect      
• Marginal effect of Fine    -0.2532*** 
(0.0854) 
-0.3003*** 
(0.0711) 
• Marginal effect of Ln (Budget 
Local Government) 
  0.0000 
(0.0032) 
 
 
• Marginal effect of Tax 
Enforcement 
   -0.0596** 
(0.0255) 
     
Model Information      
Observation  70 70 70 70 
Province 14 14 14 14 
Adjusted R2 0.387 0.556 0.554 0.557 
Within R2 0.476 0.646 0.645 0.647 
Year Effect  N Y Y Y 
Notes: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; Huber-White robust standard errors shown in parenthesis. 
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Column 4, as shown in Table 5.6, provides evidence that the nine variables, as part 
of mixed regulatory action and control variables, have behaved as predicted with respect to 
the hotspot value. Four variables, including Fine, GRDP, Crime Rate, and Tax Revenue, 
have a significant impact on influencing the hotspot value. Moreover, the impact of Fine on 
the Hotspot development that depends on Tax Enforcement also has statistical significance. 
These effects of interaction terms on the model provide evidence for the relationship 
between enforcement variables with fiscal capacity. 
Substantively, the control variable, Crime Rate, was found to be positively significant 
in Column 1–Column 4. This finding provides strong evidence that a higher crime rate in the 
community is more likely to influence the development of hotspots. Furthermore, this 
statistical test revealed that Rainfall has a negative impact on the development of the 
hotspot. The impact was observed as statistically insignificant in the model.  
The results in the same table also indicate that a 1-unit increase in fines as a share 
of GRDP imposed by the court as part of criminal enforcement in the mixed regulatory 
action statistically significantly decreases the hotspot development based on the provincial 
area in Column 1–Column 4, respectively. These findings agree with some previous studies 
demonstrating that the presence of penalties increases compliance (Shimshack and Ward, 
2008; Lim, 2016). 
As shown in Table 5.6 for Column 4, although the local government resource assigned 
capacity in monitoring is negative, as expected, the results show lower impact and statistical 
insignificance with respect to reducing hotspots, with a value of only 0.04. However, higher 
impact and significant statistical results were observed in Column 1 and Column 2. Overall 
results confirm the study of Decker (2006), which demonstrated that an increase in the state 
environmental management budget increases the state’s aggressiveness in addressing 
environmental externalities. Unfortunately, there is no significant statistical effect on hotspot 
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reduction for central government environmental spending in Column 1, Column 2, Column 3, 
or Column 4.  
Substantively, Fiscal Capacity in Table 5.6 also indicates that a 1-unit increase in the 
ability of tax administrators to identify tax evasion (TEnforce) as a share of GRDP will decrease 
the hotspot development in the provincial area by 0.04. Moreover, 1 percent increase in Fiscal 
Capacity expanding the Tax Revenue (ln (Trev)) as a share of GRDP also being statistically 
significant (p<0.1) will decrease the hotspot development in km2 of provincial area by 0.0294. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Tax Enforcement and Tax Revenue consistently have a significant 
effect on Column 1 and Column 2.  
When the interactions term and yearly effect were computed in the model as Column 
3 and Column 4, significant improvement in the F-statistic of the regulatory enforcement model 
was observed. The model with the interaction term is when two or more independent variables 
depend on the value of one or more other variables. As a result, estimates of the marginal effects 
of the independent variable should be provided to aid in understanding the conditional 
arguments in the model (Brambor et al., 2006). The first interaction between Budget Local 
Government and Fine, as reported in Column 3, shows the effect of Fine on the Hotspot 
development that depends on Local Government Budget in spending of the Environmental 
Function, as monitoring policy exhibits a negative effect and is statistically insignificant. The 
increase of 1-unit of Fine as a share of GRDP Nominal in thousands of rupiah will reduce the 
hotspot development in km2 of provincial area by 0.253 unit as the Budget Local Government 
on environmental function spending as a share of GRDP Nominal thousands of rupiah increases 
by 1 percent.  
Interestingly, a higher average marginal effect and statistical significance (p<1%) were 
reported in Column 4, even though the coefficient on the interaction term was insignificant. The 
interaction shows that the marginal effect of Fine on the Hotspot development that depends on 
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Tax Enforcement in identified tax evasion exhibits a negative effect and is statistically 
significant. That is, an increase of 1-unit Fines as a share of GRDP Nominal in thousands of 
rupiah will reduce the Hotspot development in km2 of provincial area as the Tax Enforcement 
on identified tax evasion as a share of GRDP Nominal in thousands of rupiah increases by 1-
unit. Moreover, a negative marginal effect that is statistically significant is also observed when 
Tax Enforcement that depends on Fine reduces Hotspot development. Thus, it may be possible 
that regulatory enforcement is being primarily driven by environmental policy, and support by 
fiscal policy is effective in overcoming haze pollution.  
Enhancing the illustrations of the interaction term in Table 5.6, the paper presents a 
graphical plot of predictive margins of the interaction term in Figure 5.3. The plot on the 
interaction between Fine and Budget Local Government is presented in Figure 5.3 (a), and the 
interaction between Fine and Tax Enforcement in Figure 5.3 (b). 
 
  
(a) (b) 
FIGURE 5.3 Plot of Interaction in Predictive Margin of Regulatory Enforcement 
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Figure 5.3 (b) shows that Fine has a higher reductive effect on hotspot development 
when combined with an increase of Tax Enforcement as a fiscal policy measure in land/forest 
fire. On the other hand, in Figure 5.3 (a), Fine has a lower reductive effect on hotspot 
development when interacting within the regulatory enforcement policy as Local Budget 
Government in monitoring policy. Thus, in the mixed regulatory policy, the Fine as 
environmental enforcement policy would combine with Tax Enforcement in Fiscal policy to 
yield a higher reductive effect of hotspots in land/forest fire.  
5.5 DISCUSSION 
This paper has investigated the impact of fiscal capacity on mixed regulatory action in 
reducing hotspots that create haze pollution in Sumatera and Kalimantan. The study also reveals 
a possible interaction between policy in comprehending measures in tackling land/forest fires 
that create haze pollution in Indonesia.   
5.5.1 Single Policy Regulatory Action Impact 
In general, a significant, negative impact is found between the hotspots and fines as 
criminal penalties in deterring hotspot development. The threats of penalties play a role in 
deterring offenders from committing harmful acts. This judicial enforcement is consistent with 
theory and may reflect resource allocation by the regulator to influence deterrence at the highest 
level of law enforcement.  
However, not all provinces have a basis and capacity for criminal offenses related to 
land/forest fires. As Chapter 3 discussed, based on the field research in Riau Province and South 
Sumatra Province, the limited budget and lack of coordination of agencies create less stringent 
actual enforcement and a low detection probability. As a result, economic agents do not 
correctly receive signals not to engage in unsustainable and illegal activities due to the 
inadequacy of deterrence for environmental offenses.  
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Furthermore, a sanction imposed on a responsible defendant through monetary fines 
will influence compliance; otherwise, the “right” defendant will escape the fine and dilute 
overall policy deterrence. Moreover, the expected monetary fine has to be equal to the harm 
done so that it will also affect potential violators in the case of land/forest fires. A closely current 
policy observation related to fines and environmental harm is discussed in Chapter 4. In the 
case of land/forest fires, the actual gravity of the environmental harm does not equally influence 
the monetary fine in all cases. In particular, the gravity of the judicial sanctions imposed on the 
plantation company and its director and manager is less consistent with the goal of internalizing 
the harm caused by the offense. The patronage system within the palm oil industry has been 
weakening the state capacity for implementing effective policies related to haze pollution. 
Therefore, well-connected companies are able to continue to use fire as a cost-efficient means 
of clearing land while disregarding environmental implications (Varkkey, 2016). Thus, the fine 
as part of the sanctioning policy that the defendant suffers may not achieve the compliance goal 
initially targeted by the regulator without further policy implementation interaction using the 
so-called policy mix. The findings on regulatory enforcement lead to the concern that moving 
from a single to mixed regulatory enforcement policy should be implemented to include 
tackling the haze pollution in Indonesia. 
5.5.2 Fines and Monitoring Policy Interaction 
The previous study often emphasized that the choice of the type of policy instrument 
is critical to controlling externalities. With regard to the interaction between fines and local 
government budget as monitoring proxies, the paper results expand the previous literature. As 
mentioned previously in the regression analysis, the marginal effect of fines significantly 
influences hotspot development to depend on local government monitoring in the region. The 
finding reflects the growing importance of enforcement coordination within intragovernmental 
institutions in central and local governmental agencies. However, the wide range of local 
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environmental agencies mostly depends only on their setup of monitoring and enforcement 
strategies in tackling land/forest fires. 
Indonesia's adoption of decentralized87 government has encouraged local institutions 
to develop strategies and play a greater part in enforcing the policy. However, in the case of 
land/forest fires, the Environmental Agency, as part of the local government institution, is also 
responsible for enforcing central/local government policies related to land/forest fires. 
Moreover, the Indonesian government issued Presidential Instruction No. 16/2011, which was 
amended by Presidential Instruction No. 11/201588 to strengthen the collaboration to enhance 
mitigation and monitoring coordination in the case of land/forest fires. Unfortunately, the policy 
implementation capacity that involves vertical coordination is still too bureaucratic and slow 
and is coupled with the transfer authority to local government without proper guidance 
(Nurhidayah and Djalante, 2017; Tacconi, 2007).  
Field research results discussed in Chapter 3 show that the South Sumatra Local 
Environmental Agency only provides a monitoring and fire prevention function. The agency is 
not able to independently build law enforcement cases on land/forest fires in South Sumatra 
Province. The investigator argued that the lack of support and prioritization of land/forest fire 
cases by the provincial government had undermined the investigator role in the South Sumatra 
Environmental Agency. Therefore, budget optimization for the local environmental agencies to 
increase enforcement capacity should ensure that the above-mentioned shortcomings will not 
influence and induce noncompliance.  
 
 
 
87  Law No. 32/2004 as been amended with Law No. 23/2014 on Local Government (Pemerintah 
Daerah).  
88 Please refer to footnote number 12, page 22.  
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5.5.3 Fines and Fiscal Policy Interaction 
The implementation of a strengthened regulatory approach with a tax policy to tackle 
haze pollution will increase the probability of detection and punishment for violators of the law. 
Knorring and Welzel (1998) showed that punitive taxes may improve compliance with 
regulatory policies.  
The interaction term also shows the possibility of a joint effect through a combination 
of fines leveraged as part of environmental enforcement and tax enforcement as a fiscal capacity 
measure. The increase of the marginal effect of Fine will reduce hotspot development being 
subject to the increase of tax enforcement in identifying tax evasion. The taxpayer’s 
noncompliance will affect the government's ability to generate tax revenue. The probability of 
being punished for noncompliance is creating a significant deterrent mechanism for improving 
compliance (Slemrod, 2007). Furthermore, Park and Hyun (2003) find that the magnitude of 
the fine based on identified evasion affects compliance more strongly than the probability of a 
tax audit. Hence, this combination has an implication for further reinforcing policy integrity 
and coordination within the related Ministry and Bureaus.  
Tax administration 89  action in obtaining full knowledge of the potential gaps in 
relation to enforcement would maximize revenue. Moreover, based on the regression results, 
the tax administration's ability to generate overall tax revenue, including identifying tax 
evasion, also significantly reduces hotspot development. Tax policy is a possible means of 
linking the scale of revenue to the degree of a problem in the Indonesia National Budget 
(APBN). Maatta (2006) stated that environmental taxes are taxes with the primary purpose of 
 
89 The Presidential Instruction Decree No 16/2011, amended with No. 11/2015, stated that the Ministry 
of Finance, as part of the government institution, was involved in controlling land and forest fires. 
However, the role of the Ministry of Finance is not clearly defined in the supporting process. Moreover, 
in the Ministry of Environmental and Forestry Decree No. P.32/MenLHK/Setjen/Kum.1/3/2016 for the 
national level of coordination, the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate General of Taxes are not part 
of an organizational structure. 
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generating revenue that also have a significant positive effect on the environment. Moreover, 
regular tax policy will influence economic agents by ensuring accurate income tax liabilities, 
as government tax revenues are reportedly more significant than offsets of land/forest fire-
induced taxpayer-deductible expenses.  
Additionally, this finding suggests that a possible shift from regular taxes to 
environmental taxes, which are more challenging to evade, will increase revenue in parallel 
with the effectiveness of regulatory action capacity. Regulations to hold firms liable for 
potential damages from their pollution may improve policy compliance (Bohm and Russel, 
1985). Uncertainty on the enforcement would be reduced in advance by the provision and 
improvement of overall compliance. Furthermore, strengthening fiscal institutions would be an 
integral part of tackling corruption (IMF, 2019). The critical role of fiscal institutions in helping 
to contain corruption through the overarching impact on the public sector, such as fiscal 
transparency, is expected to correlate with the control of corruption in the palm oil industry.  
Finally, the finding of this study also seems consistent with the previous study, 
whereas the level of crime in Indonesia provides a relatively statistically significant sign on 
land/forest fires. The apparent existence of a high crime rate in the community can be attributed 
to a serious moral problem, which has received relatively little attention and is likely to 
influence the development of hotspots. Moreover, the study confirmed the previous study that 
rainfall, especially with the existence of ENSO and a quasi El Nino condition, creates massive 
and aggregate severity fires in Indonesia (Hayasaka et al., 2014; Field et al., 2009; Langner and 
Siegert, 2008; Wooster et al., 2012). 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This exploratory study is among the few papers directly investigating regulatory 
enforcement capacity based on a mixed policy instrument model. From an examination of 
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regulatory enforcement, this paper indicates support for a mixed policy in decreasing hotspot 
development. There is evidence that a 1-unit increase in fines as a share of GRDP imposed 
by the court as part of criminal enforcement in the mixed regulatory action statistically 
significantly decreases hotspot development based on provincial area by 0.217 unit.  
This paper also shows that environmental policy that depends on the interaction of tax 
policy through strengthening tax enforcement produces a statistically significant marginal 
effect on reducing hotspot development. That is, an increase of 1-unit Fines as a share of GRDP 
Nominal in thousands of rupiah will reduce the Hotspot development in km2 of provincial area 
as the Tax Enforcement on identified tax evasion as a share of GRDP Nominal in thousands of 
rupiah increases by 1-unit. Moreover, the marginal effect is also statistically significant when 
Tax Enforcement on Hotspot development that depends on Fine are also found to be negative 
and statistically significant. Consistent with the previous study, the paper also finds that the 
control variable, the crime rate, and rainfall will influence the development of the hotspot.  
Based on the findings, this paper suggests empirically possible directions for future 
Indonesian environmental policy to tackle the current policy implementation failure. The model 
assumes that environmental regulatory action capacity should not be approached as a single 
policy due to the growing complexity of land/forest fires. The policy implementation might be 
strengthened by tax enforcement through the transition to a green tax revenue 90  system. 
Building the institutional capacity for a mixed enforcement policy in different dimensions 
should be the core task in the long term. However, it will be challenging to implement 
improvement inside the bureaucratic setting and without also having government political 
support in Indonesia.  
 
90 The green tax revenue, a revenue neutral swap between an environmental tax and an existing tax, can 
create economic benefits and correct environmental externalities. The swap would reduce the distortion 
in the tax system.  
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Using the regulatory enforcement model, the research investigates the option of adding 
fiscal capacity to prevent haze pollution. However, this paper does not address the dimensions 
of fiscal capacity or the complexities of local government tax revenue. Further exploration will 
contribute to better policies that address the haze pollution issue.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The thesis draws to resolve the queries which originated from the necessity to enforce 
the comprehensive regulation in environmental management that reaching deterrence at the 
level of the environmental harm created by the violation. The theoretical framework is 
underlying that a single policy is not sufficiently flexible and resilient in addressing all 
environmental problems in all contexts. Moreover, the government will tend to choose market 
mechanisms instead of command and control regulation. Due to the scarcity of previous studies 
in which considering taxation’s role in internalizing harm create from environmental violation, 
the analysis of the practical implementation of the mixed policy still has plenty of room for 
improvement. Building the conceptual connection between the current policy implementation 
and the haze pollution, the first (Chapter 3) and second (Chapter 4) main chapter qualitatively 
investigate the deterrent effect of enforcement through expected liability and harm. To evaluate 
the mixed policy impact more systematically, the third (Chapter 5) main chapter applied 
empirical estimation using a fixed effect with including an interaction term as one of the 
independent variables. 
The main research question for the study is as follows: What is the optimal mix of 
regulatory and market-based policies for pollution control that strengthen expected liability in 
deterring the Indonesia haze pollution case? The research finding shows that prevailing 
obstacles of current single policy implementation, creating the expected liability faced by 
market-players is relatively low. Answering the research question that based on robust 
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evidence, the optimal level of liability at the level of harm created by violations are the Fine 
reflecting the gravity of harm that imposed by the regulator with sufficient budget capacity and 
supported with tax administration capabilities in ensuring the economic actor compliance with 
the tax policy.  
The current research has been showing that the fine imposed on the plantation 
company and its director and manager is less consistent compared to estate employee, laborer 
and farmer/landowner in reflecting the gravity harm caused by the offense. Moreover, the 
research also finds the in-consistency implementation of the fine policy, whereas in Sumatra is 
more stringent and more reflective of the level of the environmental harm compared to 
Kalimantan. Furthermore, the current policy also burdened with the existence of obstacles in 
the execution process of environmental recovery fines based on court verdicts that were not 
including a detailed policy-related financial mechanism in the Act on how the fines would be 
utilized.  
The data also reveal that the low detection probability highlights the inadequacy of 
deterrence for environmental offenses. On average, the Police were only able to apprehend a 
suspect in only 8.10 percent of hotspot cases in Riau Province and 0.13 percent of hotspot cases 
in South Sumatra Province. Moreover, the limited budget and lack of coordination of agencies 
also lowing the probability of being inspected. As a result, the benefit of noncompliance is 
relatively high, and noncompliance practice prevails.  
Furthermore, this paper also indicates that environmental policy that depends on the 
interaction of tax policy through strengthening the Tax Administrator's ability to identify the 
evasion and increase the tax revenue will produce a significant deterrence impact and reduce 
the hotspot.  Moreover, even though the empirical results are observed the necessity of mixed 
policy, it cannot be ignored how the patronage would be influencing and overturning the policy 
implementation in tackling environmental externalities.  
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6.2 SUMMARY RESEARCH FINDING 
Deterrence emanates from the probability of detection and the severity of sanctions. It 
is necessary to investigate the deterrent effect from the existing policy in terms of tackling the 
haze pollution. One of the significant limitations of the previous study is the failure to 
understand policy intervention related to enforcement measures by a law enforcement officer. 
The actor insights will provide a valuable part of the puzzle in helping to zoom in on the primary 
problem (Lo et al., 2006). Sub-question 1: How do insufficient power and law enforcement 
capacity hamper deterrence in South Sumatra and Riau Province? 
The in-depth interviews reveal that current regulatory enforcement is still limited in 
sending a strong signal about the punishment of intentional fire behavior. This paper contributes 
to the literature by extending Carmenta et al. (2017) finding through revealing enforcement 
obstacles that hamper deterrence and create the persistence of haze pollution at South Sumatra 
and Riau Provinces. The average apprehension by Police is only 8.10 percent, with 4.41 percent 
punished burning area in Riau Province. Moreover, South Sumatra Province, the enforcement 
coverage, and monitoring are lower compared to Riau Province, 0.13 percent, and 1.09 percent, 
respectively. The lack of special arrangements for ecological recovery costs and direct financial 
mechanisms for how fines are to be utilized has hampered the enforcement of deterrence. 
Moreover, the limited budget and lack of coordination of agencies indicate a low probability of 
being inspected. As a result, the benefit of noncompliance is relatively high, and noncompliance 
practice prevails. 
In the next part, the paper will further investigate the dimension of harm that has been 
tackling by the current enforcement policy using judicial decisions in relation to criminal 
enforcement. Given the policy failure of the current noncompliance is relatively high and 
noncompliance practice prevails, criminal law enforcement is a last resort to address it. The 
enforcement will be providing greater certainty of deterrence, severity, and celerity of 
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punishment. The paper uses a content analysis approach that has painted an exciting picture and 
provided insights into judicial sanctioning decisions with detailed variations in the defendant 
and burning location types. The paper addresses the following question: Are variations in 
judicial sanctioning decisions with respect to defendants and burning site locations influenced 
by the gravity of environmental harm in the land/forest fire case?  
The analysis indicates that Indonesia’s judicial sanctioning decisions in cases of 
land/forest fires diverge from the pattern suggested in the law and economics literature. The 
current rigid policy does not always lead to higher levels of deterrence and is ineffective in 
internalizing environmental harm for all cases. Judges mostly consider the environmental 
impact of land/forest fire as aggravating factors in their judicial sanction decisions without 
identifying the core value of the harm and reflecting it in the gravity of their sanction decision; 
thus, they do not adhere to the goals of environmental law.  In particular, the gravity of the 
judicial sanctions imposed on the plantation company and its director and manager is less 
consistent with internalizing the harm caused by the offense On the other hand, in the case of 
the estate employee, laborer and farmer/landowner, the judicial sanction generally reflected the 
gravity of the environmental harm. The judicial sanctioning on environmental harm was 
reflected in the mean compensating fine for farmer/landowner that equal to 213 percent of the 
ecological recovery cost. Thus, the judicial sanction decision was set at the maximum fine for 
environmental severe harm violations.  
With respect to the burning site location factor in two islands, we find that the judicial 
sanction policy in Sumatra is more stringent and more reflective of the level of the 
environmental harm compared to Kalimantan. This was supported by the fact that the mean fine 
multiple for the convicted defendant was 1.200. This ratio suggests that the average judicial 
sanction fine is approximately equal to the measurable environmental harm from the offense.  
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Finally, the current study fills the gap in the judicial sanctioning decision in criminal court that 
analyzed a variety of defendant occupation and extending the Billiet et al. (2014) study. 
Furthermore, in the case of land/forest in Indonesia is providing evidence the current 
enforcement of the environmental policy has been failed to mete out appropriate sanction for 
criminal offenses.  
Based on the understandings existing policy on haze pollution control, sub-question 3 
will seeks evidence mixed policy as pollution control in Indonesia. Environmental policy 
interactions with the fiscal system fundamentally influence the cost-effectiveness of addressing 
climate change and meeting other social objectives (Goulder, 2013). By considering fiscal 
capacity, this chapter will provide an empirical analysis whereby mixed regulatory policy 
between tax enforcement and the environmental policy may coexist and may complement 
regulatory action. This paper extends the Lim (2016) model while considering that of Besley et 
al. (2013), who found that including tax policy as a fiscal capacity revenue source increased 
regulatory action capacity. Sub-question 3: What is the impact of fiscal capacity on mixed 
regulatory action regarding hotspot development, which creates haze pollution in Sumatra and 
Kalimantan? 
The model of regulatory enforcement assumes that environmental regulatory action 
capacity should be approached not as a single policy due to the growing complexity of the 
land/forest fire. Moreover, from the examination, this paper indicates support for the mixed 
policy in decreasing hotspot development. There is evidence that an increase of 1-unit in fines 
as a share of GRDP imposed by the court as part of criminal enforcement in the mixed 
regulatory action statistically significantly decreases the hotspot development based on km2 
the provincial area.  
However, a higher average marginal effect and statistically significant has been shown 
through the interaction of Fine that depends on Tax Enforcement in reducing the Hotspot 
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development. That is, an increase of 1-unit Fines as a share of GRDP Nominal in thousands of 
rupiah will reduce the Hotspot development in km2 of provincial area as the Tax Enforcement 
on identified tax evasion as a share of GRDP Nominal in thousands of rupiah increases by 1-
unit. Moreover, the marginal effect also statistically significant when Tax Enforcement on the 
Hotspot development that depends on Fine is found to be negative. Consistent with the previous 
study, the paper also finds that the control variable, the criminal rate, and rainfall will influence 
the development of the hotspot.  
Based on the finding, this paper suggests empirically possible directions for future 
Indonesian environmental policy to tackling the policy implementation failure. The policy 
implementation might be strengthened by tax regulatory enforcement through the transition to 
a green tax revenue system. Building the institutional capacity for mixed enforcement policy in 
different dimensions should be the core task in the long run.  
6.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The current study is expected to contribute to practical implications in strengthening 
regulatory enforcement policies. The explorations are contributing to environmental 
management policy as follows:  
1. Strengthening policy implementation based on Law No. 32/2009 and Law No. 39/2014 
related to imposing Fine that equal fraction of the harm created and adding ecological 
recovery cost as part of state debts.    
2. Building the coordination and institutional capacity for mixed enforcement policy in 
different dimensions. The single policy and single authority would be failed to tackle the 
growing complexities of the land/forest fire.  
3. The establishment of policy regimes that include a fiscal policy for environmental 
management in tackling the haze pollution. Even though it will be challenging to implement 
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an improvement inside the bureaucratic setting and without having government also 
political support in Indonesia.  
4. The policy implementation might be strengthened by tax regulatory enforcement through: 
a) Shifting from regular taxes to environmental taxes, which more challenging to evade.  
b) Strengthening and enhancing tax enforcement that deters and identified noncompliance 
in the palm oil and forestry industry to generate revenue for the government in tackling 
the haze pollution in Indonesia. 
 
6.4 LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH  
The complexity of the policy implementation on the land/forest fire was evident by a 
variety of conditions within the enforcement policy—these complexities creating limitations 
for the research. Although the research was triggered by the necessity to enforce the 
comprehensive policy implementation, the research does not deal with evaluating the judicial 
behavior in the case of land/forest fire. These researches only investigated as far as the judicial 
decision aggravating factor on the case on land/forest fire. Hence, the behavior effect of the 
judge in the courtroom is omitted. For example, the possible corruption that influences in the 
judicial decision. Furthermore, this study concentrates on regulatory enforcement in criminal 
environmental violations. However, possibly additional judicial measures such as through class 
action and citizen suit would be more influencing the land/forest fire in the future as the people 
are more aware of the risk of pollution.  
Furthermore, the research concentrates only on the effect tax revenue generated by the 
Central Government as fiscal capacity in mixed policy enforcement to hotspot development. 
Consequently, the fiscal capacity does not capture the tax revenue generated by the Local 
Government. Despite these limitations, the findings improve some of the conclusions presented 
in existing literature in the field of environmental enforcement. The fiscal capacity improves 
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upon the quality of its regulatory enforcement, updating the enforcement deterrence in the case 
of land/forest fire. 
6.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Going forward from this current study that only discusses judicial sanctioning 
decisions in criminal courts, additional future studies considering mixed policy enforcement 
with civil procedures will be contributing to comprehensively resolving the policies that address 
the haze pollution issue. For instance, a comparative mixed judicial enforcement policy study 
with class action and citizen suit would be interesting. Even though the government has the 
primary responsibility to enforce the economic agent for their non-compliance, a citizen who is 
threatened by the risk of pollution may commence a civil penalty and litigation cost. As a result, 
the prevailing of the preventative aspect of policy enforcement to requiring polluters to modify 
their activity to be more sustainable.    
Future additional studies agenda on enforcement that was influencing the monitoring 
and enforcement of inland/forest fires would include the discussion on the complexities of local 
government tax revenue. This would help deepen understanding the comprehensive framework 
concerning the optimal mixed enforcement policy. As seen in this research, haze pollution does 
not end up simply by central government policy enforcement.  
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APPENDIX – 1 
DETAIL PROFILE OF RESPONDENT IN IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
 
No Name Current Office 
Interview 
Location / 
Date 
1. AKP. Rusyandi Zuhri 
Siregar [Main] 
Investigator - Riau Regional Police 
Pekanbaru / 
Oct 16, 2018 2. Rozi Dhasa Prima, S.IP, 
MH [Assisstant] 
Assistant Investigator - Riau Regional 
Police 
3. Syafril, SH Prosecutor - Riau High Attorney 
General Office 
Pekanbaru / 
Oct 17, 2018 
4. Made Ali, SH JIKALAHARI Coordinator  
5. Ardhi Yusuf  Investigator – Ministry of 
Environmental and Forestry  Jakarta /          
Oct 19, 2018 6. Fitrian Ardiansyah  Executive Director – IDH Sustainable 
Trade Initiative  
7. Prof. Dr. Bambang 
Hero Saharjo 
Expert in Fire Ecology - Bogor 
Agricultural University  
Bogor /          
Oct 20, 2018 
8. Asep Komarudin  Forest Campaigner - Greenpeace 
Indonesia  
Jakarta /          
Oct 23, 2018 
9. Benni Yusnan  Head of Section - Local Government 
Environmental and Forestry Agency  Palembang / 
Oct 24, 2018 10. Siti Fatimah, SH, MH Prosecutor - South Sumatra High 
Attorney General Office  
11. AKP. Priyatno, SH, SIK 
[Main] 
Investigator - South Sumatra Regional 
Police Palembang / 
Oct 25, 2018 12. AIPDA. Manijo, SH 
[Assistant] 
Investigator - South Sumatra Regional 
Police 
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 APPENDIX – 2 
CONSENT LETTER 
 
Title: Haze Pollution and Future Indonesia Environmental Policy: An Analysis of 
Enforcement Policy    
Consent Form for Interviews:  A Qualitative Sub-study on Perceptions of the 
Effectiveness of Law Enforcement 
 
 
 
  
Please, 
Initial 
box: 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood document A / B and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. [Saya telah mengkonfirmasikan telah membaca dan 
mengerti dokumen A / B dan diberikan kesempatan untuk menanyakan hal-hal 
yang kurang jelas.]   
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am not wishing to 
answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. [Saya 
memahami bahwa partisipasi dalam kegiatan ini adalah sukarela dan ketika 
saya tidak berkeinginan untuk menjawab atas pertanyaan spesifik, saya memiliki 
kebebasan untuk menolak.]  
 
 
I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I understand that 
my name will not be linked with the research materials and will not be identified 
or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research. [Saya 
memahami bahwa jawaban saya akan sangat rahasia. Saya memahami bahwa 
nama saya tidak akan ada dalam seluruh dokumen riset dan tidak akan 
diidentifikasikan dalam laporan apapun terkait riset ini.] 
 
 
Thank you for reading the Document A / B about the detail questionnaire interview sub-study. 
Please initial the boxes below to confirm that you agree with each statement: 
Terimakasih telah membaca dokumen A/B terkait detail kuesioner dalam interview sub-study.  
Mohon untuk memberikan checklist dalam kotak dibawah ini yang menunjukkan Bapak/Ibu 
menyetujui setiap pernyataan berikut: 
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I agree for this interview to be tape-recorded. I understand that the audio 
recording made of this interview will be used only for analysis and that extracts 
from the interview, from which I would not be personally identified, may be used 
in any conference presentation, report or journal article developed as a result of 
the research. I understand that no other use will be made of the recording without 
my written permission and that no one outside the research team will be allowed 
access to the original recording—[Saya menyetujui pelaksanaan wawancara ini 
direkam dalam alat perekam. Saya memahami bahwa recorder sebagai hasil dari 
interview ini hanya akan digunakan untuk analysis dan ektraksi dari proses 
wawancara, dimana saya tidak akan diidentifikasikan secara personal, akan 
digunakan dalam presentasi karya ilmiah dan penulisan jurnal ilmiah. Saya 
memahami tidak akan ada penggunaan lain tanpa memperoleh ijin secara 
tertulis dari saya. Rekaman ini tidak dapat diakses dan digunakan selain oleh 
peneliti yang bersangkutan. 
 
 
I agree that my anonymized data will be kept for future research purposes, such 
as publications related to this study after the completion of the study. [Saya 
menyetujui bahwa data anonym saya akan digunakan dalam tujuan riset 
selanjutnya seperti publikasi karya ilmiah dan penulisan disertasi untuk 
penyelesaian study.] 
 
 
I agree to take part in this interview. [Saya menyetujui untuk berpartisipasi dalam 
wawancara ini.] 
 
 
 
________________________ ________________         ___________________ 
Name of participant Date                                     Signature 
 
_________________________ __________________         __________________ 
Principal Investigator Date                                     Signature 
To be counter-signed and dated electronically for telephone interviews or in the presence of 
the participant for face to face interviews  
Copies: Once this has been signed by all parties, the participant should receive a copy of the 
signed and dated participant consent form, and the information sheet. A copy of the signed and 
dated consent form should be placed in the main project file, which must be kept in a secure 
location. 
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 APPENDIX – 3 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
No Bahasa Indonesia  English Translation 
1.  Sudah berapa lama kah Anda bertugas 
dalam menangani kebakaran hutan 
dan lahan   
 How long have you been in charge of / 
involved in handling forest and land 
fires 
2. Mohon untuk dapat menceritakan 
secara umum tentang kasus kebakaran 
hutan dan lahan 
 What is your opinion (view), in general 
terms, related to the land/forest fires 
case? 
3. Mohon untuk menjelaskan peran dari 
institusi anda / peran anda dalam 
fungsi penegakan hukum dalam 
penanggulangan kebakaran lahan?  
 Would you explain briefly related to 
your institution's role / your role in the 
law enforcement process in handling 
the land/forest fires?  
4. Apakah anda pernah mendapatkan 
pelatihan terkait proses penegakan 
hukum atas kasus kebakaran hutan / 
lahan? Dan menurut anda apakah 
telah mencukupi? 
 Have you ever received training related 
to the law enforcement process in cases 
of forest/land fires? Furthermore, in 
your opinion, do the training program 
adequate? 
5. Berdasarkan kasus kebakaran lahan 
yang pernah Anda tangani selama ini, 
apakah penyebab utama dari 
terjadinya kasus - kasus tersebut? 
 Based on the land fire case you have 
handled so far, would you explain 
further the leading cause of these 
cases? 
6. Siapakah aktor yang menjadi 
tersangka utama dari kasus tersebut? 
perusahaan atau petani? 
 Who is the main suspect in the case? 
Company or farmer? Can you 
elaborate?  
7. Menurut Anda, bagaimanakah 
perbandingan proses penegakan 
hukum kebakaran lahan pada saat ini 
dengan proses penegakan hukum 
kebakaran lahan 5 tahun yang lalu? 10 
tahun yang lalu? 
 Observing the current law enforcement 
process for land/forest fires and then 
compare to the process of law 
enforcement for land/forest fires five 
years ago? Ten years ago? What is your 
opinion? 
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8. Berdasarkan sudut pandang anda, 
apakah kebijakan terkait HUKUMAN 
bagi pelaku pembakaran lahan yang 
terdapat dalam UU 32/2009, UU 
18/2004 - UU. 39/2014, KUHP dan 
UU. 41/1999 telah mencukupi dalam 
upaya melakukan perlindungan 
lingkungan dan penegakan hukum 
dalam kasus kebakaran lahan?  
 Based on your opinion, is the policy 
related to PUNISHMENT for land 
burning actors regulated in Law 
32/2009, Law 18/2004 - Law. 39/2014, 
Criminal Code, and Law. 41/1999 
sufficiently protect the environment 
from land/forest fires cases?  
9. Menurut anda, apakah penegakan 
hukum atas pembakaran lahan dengan 
menggunakan Undang Undang 
tersebut telah memberikan efek jera 
kepada pembakar lahan? 
 Does the law enforcement on land 
burning base on the current law already 
given a deterrent effect to the violators? 
What do you think of the enforcement 
activities? 
10. Berdasarkan sudut pandang anda, 
apakah diperlukan adanya alternatif 
aturan (kebijakan) untuk dapat lebih 
meningkatkan efektifitas penegakan 
hukum terkait kebakaran lahan? 
Sebagai contoh melalui pendekatan 
ekonomi? 
 In your opinion, is there a need for 
alternative rules (policies) that can 
further enhance the effectiveness of 
law enforcement to tackle the 
land/forest fires? For example, through 
an economical approach? 
11. Terkait dengan opini dan pemikiran 
anda sebelumnya pada angka 10, 
apakah industri perkebunan (utamanya 
perkebunan kelapa sawit) saat ini 
terbebani dengan aturan terkait 
kelestarian lingkungan dalam kasus 
kebakaran lahan?  
 Concerning your previous opinions in 
point 10, is the plantation industry 
(mainly oil palm plantations) currently 
burdened with regulations related to 
environmental sustainability in the case 
of fires? 
12. [PENYIDIK – PENUNTUT UMUM] 
Berdasarkan sudut pandang anda, 
apakah aparat penegak hukum 
(utamanya instansi anda) telah 
 [INVESTIGATOR – PROSECUTOR] 
In your opinion, has law enforcement 
institution (especially your agency) 
received maximum support (budget 
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mendapatkan dukungan yang 
maksimal (dukungan anggaran 
termasuk sarana dan prasarana, 
sumber daya manusia ataupun 
kebijakan) dari PEMERINTAH PUSAT 
dalam menangani kasus kebakaran 
hutan dan lahan? 
support including facilities, 
infrastructure, human resources, or 
policies) from the CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT in handling cases of 
forest and land fires? 
13. [PENYIDIK – PENUNTUT UMUM] 
Berdasarkan sudut pandang anda, 
apakah aparat penegak hukum 
(utamanya instansi anda) telah 
mendapatkan dukungan yang 
maksimal (dukungan anggaran 
termasuk sarana dan prasarana, 
sumber daya manusia ataupun 
kebijakan) dari PEMERINTAH 
DAERAH dalam menangani kasus 
kebakaran hutan dan lahan? 
 [INVESTIGATOR – PROSECUTOR] 
In your opinion, has law enforcement 
institution (especially your agency) 
received maximum support (budget 
support including facilities, 
infrastructure, human resources or 
policies) from the LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT in handling forest 
and land fires? 
14. [PENYIDIK – PENUNTUT UMUM] 
Apakah penganggaran (DIPA) yang 
dilakukan dalam proses penegakan 
hukum utamanya terkait dengan 
kebakaran lahan telah mampu 
memberikan dukungan kapasitas yang 
memadai bagi institusi? 
 [INVESTIGATOR – PROSECUTOR] 
Has the budgeting (DIPA) carried out 
in the process of law enforcement 
mainly related to land/forest fires been 
able to provide adequate capacity 
support for institutions? 
15. Sejauh pengetahuan anda, apakah 
proses penegakan hukum yang 
memerlukan dukungan anggaran 
paling besar dalam kasus kebakaran 
lahan? 
 As far as your knowledge, what is the 
process in law enforcement that 
requires the most significant budget 
support in the case of land fires? 
16. Apakah peningkatan anggaran akan 
mampu meningkatkan kapasitas 
 Are the budget increase able to 
simultaneously increase the capacity of 
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institusi dalam memberikan efek 
deterrent yang lebih besar dalam 
proses penegakan hukum  
institutions to provide a more 
significant deterrent effect in the law 
enforcement process 
17. Bagaimana menurut anda apabila 
peningkatan anggaran tersebut 
dibiayai melalui perluasan pengenaan 
pajak atas perusahaan/individu yang 
melakukan pembakaran lahan?  
 What do you think if the increased 
budget is financed through the 
expansion of taxation on 
companies/individuals who burn land? 
18. [PENUNTUT UMUM] Berdasarkan 
pengalaman anda, dalam proses 
penuntutan di muka pengadilan hal 
apakah yang menjadi kendala utama 
untuk dapat melakukan pembuktian 
atas kebakaran lahan yang terjadi 
(baik melalui tindak pidana ataupun 
perdata lingkungan hidup)? 
 [PROSECUTOR] Based on your 
experience, in the prosecution process 
in court, what is the main obstacle in 
being able to prove land/forest fire 
violation (either through criminal acts 
or environmental civil)? 
19. [PENYIDIK] Sejauh pengetahuan 
anda, bagaimana proses koordinasi 
antara Penyidik pada KemenLHK 
(Balai Pengamanan dan Penegakan 
Hukum) dengan Penyidik pada Dinas 
di Pemda dan Kepolisian dalam 
penanganan kasus kebakaran hutan? 
 [INVESTIGATOR] Based on your 
knowledge, what is the process of 
coordination between Investigators at 
the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry and the Investigator at the 
Local Government and the Police in 
handling forest fires? 
20. Apakah hambatan yang secara 
siginifikan mempengaruhi 
KOORDINASI dalam proses 
penegakan hukum menanggulangi 
kasus kebakaran lahan?  
 What are the obstacles that 
significantly affect COORDINATION 
in the law enforcement process in 
dealing with cases of land fires?  
21. Berdasarkan kasus kebakaran lahan 
yang pernah Anda tangani, pernahkah 
ada "pengaruh" (politik, masyarakat, 
pimpinan) untuk mempengaruhi proses 
 Based on the land fire case you have 
handled, has there ever been an 
"influence" (politics, community, 
leadership) to influence the law 
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penegakan hukum yang dilakukan?  --
> Mohon untuk dapat menjelaskan 
secara lebih detail. 
enforcement process carried out? -> 
Please be able to explain in more detail 
by the example. 
22. Apakah terdapat saran ataupun 
pendapat lain terkait efektifitas 
penegakan hukum atas peristiwa 
kebakaran lahan yang ingin anda 
sampaikan? 
 Are there any other suggestions or 
opinions regarding the effectiveness of 
law enforcement on land fire incidents 
that you want to convey? 
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APPENDIX – 4 
WORD CLOUD IN THE COURT VERDICT DATA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analyzing the word frequency using Nvivo-12 will helps the concepts can be found in file 
demographic. Gathering all the content, the appendix presented lahan (land), saksi (witness), 
and kebakaran (fire) have emerged as the most frequent words. 
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APPENDIX – 5 
CASE NODES IN Nvivo - 12   
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APPENDIX – 6 
EXPLORE DIAGRAM NODES IN Nvivo - 12   
 
 
 
